tristate "CIFS support (advanced network filesystem, SMBFS successor)"
depends on INET
select NLS
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_MD5
+ select CRYPTO_ARC4
help
This is the client VFS module for the Common Internet File System
(CIFS) protocol which is the successor to the Server Message Block
unsigned char *p24);
static int cifs_calculate_signature(const struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu,
- const struct session_key *key, char *signature)
+ struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *signature)
{
- struct MD5Context context;
+ int rc;
- if ((cifs_pdu == NULL) || (signature == NULL) || (key == NULL))
+ if (cifs_pdu == NULL || signature == NULL || server == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
- cifs_MD5_init(&context);
- cifs_MD5_update(&context, (char *)&key->data, key->len);
- cifs_MD5_update(&context, cifs_pdu->Protocol, cifs_pdu->smb_buf_length);
+ if (!server->secmech.sdescmd5) {
+ cERROR(1, "%s: Can't generate signature\n", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_init(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash);
+ if (rc) {
+ cERROR(1, "%s: Oould not init md5\n", __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
+ server->session_key.response, server->session_key.len);
+
+ crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
+ cifs_pdu->Protocol, cifs_pdu->smb_buf_length);
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_final(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash, signature);
- cifs_MD5_final(signature, &context);
return 0;
}
server->sequence_number++;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
- rc = cifs_calculate_signature(cifs_pdu, &server->session_key,
- smb_signature);
+ rc = cifs_calculate_signature(cifs_pdu, server, smb_signature);
if (rc)
memset(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 0, 8);
else
}
static int cifs_calc_signature2(const struct kvec *iov, int n_vec,
- const struct session_key *key, char *signature)
+ struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *signature)
{
- struct MD5Context context;
int i;
+ int rc;
- if ((iov == NULL) || (signature == NULL) || (key == NULL))
+ if (iov == NULL || signature == NULL || server == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
- cifs_MD5_init(&context);
- cifs_MD5_update(&context, (char *)&key->data, key->len);
+ if (!server->secmech.sdescmd5) {
+ cERROR(1, "%s: Can't generate signature\n", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_init(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash);
+ if (rc) {
+ cERROR(1, "%s: Oould not init md5\n", __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
+ server->session_key.response, server->session_key.len);
+
for (i = 0; i < n_vec; i++) {
if (iov[i].iov_len == 0)
continue;
if (i == 0) {
if (iov[0].iov_len <= 8) /* cmd field at offset 9 */
break; /* nothing to sign or corrupt header */
- cifs_MD5_update(&context, iov[0].iov_base+4,
- iov[0].iov_len-4);
+ crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
+ iov[i].iov_base + 4, iov[i].iov_len - 4);
} else
- cifs_MD5_update(&context, iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len);
+ crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
+ iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len);
}
- cifs_MD5_final(signature, &context);
+ rc = crypto_shash_final(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash, signature);
- return 0;
+ return rc;
}
-
int cifs_sign_smb2(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
__u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number)
{
server->sequence_number++;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
- rc = cifs_calc_signature2(iov, n_vec, &server->session_key,
- smb_signature);
+ rc = cifs_calc_signature2(iov, n_vec, server, smb_signature);
if (rc)
memset(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 0, 8);
else
}
int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu,
- const struct session_key *session_key,
+ struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
__u32 expected_sequence_number)
{
unsigned int rc;
char server_response_sig[8];
char what_we_think_sig_should_be[20];
- if (cifs_pdu == NULL || session_key == NULL)
+ if (cifs_pdu == NULL || server == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
if (cifs_pdu->Command == SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE)
cpu_to_le32(expected_sequence_number);
cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
- rc = cifs_calculate_signature(cifs_pdu, session_key,
+ rc = cifs_calculate_signature(cifs_pdu, server,
what_we_think_sig_should_be);
if (rc)
}
-/* We fill in key by putting in 40 byte array which was allocated by caller */
-int cifs_calculate_session_key(struct session_key *key, const char *rn,
- const char *password)
+/* first calculate 24 bytes ntlm response and then 16 byte session key */
+int setup_ntlm_response(struct cifsSesInfo *ses)
{
- char temp_key[16];
- if ((key == NULL) || (rn == NULL))
+ unsigned int temp_len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
+ char temp_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE];
+
+ if (!ses)
return -EINVAL;
- E_md4hash(password, temp_key);
- mdfour(key->data.ntlm, temp_key, 16);
- memcpy(key->data.ntlm+16, rn, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
- key->len = 40;
+ ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(temp_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
+ cERROR(1, "NTLM can't allocate (%u bytes) memory", temp_len);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ ses->auth_key.len = temp_len;
+
+ SMBNTencrypt(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
+ ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+
+ E_md4hash(ses->password, temp_key);
+ mdfour(ses->auth_key.response, temp_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+
return 0;
}
* two times the unicode length of a server name +
* size of a timestamp (which is 8 bytes).
*/
- ses->tilen = size + 2 * (2 * dlen) + 2 * (2 * wlen) + 8;
- ses->tiblob = kzalloc(ses->tilen, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ses->tiblob) {
- ses->tilen = 0;
+ ses->auth_key.len = size + 2 * (2 * dlen) + 2 * (2 * wlen) + 8;
+ ses->auth_key.response = kzalloc(ses->auth_key.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
+ ses->auth_key.len = 0;
cERROR(1, "Challenge target info allocation failure");
return -ENOMEM;
}
- blobptr = ses->tiblob;
+ blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
attrptr->type = cpu_to_le16(NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME);
* about target string i.e. for some, just user name might suffice.
