VERSION = 3
PATCHLEVEL = 10
-SUBLEVEL = 63
+SUBLEVEL = 64
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = TOSSUG Baby Fish
struct group_info *group_info;
int retval;
- if (!capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ if (!may_setgroups())
return -EPERM;
if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
unsigned int seg_not_present:1;
unsigned int useable:1;
#ifdef __x86_64__
+ /*
+ * Because this bit is not present in 32-bit user code, user
+ * programs can pass uninitialized values here. Therefore, in
+ * any context in which a user_desc comes from a 32-bit program,
+ * the kernel must act as though lm == 0, regardless of the
+ * actual value.
+ */
unsigned int lm:1;
#endif
};
static void __init paravirt_ops_setup(void)
{
pv_info.name = "KVM";
- pv_info.paravirt_enabled = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * KVM isn't paravirt in the sense of paravirt_enabled. A KVM
+ * guest kernel works like a bare metal kernel with additional
+ * features, and paravirt_enabled is about features that are
+ * missing.
+ */
+ pv_info.paravirt_enabled = 0;
if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_NOP_IO_DELAY))
pv_cpu_ops.io_delay = kvm_io_delay;
#endif
kvm_get_preset_lpj();
clocksource_register_hz(&kvm_clock, NSEC_PER_SEC);
- pv_info.paravirt_enabled = 1;
pv_info.name = "KVM";
if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT))
fpu = switch_fpu_prepare(prev_p, next_p, cpu);
- /*
- * Reload esp0, LDT and the page table pointer:
- */
+ /* Reload esp0 and ss1. */
load_sp0(tss, next);
- /*
- * Switch DS and ES.
- * This won't pick up thread selector changes, but I guess that is ok.
- */
- savesegment(es, prev->es);
- if (unlikely(next->es | prev->es))
- loadsegment(es, next->es);
-
- savesegment(ds, prev->ds);
- if (unlikely(next->ds | prev->ds))
- loadsegment(ds, next->ds);
-
-
/* We must save %fs and %gs before load_TLS() because
* %fs and %gs may be cleared by load_TLS().
*
savesegment(fs, fsindex);
savesegment(gs, gsindex);
+ /*
+ * Load TLS before restoring any segments so that segment loads
+ * reference the correct GDT entries.
+ */
load_TLS(next, cpu);
/*
- * Leave lazy mode, flushing any hypercalls made here.
- * This must be done before restoring TLS segments so
- * the GDT and LDT are properly updated, and must be
- * done before math_state_restore, so the TS bit is up
- * to date.
+ * Leave lazy mode, flushing any hypercalls made here. This
+ * must be done after loading TLS entries in the GDT but before
+ * loading segments that might reference them, and and it must
+ * be done before math_state_restore, so the TS bit is up to
+ * date.
*/
arch_end_context_switch(next_p);
+ /* Switch DS and ES.
+ *
+ * Reading them only returns the selectors, but writing them (if
+ * nonzero) loads the full descriptor from the GDT or LDT. The
+ * LDT for next is loaded in switch_mm, and the GDT is loaded
+ * above.
+ *
+ * We therefore need to write new values to the segment
+ * registers on every context switch unless both the new and old
+ * values are zero.
+ *
+ * Note that we don't need to do anything for CS and SS, as
+ * those are saved and restored as part of pt_regs.
+ */
+ savesegment(es, prev->es);
+ if (unlikely(next->es | prev->es))
+ loadsegment(es, next->es);
+
+ savesegment(ds, prev->ds);
+ if (unlikely(next->ds | prev->ds))
+ loadsegment(ds, next->ds);
+
/*
* Switch FS and GS.
*
- * Segment register != 0 always requires a reload. Also
- * reload when it has changed. When prev process used 64bit
- * base always reload to avoid an information leak.
+ * These are even more complicated than FS and GS: they have
+ * 64-bit bases are that controlled by arch_prctl. Those bases
+ * only differ from the values in the GDT or LDT if the selector
+ * is 0.
