Merge branch 'ks8695/boards' into next/boards
[GitHub/mt8127/android_kernel_alcatel_ttab.git] / kernel / kcmp.c
1 #include <linux/kernel.h>
2 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
3 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
4 #include <linux/string.h>
5 #include <linux/random.h>
6 #include <linux/module.h>
7 #include <linux/init.h>
8 #include <linux/errno.h>
9 #include <linux/cache.h>
10 #include <linux/bug.h>
11 #include <linux/err.h>
12 #include <linux/kcmp.h>
13
14 #include <asm/unistd.h>
15
16 /*
17 * We don't expose the real in-memory order of objects for security reasons.
18 * But still the comparison results should be suitable for sorting. So we
19 * obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare the production instead.
20 *
21 * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with
22 * a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space.
23 * Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to
24 * permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product
25 * is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is
26 * relative prime to 2^n).
27 *
28 * Note also that the obfuscation itself is invisible to userspace and if needed
29 * it can be changed to an alternate scheme.
30 */
31 static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly;
32
33 static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type)
34 {
35 return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1];
36 }
37
38 /*
39 * 0 - equal, i.e. v1 = v2
40 * 1 - less than, i.e. v1 < v2
41 * 2 - greater than, i.e. v1 > v2
42 * 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future)
43 */
44 static int kcmp_ptr(void *v1, void *v2, enum kcmp_type type)
45 {
46 long ret;
47
48 ret = kptr_obfuscate((long)v1, type) - kptr_obfuscate((long)v2, type);
49
50 return (ret < 0) | ((ret > 0) << 1);
51 }
52
53 /* The caller must have pinned the task */
54 static struct file *
55 get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx)
56 {
57 struct file *file = NULL;
58
59 task_lock(task);
60 rcu_read_lock();
61
62 if (task->files)
63 file = fcheck_files(task->files, idx);
64
65 rcu_read_unlock();
66 task_unlock(task);
67
68 return file;
69 }
70
71 static void kcmp_unlock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
72 {
73 if (likely(m2 != m1))
74 mutex_unlock(m2);
75 mutex_unlock(m1);
76 }
77
78 static int kcmp_lock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
79 {
80 int err;
81
82 if (m2 > m1)
83 swap(m1, m2);
84
85 err = mutex_lock_killable(m1);
86 if (!err && likely(m1 != m2)) {
87 err = mutex_lock_killable_nested(m2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
88 if (err)
89 mutex_unlock(m1);
90 }
91
92 return err;
93 }
94
95 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type,
96 unsigned long, idx1, unsigned long, idx2)
97 {
98 struct task_struct *task1, *task2;
99 int ret;
100
101 rcu_read_lock();
102
103 /*
104 * Tasks are looked up in caller's PID namespace only.
105 */
106 task1 = find_task_by_vpid(pid1);
107 task2 = find_task_by_vpid(pid2);
108 if (!task1 || !task2)
109 goto err_no_task;
110
111 get_task_struct(task1);
112 get_task_struct(task2);
113
114 rcu_read_unlock();
115
116 /*
117 * One should have enough rights to inspect task details.
118 */
119 ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
120 &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
121 if (ret)
122 goto err;
123 if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ) ||
124 !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
125 ret = -EPERM;
126 goto err_unlock;
127 }
128
129 switch (type) {
130 case KCMP_FILE: {
131 struct file *filp1, *filp2;
132
133 filp1 = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1);
134 filp2 = get_file_raw_ptr(task2, idx2);
135
136 if (filp1 && filp2)
137 ret = kcmp_ptr(filp1, filp2, KCMP_FILE);
138 else
139 ret = -EBADF;
140 break;
141 }
142 case KCMP_VM:
143 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->mm, task2->mm, KCMP_VM);
144 break;
145 case KCMP_FILES:
146 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->files, task2->files, KCMP_FILES);
147 break;
148 case KCMP_FS:
149 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->fs, task2->fs, KCMP_FS);
150 break;
151 case KCMP_SIGHAND:
152 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sighand, task2->sighand, KCMP_SIGHAND);
153 break;
154 case KCMP_IO:
155 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->io_context, task2->io_context, KCMP_IO);
156 break;
157 case KCMP_SYSVSEM:
158 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
159 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sysvsem.undo_list,
160 task2->sysvsem.undo_list,
161 KCMP_SYSVSEM);
162 #else
163 ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
164 #endif
165 break;
166 default:
167 ret = -EINVAL;
168 break;
169 }
170
171 err_unlock:
172 kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
173 &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
174 err:
175 put_task_struct(task1);
176 put_task_struct(task2);
177
178 return ret;
179
180 err_no_task:
181 rcu_read_unlock();
182 return -ESRCH;
183 }
184
185 static __init int kcmp_cookies_init(void)
186 {
187 int i;
188
189 get_random_bytes(cookies, sizeof(cookies));
190
191 for (i = 0; i < KCMP_TYPES; i++)
192 cookies[i][1] |= (~(~0UL >> 1) | 1);
193
194 return 0;
195 }
196 arch_initcall(kcmp_cookies_init);