*/
static int
-find_domain_name(struct cifsSesInfo *ses)
+find_domain_name(struct cifsSesInfo *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
unsigned int attrsize;
unsigned int type;
unsigned char *blobend;
struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
- if (!ses->tilen || !ses->tiblob)
+ if (!ses->auth_key.len || !ses->auth_key.response)
return 0;
- blobptr = ses->tiblob;
- blobend = ses->tiblob + ses->tilen;
+ blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
+ blobend = blobptr + ses->auth_key.len;
while (blobptr + onesize < blobend) {
attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
if (!attrsize)
break;
if (!ses->domainName) {
- struct nls_table *default_nls;
ses->domainName =
kmalloc(attrsize + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ses->domainName)
return -ENOMEM;
- default_nls = load_nls_default();
cifs_from_ucs2(ses->domainName,
(__le16 *)blobptr, attrsize, attrsize,
- default_nls, false);
- unload_nls(default_nls);
+ nls_cp, false);
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
-static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
+static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifsSesInfo *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc = 0;
int len;
- char nt_hash[16];
- struct HMACMD5Context *pctxt;
+ char nt_hash[CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE];
wchar_t *user;
wchar_t *domain;
+ wchar_t *server;
- pctxt = kmalloc(sizeof(struct HMACMD5Context), GFP_KERNEL);
-
- if (pctxt == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
+ cERROR(1, "calc_ntlmv2_hash: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
/* calculate md4 hash of password */
E_md4hash(ses->password, nt_hash);
- /* convert Domainname to unicode and uppercase */
- hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(nt_hash, 16, pctxt);
+ crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5, nt_hash,
+ CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE);
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
+ if (rc) {
+ cERROR(1, "calc_ntlmv2_hash: could not init hmacmd5\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
/* convert ses->userName to unicode and uppercase */
len = strlen(ses->userName);
user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (user == NULL)
+ if (user == NULL) {
+ cERROR(1, "calc_ntlmv2_hash: user mem alloc failure\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
goto calc_exit_2;
+ }
len = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)user, ses->userName, len, nls_cp);
UniStrupr(user);
- hmac_md5_update((char *)user, 2*len, pctxt);
+
+ crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ (char *)user, 2 * len);
/* convert ses->domainName to unicode and uppercase */
if (ses->domainName) {
len = strlen(ses->domainName);
domain = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (domain == NULL)
+ if (domain == NULL) {
+ cERROR(1, "calc_ntlmv2_hash: domain mem alloc failure");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
goto calc_exit_1;
+ }
len = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)domain, ses->domainName, len,
nls_cp);
- /* the following line was removed since it didn't work well
- with lower cased domain name that passed as an option.
- Maybe converting the domain name earlier makes sense */
- /* UniStrupr(domain); */
-
- hmac_md5_update((char *)domain, 2*len, pctxt);
-
+ crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ (char *)domain, 2 * len);
kfree(domain);
+ } else if (ses->serverName) {
+ len = strlen(ses->serverName);
+
+ server = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (server == NULL) {
+ cERROR(1, "calc_ntlmv2_hash: server mem alloc failure");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto calc_exit_1;
+ }
+ len = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)server, ses->serverName, len,
+ nls_cp);
+ crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ (char *)server, 2 * len);
+ kfree(server);
}
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ ntlmv2_hash);
+
calc_exit_1:
kfree(user);
calc_exit_2:
- /* BB FIXME what about bytes 24 through 40 of the signing key?