+ *
+ * Loading the segment register resets the hidden base part of
+ * the register to 0 or the value from the GDT / LDT. If the
+ * next base address zero, writing 0 to the segment register is
+ * much faster than using wrmsr to explicitly zero the base.
+ *
+ * The thread_struct.fs and thread_struct.gs values are 0
+ * if the fs and gs bases respectively are not overridden
+ * from the values implied by fsindex and gsindex. They
+ * are nonzero, and store the nonzero base addresses, if
+ * the bases are overridden.
+ *
+ * (fs != 0 && fsindex != 0) || (gs != 0 && gsindex != 0) should
+ * be impossible.
+ *
+ * Therefore we need to reload the segment registers if either
+ * the old or new selector is nonzero, and we need to override
+ * the base address if next thread expects it to be overridden.
+ *
+ * This code is unnecessarily slow in the case where the old and
+ * new indexes are zero and the new base is nonzero -- it will
+ * unnecessarily write 0 to the selector before writing the new
+ * base address.
+ *
+ * Note: This all depends on arch_prctl being the only way that
+ * user code can override the segment base. Once wrfsbase and
+ * wrgsbase are enabled, most of this code will need to change.
*/
if (unlikely(fsindex | next->fsindex | prev->fs)) {
loadsegment(fs, next->fsindex);
+
/*
- * Check if the user used a selector != 0; if yes
- * clear 64bit base, since overloaded base is always
- * mapped to the Null selector
+ * If user code wrote a nonzero value to FS, then it also
+ * cleared the overridden base address.
+ *
+ * XXX: if user code wrote 0 to FS and cleared the base
+ * address itself, we won't notice and we'll incorrectly
+ * restore the prior base address next time we reschdule
+ * the process.
*/
if (fsindex)
prev->fs = 0;
}
- /* when next process has a 64bit base use it */
if (next->fs)
wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, next->fs);
prev->fsindex = fsindex;
if (unlikely(gsindex | next->gsindex | prev->gs)) {
load_gs_index(next->gsindex);
+
+ /* This works (and fails) the same way as fsindex above. */
if (gsindex)
prev->gs = 0;
}
return -ESRCH;
}
+static bool tls_desc_okay(const struct user_desc *info)
+{
+ if (LDT_empty(info))
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * espfix is required for 16-bit data segments, but espfix
+ * only works for LDT segments.
+ */
+ if (!info->seg_32bit)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Only allow data segments in the TLS array. */
+ if (info->contents > 1)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Non-present segments with DPL 3 present an interesting attack
+ * surface. The kernel should handle such segments correctly,
+ * but TLS is very difficult to protect in a sandbox, so prevent
+ * such segments from being created.
+ *
+ * If userspace needs to remove a TLS entry, it can still delete
+ * it outright.
+ */
+ if (info->seg_not_present)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static void set_tls_desc(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
const struct user_desc *info, int n)
{
if (copy_from_user(&info, u_info, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
+ if (!tls_desc_okay(&info))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (idx == -1)
idx = info.entry_number;
{
struct user_desc infobuf[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES];
const struct user_desc *info;
+ int i;
if (pos >= GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * sizeof(struct user_desc) ||
(pos % sizeof(struct user_desc)) != 0 ||
else
info = infobuf;
+ for (i = 0; i < count / sizeof(struct user_desc); i++)
+ if (!tls_desc_okay(info + i))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
set_tls_desc(target,
GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + (pos / sizeof(struct user_desc)),
info, count / sizeof(struct user_desc));
{
struct af_alg_completion *completion = req->data;
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ return;
+
completion->err = err;
complete(&completion->completion);
}
{
unsigned long i;
int dirty, need_write;
- int wait = 0;
if (!bitmap || !bitmap->storage.filemap ||
test_bit(BITMAP_STALE, &bitmap->flags))
clear_page_attr(bitmap, i, BITMAP_PAGE_PENDING);
write_page(bitmap, bitmap->storage.filemap[i], 0);
}
- if (dirty)
- wait = 1;
- }
- if (wait) { /* if any writes were performed, we need to wait on them */
- if (bitmap->storage.file)
- wait_event(bitmap->write_wait,
- atomic_read(&bitmap->pending_writes)==0);
- else
- md_super_wait(bitmap->mddev);
}
+ if (bitmap->storage.file)
+ wait_event(bitmap->write_wait,
+ atomic_read(&bitmap->pending_writes)==0);
+ else
+ md_super_wait(bitmap->mddev);
+
if (test_bit(BITMAP_WRITE_ERROR, &bitmap->flags))
bitmap_file_kick(bitmap);
}
end_io(&b->bio, r);
}
+static void inline_endio(struct bio *bio, int error)
+{
+ bio_end_io_t *end_fn = bio->bi_private;
+
+ /*
+ * Reset the bio to free any attached resources
+ * (e.g. bio integrity profiles).
