KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings

commit 237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3 upstream.

It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user.  For example:

    sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
                           keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
                           sleep 15' &
    sleep 1
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us

This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions.  In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:

    -4: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid.4000
    -5: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000

Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING.  Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.

Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[wt: adjust context]

Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>

diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 4dfde1161c5e7878565d05ad7f5293e9e4d19cef..66633b5f2f65698fbd7959578d3753fada5f6c54 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ struct key {
 #define KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE      5       /* set if key is negative */
 #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR        6       /* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */
 #define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED   7       /* set if key has been invalidated */
+#define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING   11      /* set if key is a user or user session keyring */
 
        /* the description string
         * - this is used to match a key against search criteria
@@ -203,6 +204,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
 #define KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA     0x0000  /* add to quota, reject if would overrun */
 #define KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN        0x0001  /* add to quota, permit even if overrun */
 #define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA 0x0002  /* not in quota */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING  0x0010  /* allocating a user or user session keyring */
 
 extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
 extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);

diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index d4f1468b9b50f46cd7d739544902a77a3ff40384..ce6d4634a84072612ad09641cee82ec7b7593ba9 100644 (file)
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
                                         key_match_func_t match,
                                         const struct cred *cred);
 
-extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check);
+extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring);
 
 extern int install_user_keyrings(void);
 extern int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *);

diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 6373ff18b8eaa3f9104838944d458daa123eba88..248c2e731375c74cae08a1d4e37c807217c0eb15 100644 (file)
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 
        if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
                key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
+       if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING)
+               key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING;
 
        memset(&key->type_data, 0, sizeof(key->type_data));
 

diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 6ece7f2e5707f45c2736ca4a05504c2dd391ea00..b0cabf68c678d55336d25dd733178a9b4149cd4e 100644 (file)
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -583,15 +583,15 @@ found:
 /*
  * Find a keyring with the specified name.
  *
- * All named keyrings in the current user namespace are searched, provided they
- * grant Search permission directly to the caller (unless this check is
- * skipped).  Keyrings whose usage points have reached zero or who have been
- * revoked are skipped.
+ * Only keyrings that have nonzero refcount, are not revoked, and are owned by a
+ * user in the current user namespace are considered.  If @uid_keyring is %true,
+ * the keyring additionally must have been allocated as a user or user session
+ * keyring; otherwise, it must grant Search permission directly to the caller.
  *
  * Returns a pointer to the keyring with the keyring's refcount having being
  * incremented on success.  -ENOKEY is returned if a key could not be found.
  */
-struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
+struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring)
 {
        struct key *keyring;
        int bucket;
@@ -619,10 +619,15 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
                        if (strcmp(keyring->description, name) != 0)
                                continue;
 
-                       if (!skip_perm_check &&
-                           key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
-                                          KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
-                               continue;
+                       if (uid_keyring) {
+                               if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING,
+                                             &keyring->flags))
+                                       continue;
+                       } else {
+                               if (key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
+                                                  KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+                                       continue;
+                       }
 
                        /* we've got a match but we might end up racing with
                         * key_cleanup() if the keyring is currently 'dead'

diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 33384662fc82e2c4982bbc3df9b0861051132333..f58a5aa05fa4594f60c6b7a0806363786a8ec154 100644 (file)
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -76,7 +76,9 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
                if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
                        uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
                                                    cred, user_keyring_perm,
-                                                   KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+                                                   KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |
+                                                       KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
+                                                   NULL);
                        if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
                                ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
                                goto error;
@@ -92,7 +94,9 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
                        session_keyring =
                                keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
                                              cred, user_keyring_perm,
-                                             KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+                                             KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |
+                                                 KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
+                                             NULL);
                        if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
                                ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
                                goto error_release;