- compare with the NTLM example */
- hmac_md5_final(ses->ntlmv2_hash, pctxt);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifsSesInfo *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash)
+{
+ int rc;
+ unsigned int offset = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + 8;
+
+ if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
+ cERROR(1, "calc_ntlmv2_hash: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+ ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
+ if (rc) {
+ cERROR(1, "CalcNTLMv2_response: could not init hmacmd5");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (ses->server->secType == RawNTLMSSP)
+ memcpy(ses->auth_key.response + offset,
+ ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
+ else
+ memcpy(ses->auth_key.response + offset,
+ ses->server->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
+ crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ ses->auth_key.response + offset, ses->auth_key.len - offset);
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
- kfree(pctxt);
return rc;
}
+
int
-setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifsSesInfo *ses, char *resp_buf,
- const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifsSesInfo *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc;
- struct ntlmv2_resp *buf = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)resp_buf;
- struct HMACMD5Context context;
-
- buf->blob_signature = cpu_to_le32(0x00000101);
- buf->reserved = 0;
- buf->time = cpu_to_le64(cifs_UnixTimeToNT(CURRENT_TIME));
- get_random_bytes(&buf->client_chal, sizeof(buf->client_chal));
- buf->reserved2 = 0;
+ int baselen;
+ unsigned int tilen;
+ struct ntlmv2_resp *buf;
+ char ntlmv2_hash[16];
+ unsigned char *tiblob = NULL; /* target info blob */
if (ses->server->secType == RawNTLMSSP) {
if (!ses->domainName) {
- rc = find_domain_name(ses);
+ rc = find_domain_name(ses, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cERROR(1, "error %d finding domain name", rc);
goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
rc = build_avpair_blob(ses, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cERROR(1, "error %d building av pair blob", rc);
- return rc;
+ goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
}
}
- /* calculate buf->ntlmv2_hash */
- rc = calc_ntlmv2_hash(ses, nls_cp);
+ baselen = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
+ tilen = ses->auth_key.len;
+ tiblob = ses->auth_key.response;
+
+ ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(baselen + tilen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
+ rc = ENOMEM;
+ ses->auth_key.len = 0;
+ cERROR(1, "%s: Can't allocate auth blob", __func__);
+ goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+ }
+ ses->auth_key.len += baselen;
+
+ buf = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)
+ (ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ buf->blob_signature = cpu_to_le32(0x00000101);
+ buf->reserved = 0;
+ buf->time = cpu_to_le64(cifs_UnixTimeToNT(CURRENT_TIME));
+ get_random_bytes(&buf->client_chal, sizeof(buf->client_chal));
+ buf->reserved2 = 0;
+
+ memcpy(ses->auth_key.response + baselen, tiblob, tilen);
+
+ /* calculate ntlmv2_hash */
+ rc = calc_ntlmv2_hash(ses, ntlmv2_hash, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cERROR(1, "could not get v2 hash rc %d", rc);
goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
}
- CalcNTLMv2_response(ses, resp_buf);
+
+ /* calculate first part of the client response (CR1) */
+ rc = CalcNTLMv2_response(ses, ntlmv2_hash);
+ if (rc) {
+ cERROR(1, "Could not calculate CR1 rc: %d", rc);
+ goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+ }
/* now calculate the session key for NTLMv2 */
- hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(ses->ntlmv2_hash, 16, &context);
- hmac_md5_update(resp_buf, 16, &context);
- hmac_md5_final(ses->auth_key.data.ntlmv2.key, &context);
+ crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+ ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
+ if (rc) {
+ cERROR(1, "%s: Could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
+ goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+ }
- memcpy(&ses->auth_key.data.ntlmv2.resp, resp_buf,
- sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp));
- ses->auth_key.len = 16 + sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
+ crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
+ CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
- return 0;
+ rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+ ses->auth_key.response);
setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret:
- kfree(ses->tiblob);
- ses->tiblob = NULL;
- ses->tilen = 0;
+ kfree(tiblob);
return rc;
}
-void CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
- char *v2_session_response)
+int
+calc_seckey(struct cifsSesInfo *ses)
{
- struct HMACMD5Context context;
- /* rest of v2 struct already generated */
- memcpy(v2_session_response + 8, ses->cryptKey, 8);
- hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(ses->ntlmv2_hash, 16, &context);
+ int rc;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_arc4;
+ struct scatterlist sgin, sgout;
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+ unsigned char sec_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE]; /* a nonce */
+
+ get_random_bytes(sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+
+ tfm_arc4 = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (!tfm_arc4 || IS_ERR(tfm_arc4)) {
+ cERROR(1, "could not allocate crypto API arc4\n");
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm_arc4);
+ }
- hmac_md5_update(v2_session_response+8,
- sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp) - 8, &context);
+ desc.tfm = tfm_arc4;
- if (ses->tilen)
- hmac_md5_update(ses->tiblob, ses->tilen, &context);
+ crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm_arc4, ses->auth_key.response,
+ CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
- hmac_md5_final(v2_session_response, &context);
-/* cifs_dump_mem("v2_sess_rsp: ", v2_session_response, 32); */
+ sg_init_one(&sgin, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ sg_init_one(&sgout, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
+
+ rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sgout, &sgin, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
+ if (rc) {
+ cERROR(1, "could not encrypt session key rc: %d\n", rc);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_arc4);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* make secondary_key/nonce as session key */
+ memcpy(ses->auth_key.response, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ /* and make len as that of session key only */
+ ses->auth_key.len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_arc4);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+cifs_crypto_shash_release(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
+{
+ if (server->secmech.md5)
+ crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5);
+
+ if (server->secmech.hmacmd5)
+ crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+
+ kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5);
+
+ kfree(server->secmech.sdescmd5);
+}
+
+int
+cifs_crypto_shash_allocate(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
+{
+ int rc;
+ unsigned int size;
+
+ server->secmech.hmacmd5 = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(md5)", 0, 0);
+ if (!server->secmech.hmacmd5 ||
+ IS_ERR(server->secmech.hmacmd5)) {
+ cERROR(1, "could not allocate crypto hmacmd5\n");
+ return PTR_ERR(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+ }
+
+ server->secmech.md5 = crypto_alloc_shash("md5", 0, 0);
+ if (!server->secmech.md5 || IS_ERR(server->secmech.md5)) {
+ cERROR(1, "could not allocate crypto md5\n");
+ rc = PTR_ERR(server->secmech.md5);
+ goto crypto_allocate_md5_fail;
+ }
+
+ size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+ crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+ server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
+ cERROR(1, "cifs_crypto_shash_allocate: can't alloc hmacmd5\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto crypto_allocate_hmacmd5_sdesc_fail;
+ }
+ server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash.tfm = server->secmech.hmacmd5;
+ server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash.flags = 0x0;
+
+
+ size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+ crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.md5);
+ server->secmech.sdescmd5 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!server->secmech.sdescmd5) {
+ cERROR(1, "cifs_crypto_shash_allocate: can't alloc md5\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto crypto_allocate_md5_sdesc_fail;
+ }
+ server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash.tfm = server->secmech.md5;
+ server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash.flags = 0x0;
+
+ return 0;
+
+crypto_allocate_md5_sdesc_fail:
+ kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5);
+
+crypto_allocate_hmacmd5_sdesc_fail:
+ crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5);
+
+crypto_allocate_md5_fail:
+ crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+
+ return rc;
}
return NULL;
cifs_inode->cifsAttrs = 0x20; /* default */
cifs_inode->time = 0;
- cifs_inode->write_behind_rc = 0;
/* Until the file is open and we have gotten oplock
info back from the server, can not assume caching of
file data or metadata */
extern const struct export_operations cifs_export_ops;
#endif /* EXPERIMENTAL */
-#define CIFS_VERSION "1.67"
+#define CIFS_VERSION "1.68"
#endif /* _CIFSFS_H */
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include "cifs_fs_sb.h"
#include "cifsacl.h"
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+
/*
* The sizes of various internal tables and strings
*/
* CIFS vfs client Status information (based on what we know.)