+ */
+ bio_reset(bio);
+
+ end_fn(bio, error);
+}
+
static void use_inline_bio(struct dm_buffer *b, int rw, sector_t block,
bio_end_io_t *end_io)
{
b->bio.bi_max_vecs = DM_BUFIO_INLINE_VECS;
b->bio.bi_sector = block << b->c->sectors_per_block_bits;
b->bio.bi_bdev = b->c->bdev;
- b->bio.bi_end_io = end_io;
+ b->bio.bi_end_io = inline_endio;
+ /*
+ * Use of .bi_private isn't a problem here because
+ * the dm_buffer's inline bio is local to bufio.
+ */
+ b->bio.bi_private = end_io;
/*
* We assume that if len >= PAGE_SIZE ptr is page-aligned.
{
struct sm_metadata *smm = container_of(sm, struct sm_metadata, sm);
- return smm->ll.nr_blocks;
+ *count = smm->ll.nr_blocks;
+
+ return 0;
}
static int sm_bootstrap_get_nr_free(struct dm_space_map *sm, dm_block_t *count)
return 0;
}
+static int tc6393xb_ohci_suspend(struct platform_device *dev)
+{
+ struct tc6393xb_platform_data *tcpd = dev_get_platdata(dev->dev.parent);
+
+ /* We can't properly store/restore OHCI state, so fail here */
+ if (tcpd->resume_restore)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ return tc6393xb_ohci_disable(dev);
+}
+
static int tc6393xb_fb_enable(struct platform_device *dev)
{
struct tc6393xb *tc6393xb = dev_get_drvdata(dev->dev.parent);
.num_resources = ARRAY_SIZE(tc6393xb_ohci_resources),
.resources = tc6393xb_ohci_resources,
.enable = tc6393xb_ohci_enable,
- .suspend = tc6393xb_ohci_disable,
+ .suspend = tc6393xb_ohci_suspend,
.resume = tc6393xb_ohci_enable,
.disable = tc6393xb_ohci_disable,
},
int ret;
struct mmc_blk_data *md = mmc_blk_get(dev_to_disk(dev));
- ret = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d",
+ ret = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
get_disk_ro(dev_to_disk(dev)) ^
md->read_only);
mmc_blk_put(md);
abort_fr->abort_mfi_phys_addr_hi = 0;
cmd->sync_cmd = 1;
- cmd->cmd_status = 0xFF;
+ cmd->cmd_status = ENODATA;
instance->instancet->issue_dcmd(instance, cmd);
if (ret)
break;
- /* opt_discard */
- if (btrfs_test_opt(root, DISCARD))
- ret = btrfs_error_discard_extent(root, start,
- end + 1 - start,
- NULL);
-
clear_extent_dirty(unpin, start, end, GFP_NOFS);
btrfs_error_unpin_extent_range(root, start, end);
cond_resched();
update_global_block_rsv(fs_info);
}
-static int unpin_extent_range(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 start, u64 end)
+static int unpin_extent_range(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 start, u64 end,
+ const bool return_free_space)
{
struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = root->fs_info;
struct btrfs_block_group_cache *cache = NULL;
if (start < cache->last_byte_to_unpin) {
len = min(len, cache->last_byte_to_unpin - start);
- btrfs_add_free_space(cache, start, len);
+ if (return_free_space)
+ btrfs_add_free_space(cache, start, len);
}
start += len;
end + 1 - start, NULL);
clear_extent_dirty(unpin, start, end, GFP_NOFS);
- unpin_extent_range(root, start, end);
+ unpin_extent_range(root, start, end, true);
cond_resched();
}
