sctp: validate chunk len before actually using it

commit bf911e985d6bbaa328c20c3e05f4eb03de11fdd6 upstream.

Andrey Konovalov reported that KASAN detected that SCTP was using a slab
beyond the boundaries. It was caused because when handling out of the
blue packets in function sctp_sf_ootb() it was checking the chunk len
only after already processing the first chunk, validating only for the
2nd and subsequent ones.

The fix is to just move the check upwards so it's also validated for the
1st chunk.

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 71aab87810632dd0778834ac8efb8767250052e9..ac7b95a904b86a4f4a880c657f6140dad472fcb4 100644 (file)
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -3434,6 +3434,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
                        return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
                                                  commands);
 
+               /* Report violation if chunk len overflows */
+               ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length));
+               if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
+                       return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
+                                                 commands);
+
                /* Now that we know we at least have a chunk header,
                 * do things that are type appropriate.
                 */