*/
- /* associated with each tcp and smb session */
+/* associated with each tcp and smb session */
enum statusEnum {
CifsNew = 0,
CifsGood,
struct session_key {
unsigned int len;
- union {
- char ntlm[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + 16];
- char krb5[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + 16]; /* BB: length correct? */
- struct {
- char key[16];
- struct ntlmv2_resp resp;
- } ntlmv2;
- } data;
+ char *response;
+};
+
+/* crypto security descriptor definition */
+struct sdesc {
+ struct shash_desc shash;
+ char ctx[];
+};
+
+/* crypto hashing related structure/fields, not specific to a sec mech */
+struct cifs_secmech {
+ struct crypto_shash *hmacmd5; /* hmac-md5 hash function */
+ struct crypto_shash *md5; /* md5 hash function */
+ struct sdesc *sdeschmacmd5; /* ctxt to generate ntlmv2 hash, CR1 */
+ struct sdesc *sdescmd5; /* ctxt to generate cifs/smb signature */
+};
+
+/* per smb session structure/fields */
+struct ntlmssp_auth {
+ __u32 client_flags; /* sent by client in type 1 ntlmsssp exchange */
+ __u32 server_flags; /* sent by server in type 2 ntlmssp exchange */
+ unsigned char ciphertext[CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE]; /* sent to server */
+ char cryptkey[CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE]; /* used by ntlmssp */
};
struct cifs_cred {
int capabilities; /* allow selective disabling of caps by smb sess */
int timeAdj; /* Adjust for difference in server time zone in sec */
__u16 CurrentMid; /* multiplex id - rotating counter */
+ char cryptkey[CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE]; /* used by ntlm, ntlmv2 etc */
/* 16th byte of RFC1001 workstation name is always null */
char workstation_RFC1001_name[RFC1001_NAME_LEN_WITH_NULL];
__u32 sequence_number; /* needed for CIFS PDU signature */
struct session_key session_key;
unsigned long lstrp; /* when we got last response from this server */
u16 dialect; /* dialect index that server chose */
+ struct cifs_secmech secmech; /* crypto sec mech functs, descriptors */
/* extended security flavors that server supports */
bool sec_kerberos; /* supports plain Kerberos */
bool sec_mskerberos; /* supports legacy MS Kerberos */
char userName[MAX_USERNAME_SIZE + 1];
char *domainName;
char *password;
- char cryptKey[CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE];
struct session_key auth_key;
- char ntlmv2_hash[16];
- unsigned int tilen; /* length of the target info blob */
- unsigned char *tiblob; /* target info blob in challenge response */
+ struct ntlmssp_auth *ntlmssp; /* ciphertext, flags, server challenge */
bool need_reconnect:1; /* connection reset, uid now invalid */
};
/* no more than one of the following three session flags may be set */
struct list_head llist; /* list of byte range locks we have. */
bool invalidHandle:1; /* file closed via session abend */
bool oplock_break_cancelled:1;
- atomic_t count; /* reference count */
+ int count; /* refcount protected by cifs_file_list_lock */
struct mutex fh_mutex; /* prevents reopen race after dead ses*/
struct cifs_search_info srch_inf;
struct work_struct oplock_break; /* work for oplock breaks */
};
-/* Take a reference on the file private data */
+/*
+ * Take a reference on the file private data. Must be called with
+ * cifs_file_list_lock held.