int btrfs_error_unpin_extent_range(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 start, u64 end)
{
- return unpin_extent_range(root, start, end);
+ return unpin_extent_range(root, start, end, false);
}
int btrfs_error_discard_extent(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 bytenr,
if (!em)
goto out;
- if (!test_bit(EXTENT_FLAG_LOGGING, &em->flags))
- list_move(&em->list, &tree->modified_extents);
em->generation = gen;
clear_bit(EXTENT_FLAG_PINNED, &em->flags);
em->mod_start = em->start;
break;
case 2:
dst[dst_byte_offset++] |= (src_byte);
- dst[dst_byte_offset] = 0;
current_bit_offset = 0;
break;
}
{
int rc = 0;
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat = NULL;
- struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
/* Private value of ecryptfs_dentry allocated in
* ecryptfs_lookup() */
struct ecryptfs_file_info *file_info;
- mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
- ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
- if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED)
- && ((file->f_flags & O_WRONLY) || (file->f_flags & O_RDWR)
- || (file->f_flags & O_CREAT) || (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)
- || (file->f_flags & O_APPEND))) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "Mount has encrypted view enabled; "
- "files may only be read\n");
- rc = -EPERM;
- goto out;
- }
/* Released in ecryptfs_release or end of function if failure */
file_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_file_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
ecryptfs_set_file_private(file, file_info);
{
struct super_block *s;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi;
+ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *root_info;
const char *err = "Getting sb failed";
struct inode *inode;
err = "Error parsing options";
goto out;
}
+ mount_crypt_stat = &sbi->mount_crypt_stat;
s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(s)) {
/**
* Set the POSIX ACL flag based on whether they're enabled in the lower
- * mount. Force a read-only eCryptfs mount if the lower mount is ro.
- * Allow a ro eCryptfs mount even when the lower mount is rw.
+ * mount.
*/
s->s_flags = flags & ~MS_POSIXACL;
- s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & (MS_RDONLY | MS_POSIXACL);
+ s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_POSIXACL;
+
+ /**
+ * Force a read-only eCryptfs mount when:
+ * 1) The lower mount is ro
+ * 2) The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified
+ */
+ if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY ||
+ mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED)
+ s->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
int cont_size;
int cont_extent;
int cont_offset;
+ int cont_loops;
struct inode *inode;
};
rs->inode = inode;
}
+/* Maximum number of Rock Ridge continuation entries */
+#define RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES 32
+
/*
* Returns 0 if the caller should continue scanning, 1 if the scan must end
* and -ve on error.
