fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid

commit 23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03 upstream.

The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces.  For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.

This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.

Fixes CVE-2014-4014.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 8dd5825ec7088f4e66498e696c098dabcd759acf..66fa6251c398d7584042c7169967f54bfed4278e 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -50,14 +50,14 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
        if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
            (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
             !uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) &&
-           !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+           !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
                return -EPERM;
 
        /* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
        if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
            (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
            (!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) &&
-           !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+           !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
                return -EPERM;
 
        /* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
                /* Also check the setgid bit! */
                if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
                                inode->i_gid) &&
-                   !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+                   !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
                        attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
        }
 
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ void setattr_copy(struct inode *inode, const struct iattr *attr)
                umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
 
                if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
-                   !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+                   !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
                        mode &= ~S_ISGID;
                inode->i_mode = mode;
        }

diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index 00d5fc3b86e12419d2d350032b173009bddcd2cd..1b300a06b8be34d822eb6b75d9ff0a8535aa0d2c 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -1837,14 +1837,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_owner);
  * inode_owner_or_capable - check current task permissions to inode
  * @inode: inode being checked
  *
- * Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER to the inode, or
- * owns the file.
+ * Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER in a namespace with the
+ * inode owner uid mapped, or owns the file.
  */
 bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode)
 {
+       struct user_namespace *ns;
+
        if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))
                return true;
-       if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER))
+
+       ns = current_user_ns();
+       if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid))
                return true;
        return false;
 }

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 1211ee5a1cb342b1c9de2dd0c4a684d505c6426b..6ac16a37ded29dea1d9d1335626540ab50c4ffab 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -321,10 +321,11 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 
        if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
                /* DACs are overridable for directories */
-               if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+               if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
                        return 0;
                if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
-                       if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+                       if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode,
+                                                    CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
                                return 0;
                return -EACCES;
        }
@@ -334,7 +335,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
         * at least one exec bit set.
         */
        if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
-               if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+               if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
                        return 0;
 
        /*
@@ -342,7 +343,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
         */
        mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
        if (mask == MAY_READ)
-               if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+               if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
                        return 0;
 
        return -EACCES;
@@ -2199,7 +2200,7 @@ static inline int check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
                return 0;
        if (uid_eq(dir->i_uid, fsuid))
                return 0;
-       return !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
+       return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
 }
 
 /*

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index d9a4f7f40f329b22c81f86e31c72b259d4acb4bf..15f90929fb51b615c7a778bc33045cea0363b099 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
 extern bool capable(int cap);
 extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool nsown_capable(int cap);
-extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
+extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
 extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 
 /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */

diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index f6c2ce5701e1c3c723d03e3d917c62f584c3a074..d52eecc0942b0eacc20ef0a7e6bf277d31e87a8f 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -445,22 +445,18 @@ bool nsown_capable(int cap)
 }
 
 /**
- * inode_capable - Check superior capability over inode
+ * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped
  * @inode: The inode in question
  * @cap: The capability in question
  *
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability
- * targeted at it's own user namespace and that the given inode is owned
- * by the current user namespace or a child namespace.
- *
- * Currently we check to see if an inode is owned by the current
- * user namespace by seeing if the inode's owner maps into the
- * current user namespace.
- *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at
+ * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are
+ * mapped into the current user namespace.
  */
-bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
+bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
 {
        struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
 
-       return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid);
+       return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
+               kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
 }