+ */
static inline void cifsFileInfo_get(struct cifsFileInfo *cifs_file)
{
- atomic_inc(&cifs_file->count);
+ ++cifs_file->count;
}
void cifsFileInfo_put(struct cifsFileInfo *cifs_file);
struct list_head lockList;
/* BB add in lists for dirty pages i.e. write caching info for oplock */
struct list_head openFileList;
- int write_behind_rc;
__u32 cifsAttrs; /* e.g. DOS archive bit, sparse, compressed, system */
unsigned long time; /* jiffies of last update/check of inode */
bool clientCanCacheRead:1; /* read oplock */
* GlobalMid_Lock protects:
* list operations on pending_mid_q and oplockQ
* updates to XID counters, multiplex id and SMB sequence numbers
- * GlobalSMBSesLock protects:
+ * cifs_file_list_lock protects:
* list operations on tcp and SMB session lists and tCon lists
* f_owner.lock protects certain per file struct operations
* mapping->page_lock protects certain per page operations
*/
#define CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE (8)
+/*
+ * Size of the ntlm client response
+ */
+#define CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE (24)
+
/*
* Size of the session key (crypto key encrypted with the password
*/
-#define CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE (24)
+#define CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE (16)
+
+#define CIFS_CLIENT_CHALLENGE_SIZE (8)
+#define CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE (8)
+#define CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE (16)
+#define CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE (16)
+#define CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE (16)
/*
* Maximum user name length
extern int cifs_sign_smb2(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *,
__u32 *);
extern int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_hdr *,
- const struct session_key *session_key,
+ struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
__u32 expected_sequence_number);
-extern int cifs_calculate_session_key(struct session_key *key, const char *rn,
- const char *pass);
-extern void CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifsSesInfo *, char *);
-extern int setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifsSesInfo *, char *,
- const struct nls_table *);
+extern void SMBNTencrypt(unsigned char *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *);
+extern int setup_ntlm_response(struct cifsSesInfo *);
+extern int setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifsSesInfo *, const struct nls_table *);
+extern int cifs_crypto_shash_allocate(struct TCP_Server_Info *);
+extern void cifs_crypto_shash_release(struct TCP_Server_Info *);
+extern int calc_seckey(struct cifsSesInfo *);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
extern void calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey,
bool encrypt, char *lnm_session_key);
if (rsp->EncryptionKeyLength ==
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE)) {
- memcpy(ses->cryptKey, rsp->EncryptionKey,
+ memcpy(ses->server->cryptkey, rsp->EncryptionKey,
CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
} else if (server->secMode & SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT) {
rc = -EIO; /* need cryptkey unless plain text */
server->timeAdj = (int)(__s16)le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->ServerTimeZone);
server->timeAdj *= 60;
if (pSMBr->EncryptionKeyLength == CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE) {
- memcpy(ses->cryptKey, pSMBr->u.EncryptionKey,
+ memcpy(ses->server->cryptkey, pSMBr->u.EncryptionKey,
CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
} else if ((pSMBr->hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC)
&& (pSMBr->EncryptionKeyLength == 0)) {
}
server->sequence_number = 0;
server->session_estab = false;
+ kfree(server->session_key.response);
+ server->session_key.response = NULL;
+ server->session_key.len = 0;
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
list_for_each(tmp, &server->pending_mid_q) {
}
i = cifs_convert_address((struct sockaddr *)&vol->srcaddr,
value, strlen(value));
- if (i < 0) {
+ if (i == 0) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: Could not parse"
" srcaddr: %s\n",
value);
server->tcpStatus = CifsExiting;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
+ cifs_crypto_shash_release(server);
cifs_fscache_release_client_cookie(server);
+ kfree(server->session_key.response);
+ server->session_key.response = NULL;
+ server->session_key.len = 0;
+
task = xchg(&server->tsk, NULL);
if (task)
force_sig(SIGKILL, task);
goto out_err;
}
+ rc = cifs_crypto_shash_allocate(tcp_ses);
+ if (rc) {
+ cERROR(1, "could not setup hash structures rc %d", rc);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
tcp_ses->hostname = extract_hostname(volume_info->UNC);
if (IS_ERR(tcp_ses->hostname)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(tcp_ses->hostname);
- goto out_err;
+ goto out_err_crypto_release;
}
tcp_ses->noblocksnd = volume_info->noblocksnd;
}
if (rc < 0) {
cERROR(1, "Error connecting to socket. Aborting operation");
- goto out_err;
+ goto out_err_crypto_release;
}
/*
rc = PTR_ERR(tcp_ses->tsk);
cERROR(1, "error %d create cifsd thread", rc);
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
- goto out_err;
+ goto out_err_crypto_release;
}
/* thread spawned, put it on the list */
return tcp_ses;
+out_err_crypto_release:
+ cifs_crypto_shash_release(tcp_ses);
+
out_err:
if (tcp_ses) {
if (!IS_ERR(tcp_ses->hostname))
if (ses == NULL)
goto get_ses_fail;
- ses->tilen = 0;
- ses->tiblob = NULL;
/* new SMB session uses our server ref */
ses->server = server;
if (server->addr.sockAddr6.sin6_family == AF_INET6)
goto get_ses_fail;
}
if (volume_info->domainname) {
- int len = strlen(volume_info->domainname);
- ses->domainName = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (ses->domainName)
- strcpy(ses->domainName, volume_info->domainname);