goto out;
}
ret = -EIO;
+ if (++rs->cont_loops >= RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES)
+ goto out;
bh = sb_bread(rs->inode->i_sb, rs->cont_extent);
if (bh) {
memcpy(rs->buffer, bh->b_data + rs->cont_offset,
rs.cont_size = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.size);
break;
case SIG('E', 'R'):
+ /* Invalid length of ER tag id? */
+ if (rr->u.ER.len_id + offsetof(struct rock_ridge, u.ER.data) > rr->len)
+ goto out;
ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock = 1;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "ISO 9660 Extensions: ");
{
goto dput_and_out;
if (!check_mnt(mnt))
goto dput_and_out;
+ retval = -EPERM;
+ if (flags & MNT_FORCE && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ goto dput_and_out;
retval = do_umount(mnt, flags);
#ifdef UMOUNT_LOG
}
if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NODEV) &&
!(mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)) {
- return -EPERM;
+ /* Was the nodev implicitly added in mount? */
+ if ((mnt->mnt_ns->user_ns != &init_user_ns) &&
+ !(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT)) {
+ mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
+ } else {
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
}
if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOSUID) &&
!(mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
result = -EIO;
}
}
- result = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&server->root_setup_lock);
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
+ /* nfs4_layoutget_release calls pnfs_put_layout_hdr */
+ pnfs_get_layout_hdr(NFS_I(inode)->layout);
+
lgp->args.layout.pages = nfs4_alloc_pages(max_pages, gfp_flags);
if (!lgp->args.layout.pages) {
nfs4_layoutget_release(lgp);
lgp->res.seq_res.sr_slot = NULL;
nfs41_init_sequence(&lgp->args.seq_args, &lgp->res.seq_res, 0);
- /* nfs4_layoutget_release calls pnfs_put_layout_hdr */
- pnfs_get_layout_hdr(NFS_I(inode)->layout);
-
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return ERR_CAST(task);
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = proc_id_map_release,
};
+
+static int proc_setgroups_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *ns = NULL;
+ struct task_struct *task;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = -ESRCH;
+ task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ if (task) {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ns = get_user_ns(task_cred_xxx(task, user_ns));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ put_task_struct(task);
+ }
+ if (!ns)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ if (!ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ goto err_put_ns;
+ }
+
+ ret = single_open(file, &proc_setgroups_show, ns);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_put_ns;
+
+ return 0;
+err_put_ns:
+ put_user_ns(ns);
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int proc_setgroups_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
+ struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+ int ret = single_release(inode, file);
+ put_user_ns(ns);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations proc_setgroups_operations = {
+ .open = proc_setgroups_open,
+ .write = proc_setgroups_write,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = proc_setgroups_release,
+};
#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
static int proc_pid_personality(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
REG("uid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_uid_map_operations),
REG("gid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_gid_map_operations),
REG("projid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_projid_map_operations),
+ REG("setgroups", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_setgroups_operations),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
REG("timers", S_IRUGO, proc_timers_operations),
REG("uid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_uid_map_operations),
REG("gid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_gid_map_operations),
REG("projid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_projid_map_operations),
+ REG("setgroups", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_setgroups_operations),
#endif
};
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
unsigned char *symlink;
- int err = -EIO;
+ int err;
unsigned char *p = kmap(page);
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo;
uint32_t pos;
+ /* We don't support symlinks longer than one block */
+ if (inode->i_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize) {
+ err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto out_unmap;
+ }
+
iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
pos = udf_block_map(inode, 0);
} else {
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, pos);
- if (!bh)
- goto out;
+ if (!bh) {
+ err = -EIO;
+ goto out_unlock_inode;
+ }
symlink = bh->b_data;
}
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
-out:
+out_unlock_inode:
up_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
SetPageError(page);
+out_unmap:
kunmap(page);
unlock_page(page);
return err;
extern int set_current_groups(struct group_info *);
extern int set_groups(struct cred *, struct group_info *);
extern int groups_search(const struct group_info *, kgid_t);
+extern bool may_setgroups(void);
/* access the groups "array" with this macro */
#define GROUP_AT(gi, i) \
} extent[UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS];
};
+#define USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED 1UL
+
+#define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED
+
struct user_namespace {
struct uid_gid_map uid_map;
struct uid_gid_map gid_map;
kuid_t owner;
kgid_t group;
unsigned int proc_inum;
+ unsigned long flags;
bool may_mount_sysfs;
bool may_mount_proc;
};
extern ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
+extern ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
+extern int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
+extern bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns);
#else
static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
}
+static inline bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ return true;
+}
#endif
void update_mnt_policy(struct user_namespace *userns);
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
/* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */
return i;
}
+bool may_setgroups(void)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+
+ return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID) &&
+ userns_may_setgroups(user_ns);
+}
+
/*
* SMP: Our groups are copy-on-write. We can set them safely
* without another task interfering.