+ ses->domainName = kstrdup(volume_info->domainname, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->domainName)
+ goto get_ses_fail;
}
ses->cred_uid = volume_info->cred_uid;
ses->linux_uid = volume_info->linux_uid;
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
if ((global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN) &&
(ses->server->secType == LANMAN))
- calc_lanman_hash(tcon->password, ses->cryptKey,
+ calc_lanman_hash(tcon->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
ses->server->secMode &
SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT ? true : false,
bcc_ptr);
else
#endif /* CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */
- SMBNTencrypt(tcon->password, ses->cryptKey, bcc_ptr);
+ SMBNTencrypt(tcon->password, ses->server->cryptkey, bcc_ptr);
bcc_ptr += CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
} else {
mutex_lock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
if (!server->session_estab) {
- memcpy(&server->session_key.data,
- &ses->auth_key.data, ses->auth_key.len);
+ server->session_key.response = ses->auth_key.response;
server->session_key.len = ses->auth_key.len;
- ses->server->session_estab = true;
+ server->sequence_number = 0x2;
+ server->session_estab = true;
+ ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
}
mutex_unlock(&server->srv_mutex);
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
}
+ kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
+ ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
+ ses->auth_key.len = 0;
+ kfree(ses->ntlmssp);
+ ses->ntlmssp = NULL;
+
return rc;
}
/* BB no need to lock inode until after invalidate
since namei code should already have it locked? */
rc = filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
- if (rc != 0)
- pCifsInode->write_behind_rc = rc;
+ mapping_set_error(inode->i_mapping, rc);
}
cFYI(1, "invalidating remote inode since open detected it "
"changed");
if (pCifsFile == NULL)
return pCifsFile;
+ pCifsFile->count = 1;
pCifsFile->netfid = fileHandle;
pCifsFile->pid = current->tgid;
pCifsFile->uid = current_fsuid();
mutex_init(&pCifsFile->fh_mutex);
mutex_init(&pCifsFile->lock_mutex);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pCifsFile->llist);
- atomic_set(&pCifsFile->count, 1);
INIT_WORK(&pCifsFile->oplock_break, cifs_oplock_break);
spin_lock(&cifs_file_list_lock);
/*
* Release a reference on the file private data. This may involve closing
- * the filehandle out on the server.
+ * the filehandle out on the server. Must be called without holding
+ * cifs_file_list_lock.
*/
void cifsFileInfo_put(struct cifsFileInfo *cifs_file)
{
struct cifsLockInfo *li, *tmp;
spin_lock(&cifs_file_list_lock);
- if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&cifs_file->count)) {
+ if (--cifs_file->count > 0) {
spin_unlock(&cifs_file_list_lock);
return;
}
if (can_flush) {
rc = filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
- if (rc != 0)
- CIFS_I(inode)->write_behind_rc = rc;
+ mapping_set_error(inode->i_mapping, rc);
pCifsInode->clientCanCacheAll = false;
pCifsInode->clientCanCacheRead = false;
if (!experimEnabled && tcon->ses->server->secMode &
(SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED | SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED)) {
cifsFileInfo_put(open_file);
+ kfree(iov);
return generic_writepages(mapping, wbc);
}
cifsFileInfo_put(open_file);
if (rc || bytes_written < bytes_to_write) {
cERROR(1, "Write2 ret %d, wrote %d",
rc, bytes_written);
- /* BB what if continued retry is
- requested via mount flags? */
- if (rc == -ENOSPC)
- set_bit(AS_ENOSPC, &mapping->flags);
- else
- set_bit(AS_EIO, &mapping->flags);
+ mapping_set_error(mapping, rc);
} else {
cifs_stats_bytes_written(tcon, bytes_written);
}
rc = filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
if (rc == 0) {
- rc = CIFS_I(inode)->write_behind_rc;
- CIFS_I(inode)->write_behind_rc = 0;
+ struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb = CIFS_SB(inode->i_sb);
+
tcon = tlink_tcon(smbfile->tlink);
- if (!rc && tcon && smbfile &&
- !(CIFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_NOSSYNC))
+ if (!(cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_NOSSYNC))
rc = CIFSSMBFlush(xid, tcon, smbfile->netfid);
}
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
int rc = 0;
- /* Rather than do the steps manually:
- lock the inode for writing
- loop through pages looking for write behind data (dirty pages)
- coalesce into contiguous 16K (or smaller) chunks to write to server
- send to server (prefer in parallel)
- deal with writebehind errors
- unlock inode for writing
- filemapfdatawrite appears easier for the time being */
-
- rc = filemap_fdatawrite(inode->i_mapping);
- /* reset wb rc if we were able to write out dirty pages */
- if (!rc) {
- rc = CIFS_I(inode)->write_behind_rc;
- CIFS_I(inode)->write_behind_rc = 0;
- }
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+ rc = filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
cFYI(1, "Flush inode %p file %p rc %d", inode, file, rc);
oplock_break);
struct inode *inode = cfile->dentry->d_inode;
struct cifsInodeInfo *cinode = CIFS_I(inode);
- int rc, waitrc = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
if (inode && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
if (cinode->clientCanCacheRead)
break_lease(inode, O_WRONLY);
rc = filemap_fdatawrite(inode->i_mapping);
if (cinode->clientCanCacheRead == 0) {
- waitrc = filemap_fdatawait(inode->i_mapping);
+ rc = filemap_fdatawait(inode->i_mapping);
+ mapping_set_error(inode->i_mapping, rc);
invalidate_remote_inode(inode);
}
- if (!rc)
- rc = waitrc;
- if (rc)
- cinode->write_behind_rc = rc;
cFYI(1, "Oplock flush inode %p rc %d", inode, rc);
}
/*
* We might have kicked in before is_valid_oplock_break()
* finished grabbing reference for us. Make sure it's done by
- * waiting for GlobalSMSSeslock.