struct group_info *group_info;
int retval;
- if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ if (!may_setgroups())
return -EPERM;
if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
out_unlock:
spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
+ put_pid_ns(ns);
+
out_free:
while (++i <= ns->level)
free_pidmap(pid->numbers + i);
struct group_info *group_info;
int retval;
- if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ if (!may_setgroups())
return -EPERM;
if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
.owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
.proc_inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO,
+ .flags = USERNS_INIT_FLAGS,
.may_mount_sysfs = true,
.may_mount_proc = true,
};
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
ns->owner = owner;
ns->group = group;
+ /* Inherit USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from our parent */
+ mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
+ ns->flags = parent_ns->flags;
+ mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
+
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
update_mnt_policy(ns);
return false;
}
-
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(id_map_mutex);
-
static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
int cap_setid,
ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
/*
- * The id_map_mutex serializes all writes to any given map.
+ * The userns_state_mutex serializes all writes to any given map.
*
* Any map is only ever written once.
*
* order and smp_rmb() is guaranteed that we don't have crazy
* architectures returning stale data.
*/
- mutex_lock(&id_map_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
ret = -EPERM;
/* Only allow one successful write to the map */
*ppos = count;
ret = count;
out:
- mutex_unlock(&id_map_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
if (page)
free_page(page);
return ret;
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
{
- /* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */
- if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) {
+ const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred;
+ /* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't
+ * be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings.
+ */
+ if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1) &&
+ uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) {
u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
- if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
+ if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid))
return true;
- }
- else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
+ } else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
- if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid))
+ if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) &&
+ gid_eq(gid, cred->egid))
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
+int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+ unsigned long userns_flags = ACCESS_ONCE(ns->flags);
+
+ seq_printf(seq, "%s\n",
+ (userns_flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) ?
+ "allow" : "deny");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
+ struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+ char kbuf[8], *pos;
+ bool setgroups_allowed;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ /* Only allow a very narrow range of strings to be written */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= sizeof(kbuf)))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* What was written? */
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, count))
+ goto out;
+ kbuf[count] = '\0';
+ pos = kbuf;
+
+ /* What is being requested? */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (strncmp(pos, "allow", 5) == 0) {
+ pos += 5;
+ setgroups_allowed = true;
+ }
+ else if (strncmp(pos, "deny", 4) == 0) {
+ pos += 4;
+ setgroups_allowed = false;
+ }
+ else
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */
+ pos = skip_spaces(pos);
+ if (*pos != '\0')
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
+ if (setgroups_allowed) {
+ /* Enabling setgroups after setgroups has been disabled
+ * is not allowed.
+ */
+ if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED))
+ goto out_unlock;
+ } else {
+ /* Permanently disabling setgroups after setgroups has
+ * been enabled by writing the gid_map is not allowed.
+ */
+ if (ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ ns->flags &= ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
+
+ /* Report a successful write */
+ *ppos = count;
+ ret = count;
+out:
+ return ret;
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ bool allowed;
+
+ mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
+ /* It is not safe to use setgroups until a gid mapping in
+ * the user namespace has been established.