+ * waiting for cifs_file_list_lock.
*/
spin_lock(&cifs_file_list_lock);
spin_unlock(&cifs_file_list_lock);
cifs_oplock_break_put(cfile);
}
+/* must be called while holding cifs_file_list_lock */
void cifs_oplock_break_get(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile)
{
cifs_sb_active(cfile->dentry->d_sb);
/* write back any cached data */
if (inode->i_mapping && inode->i_mapping->nrpages != 0) {
rc = filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
- if (rc)
- cifs_i->write_behind_rc = rc;
+ mapping_set_error(inode->i_mapping, rc);
}
invalidate_remote_inode(inode);
cifs_fscache_reset_inode_cookie(inode);
* the flush returns error?
*/
rc = filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
- if (rc != 0) {
- cifsInode->write_behind_rc = rc;
- rc = 0;
- }
+ mapping_set_error(inode->i_mapping, rc);
+ rc = 0;
if (attrs->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
rc = cifs_set_file_size(inode, attrs, xid, full_path);
* the flush returns error?
*/
rc = filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
- if (rc != 0) {
- cifsInode->write_behind_rc = rc;
- rc = 0;
- }
+ mapping_set_error(inode->i_mapping, rc);
+ rc = 0;
if (attrs->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
rc = cifs_set_file_size(inode, attrs, xid, full_path);
* cifs_oplock_break_put() can't be called
* from here. Get reference after queueing
* succeeded. cifs_oplock_break() will
- * synchronize using GlobalSMSSeslock.
+ * synchronize using cifs_file_list_lock.
*/
if (queue_work(system_nrt_wq,
&netfile->oplock_break))
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "cifs_spnego.h"
-extern void SMBNTencrypt(unsigned char *passwd, unsigned char *c8,
- unsigned char *p24);
-
/*
* Checks if this is the first smb session to be reconnected after
* the socket has been reestablished (so we know whether to use vc 0).
return -EINVAL;
}
- memcpy(ses->cryptKey, pblob->Challenge, CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
+ memcpy(ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, pblob->Challenge, CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
/* BB we could decode pblob->NegotiateFlags; some may be useful */
/* In particular we can examine sign flags */
/* BB spec says that if AvId field of MsvAvTimestamp is populated then
we must set the MIC field of the AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE */
-
+ ses->ntlmssp->server_flags = le32_to_cpu(pblob->NegotiateFlags);
tioffset = cpu_to_le16(pblob->TargetInfoArray.BufferOffset);
tilen = cpu_to_le16(pblob->TargetInfoArray.Length);
- ses->tilen = tilen;
- if (ses->tilen) {
- ses->tiblob = kmalloc(tilen, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ses->tiblob) {
+ if (tilen) {
+ ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(tilen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
cERROR(1, "Challenge target info allocation failure");
- ses->tilen = 0;
return -ENOMEM;
}
- memcpy(ses->tiblob, bcc_ptr + tioffset, ses->tilen);
+ memcpy(ses->auth_key.response, bcc_ptr + tioffset, tilen);
+ ses->auth_key.len = tilen;
}
return 0;
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM;
if (ses->server->secMode &
- (SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED | SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED))
+ (SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED | SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED)) {
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
- if (ses->server->secMode & SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED)
- flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN;
+ if (!ses->server->session_estab)
+ flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH |
+ NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC;
+ }
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags |= cpu_to_le32(flags);
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc;
- unsigned int size;
AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)pbuffer;
__u32 flags;
unsigned char *tmp;
- struct ntlmv2_resp ntlmv2_response = {};
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate;
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
- rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, (char *)&ntlmv2_response, nls_cp);
+ rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cERROR(1, "Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication", rc);
goto setup_ntlmv2_ret;
}
- size = sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
- memcpy(tmp, (char *)&ntlmv2_response, size);
- tmp += size;
- if (ses->tilen > 0) {
- memcpy(tmp, ses->tiblob, ses->tilen);
- tmp += ses->tilen;
- }
+ memcpy(tmp, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
+ ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ tmp += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
- sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = cpu_to_le16(size + ses->tilen);
+ sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length =
+ cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength =
- cpu_to_le16(size + ses->tilen);
- kfree(ses->tiblob);
- ses->tiblob = NULL;
- ses->tilen = 0;
+ cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
- sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
- sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0;
- sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
+ if ((ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH) &&
+ !calc_seckey(ses)) {
+ memcpy(tmp, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
+ sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
+ sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
+ sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength =
+ cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
+ tmp += CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE;
+ } else {
+ sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
+ sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0;
+ sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
+ }
setup_ntlmv2_ret:
*buflen = tmp - pbuffer;
return -EINVAL;
type = ses->server->secType;
-
cFYI(1, "sess setup type %d", type);
+ if (type == RawNTLMSSP) {
+ /* if memory allocation is successful, caller of this function
+ * frees it.