+ */
+ allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0;
+ /* Is setgroups allowed? */
+ allowed = allowed && (ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED);
+ mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
+
+ return allowed;
+}
+
static void *userns_get(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns;
int i;
mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
- for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sta->gtk); i++) {
key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->gtk[i]);
if (!key)
continue;
sc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl);
frag = sc & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG;
- if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0))
- goto out;
-
if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) {
rx->local->dot11MulticastReceivedFrameCount++;
- goto out;
+ goto out_no_led;
}
+ if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0))
+ goto out;
+
I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_fragments);
if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
status->rx_flags |= IEEE80211_RX_FRAGMENTED;
out:
+ ieee80211_led_rx(rx->local);
+ out_no_led:
if (rx->sta)
rx->sta->rx_packets++;
- ieee80211_led_rx(rx->local);
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
ret = encrypted_shash_alloc();
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+ ret = aes_get_sizes();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
ret = register_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- return aes_get_sizes();
+ return 0;
out:
encrypted_shash_release();
return ret;
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
# define CLONE_NEWPID 0x20000000
#endif
+#ifndef MS_REC
+# define MS_REC 16384
+#endif
#ifndef MS_RELATIME
-#define MS_RELATIME (1 << 21)
+# define MS_RELATIME (1 << 21)
#endif
#ifndef MS_STRICTATIME
-#define MS_STRICTATIME (1 << 24)
+# define MS_STRICTATIME (1 << 24)
#endif
static void die(char *fmt, ...)
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
-static void write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
+static void vmaybe_write_file(bool enoent_ok, char *filename, char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
char buf[4096];
int fd;
ssize_t written;
int buf_len;
- va_list ap;
- va_start(ap, fmt);
buf_len = vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
if (buf_len < 0) {
die("vsnprintf failed: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
+ if ((errno == ENOENT) && enoent_ok)
+ return;
die("open of %s failed: %s\n",
filename, strerror(errno));
}
}
}
+static void maybe_write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ vmaybe_write_file(true, filename, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+}
+
+static void write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ vmaybe_write_file(false, filename, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+}
+
+static int read_mnt_flags(const char *path)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct statvfs stat;
+ int mnt_flags;
+
+ ret = statvfs(path, &stat);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ die("statvfs of %s failed: %s\n",
+ path, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (stat.f_flag & ~(ST_RDONLY | ST_NOSUID | ST_NODEV | \
+ ST_NOEXEC | ST_NOATIME | ST_NODIRATIME | ST_RELATIME | \
+ ST_SYNCHRONOUS | ST_MANDLOCK)) {
+ die("Unrecognized mount flags\n");
+ }
+ mnt_flags = 0;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_RDONLY)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_NOSUID)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_NODEV)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_NODEV;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_NOEXEC)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_NOATIME)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_NOATIME;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_NODIRATIME)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_NODIRATIME;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_RELATIME)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_RELATIME;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_SYNCHRONOUS)
+ mnt_flags |= MS_SYNCHRONOUS;
+ if (stat.f_flag & ST_MANDLOCK)
+ mnt_flags |= ST_MANDLOCK;
+
+ return mnt_flags;
+}
+
static void create_and_enter_userns(void)
{
uid_t uid;
strerror(errno));
}
+ maybe_write_file("/proc/self/setgroups", "deny");
write_file("/proc/self/uid_map", "0 %d 1", uid);
write_file("/proc/self/gid_map", "0 %d 1", gid);
- if (setgroups(0, NULL) != 0) {
- die("setgroups failed: %s\n",
- strerror(errno));
- }
if (setgid(0) != 0) {
die ("setgid(0) failed %s\n",
strerror(errno));
}
static
-bool test_unpriv_remount(int mount_flags, int remount_flags, int invalid_flags)
+bool test_unpriv_remount(const char *fstype, const char *mount_options,
+ int mount_flags, int remount_flags, int invalid_flags)
{
pid_t child;
strerror(errno));
}
- if (mount("testing", "/tmp", "ramfs", mount_flags, NULL) != 0) {
- die("mount of /tmp failed: %s\n",
- strerror(errno));
+ if (mount("testing", "/tmp", fstype, mount_flags, mount_options) != 0) {
+ die("mount of %s with options '%s' on /tmp failed: %s\n",
+ fstype,
+ mount_options? mount_options : "",
+ strerror(errno));
}
create_and_enter_userns();
static bool test_unpriv_remount_simple(int mount_flags)
{
- return test_unpriv_remount(mount_flags, mount_flags, 0);
+ return test_unpriv_remount("ramfs", NULL, mount_flags, mount_flags, 0);
}
static bool test_unpriv_remount_atime(int mount_flags, int invalid_flags)
{
- return test_unpriv_remount(mount_flags, mount_flags, invalid_flags);
+ return test_unpriv_remount("ramfs", NULL, mount_flags, mount_flags,
+ invalid_flags);
+}
+
+static bool test_priv_mount_unpriv_remount(void)
+{
+ pid_t child;
+ int ret;
+ const char *orig_path = "/dev";
+ const char *dest_path = "/tmp";
+ int orig_mnt_flags, remount_mnt_flags;
+
+ child = fork();
+ if (child == -1) {
+ die("fork failed: %s\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (child != 0) { /* parent */
+ pid_t pid;
+ int status;
+ pid = waitpid(child, &status, 0);
+ if (pid == -1) {
+ die("waitpid failed: %s\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (pid != child) {
+ die("waited for %d got %d\n",
+ child, pid);
+ }
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ die("child did not terminate cleanly\n");
+ }
+ return WEXITSTATUS(status) == EXIT_SUCCESS ? true : false;
+ }
+
+ orig_mnt_flags = read_mnt_flags(orig_path);
+
+ create_and_enter_userns();
+ ret = unshare(CLONE_NEWNS);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ die("unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) failed: %s\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ ret = mount(orig_path, dest_path, "bind", MS_BIND | MS_REC, NULL);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ die("recursive bind mount of %s onto %s failed: %s\n",
+ orig_path, dest_path, strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ ret = mount(dest_path, dest_path, "none",
+ MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND | orig_mnt_flags , NULL);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /* system("cat /proc/self/mounts"); */
+ die("remount of /tmp failed: %s\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ remount_mnt_flags = read_mnt_flags(dest_path);
+ if (orig_mnt_flags != remount_mnt_flags) {
+ die("Mount flags unexpectedly changed during remount of %s originally mounted on %s\n",
+ dest_path, orig_path);
+ }
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_RDONLY|MS_NODEV)) {
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_RDONLY)) {
die("MS_RDONLY malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NODEV)) {
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount("devpts", "newinstance", MS_NODEV, MS_NODEV, 0)) {
die("MS_NODEV malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV)) {
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOSUID)) {
die("MS_NOSUID malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV)) {
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOEXEC)) {
die("MS_NOEXEC malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME|MS_NODEV,
- MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME,
+ MS_NOATIME))
{
die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV,
- MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME,
+ MS_NOATIME))
{
die("MS_STRICTATIME malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV,
- MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV))
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME,
+ MS_STRICTATIME))
{
- die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+ die("MS_NOATIME malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME|MS_NODIRATIME|MS_NODEV,
- MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME|MS_NODIRATIME,
+ MS_NOATIME))
{
- die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+ die("MS_RELATIME|MS_NODIRATIME malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODIRATIME|MS_NODEV,
- MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODIRATIME,
+ MS_NOATIME))
{
- die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+ die("MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODIRATIME malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME|MS_NODIRATIME|MS_NODEV,
- MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV))
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME|MS_NODIRATIME,
+ MS_STRICTATIME))
{
- die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+ die("MS_NOATIME|MS_DIRATIME malfunctions\n");
}
- if (!test_unpriv_remount(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV, MS_NODEV,
- MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+ if (!test_unpriv_remount("ramfs", NULL, MS_STRICTATIME, 0, MS_NOATIME))
{
die("Default atime malfunctions\n");
}
+ if (!test_priv_mount_unpriv_remount()) {
+ die("Mount flags unexpectedly changed after remount\n");
+ }
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
projects / GitHub / mt8127 / android_kernel_alcatel_ttab.git / commitdiff