+ */
+ ses->ntlmssp = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ntlmssp_auth), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->ntlmssp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate:
if (phase == NtLmChallenge)
phase = NtLmAuthenticate; /* if ntlmssp, now final phase */
/* no capabilities flags in old lanman negotiation */
pSMB->old_req.PasswordLength = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
- /* BB calculate hash with password */
- /* and copy into bcc */
- calc_lanman_hash(ses->password, ses->cryptKey,
+ /* Calculate hash with password and copy into bcc_ptr.
+ * Encryption Key (stored as in cryptkey) gets used if the
+ * security mode bit in Negottiate Protocol response states
+ * to use challenge/response method (i.e. Password bit is 1).
+ */
+
+ calc_lanman_hash(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
ses->server->secMode & SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT ?
true : false, lnm_session_key);
ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
#endif
} else if (type == NTLM) {
- char ntlm_session_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE];
-
pSMB->req_no_secext.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength =
- cpu_to_le16(CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength =
- cpu_to_le16(CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+
+ /* calculate ntlm response and session key */
+ rc = setup_ntlm_response(ses);
+ if (rc) {
+ cERROR(1, "Error %d during NTLM authentication", rc);
+ goto ssetup_exit;
+ }
- /* calculate session key */
- SMBNTencrypt(ses->password, ses->cryptKey, ntlm_session_key);
+ /* copy ntlm response */
+ memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
+ CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+ bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
+ memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
+ CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
+ bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
- cifs_calculate_session_key(&ses->auth_key,
- ntlm_session_key, ses->password);
- /* copy session key */
- memcpy(bcc_ptr, (char *)ntlm_session_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
- bcc_ptr += CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
- memcpy(bcc_ptr, (char *)ntlm_session_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
- bcc_ptr += CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
/* unicode strings must be word aligned */
if (iov[0].iov_len % 2) {
} else
ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
} else if (type == NTLMv2) {
- char *v2_sess_key =
- kmalloc(sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp), GFP_KERNEL);
-
- /* BB FIXME change all users of v2_sess_key to
- struct ntlmv2_resp */
-
- if (v2_sess_key == NULL) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto ssetup_exit;
- }
-
pSMB->req_no_secext.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
/* LM2 password would be here if we supported it */
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength = 0;
- /* cpu_to_le16(LM2_SESS_KEY_SIZE); */
- /* calculate session key */
- rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, v2_sess_key, nls_cp);
+ /* calculate nlmv2 response and session key */
+ rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cERROR(1, "Error %d during NTLMv2 authentication", rc);
- kfree(v2_sess_key);
goto ssetup_exit;
}
- memcpy(bcc_ptr, (char *)v2_sess_key,
- sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp));
- bcc_ptr += sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
- kfree(v2_sess_key);
+ memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
+ ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+ bcc_ptr += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
+
/* set case sensitive password length after tilen may get
* assigned, tilen is 0 otherwise.
*/
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength =
- cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp) + ses->tilen);
- if (ses->tilen > 0) {
- memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->tiblob, ses->tilen);
- bcc_ptr += ses->tilen;
- /* we never did allocate ses->domainName to free */
- kfree(ses->tiblob);
- ses->tiblob = NULL;
- ses->tilen = 0;
- }
+ cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
if (iov[0].iov_len % 2) {
} else if (type == Kerberos) {
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL
struct cifs_spnego_msg *msg;
+
spnego_key = cifs_get_spnego_key(ses);
if (IS_ERR(spnego_key)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(spnego_key);
rc = -EKEYREJECTED;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
- /* bail out if key is too long */
- if (msg->sesskey_len >
- sizeof(ses->auth_key.data.krb5)) {
- cERROR(1, "Kerberos signing key too long (%u bytes)",
- msg->sesskey_len);
- rc = -EOVERFLOW;
+
+ ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(msg->sesskey_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
+ cERROR(1, "Kerberos can't allocate (%u bytes) memory",
+ msg->sesskey_len);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
+ memcpy(ses->auth_key.response, msg->data, msg->sesskey_len);
ses->auth_key.len = msg->sesskey_len;
- memcpy(ses->auth_key.data.krb5, msg->data, msg->sesskey_len);
+
pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC;
capabilities |= CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY;
pSMB->req.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
CIFS_STD_OP /* not long */ | CIFS_LOG_ERROR);
/* SMB request buf freed in SendReceive2 */
- cFYI(1, "ssetup rc from sendrecv2 is %d", rc);
-
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)iov[0].iov_base;
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)iov[0].iov_base;
(ses->server->secMode & (SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED |
SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED))) {
rc = cifs_verify_signature(midQ->resp_buf,
- &ses->server->session_key,
+ ses->server,
midQ->sequence_number+1);
if (rc) {
cERROR(1, "Unexpected SMB signature");
(ses->server->secMode & (SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED |
SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED))) {
rc = cifs_verify_signature(out_buf,
- &ses->server->session_key,
+ ses->server,
midQ->sequence_number+1);
if (rc) {
cERROR(1, "Unexpected SMB signature");
(ses->server->secMode & (SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED |
SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED))) {
rc = cifs_verify_signature(out_buf,
- &ses->server->session_key,
+ ses->server,
midQ->sequence_number+1);
if (rc) {
cERROR(1, "Unexpected SMB signature");
projects / GitHub / mt8127 / android_kernel_alcatel_ttab.git / commitdiff