evm: prohibit userspace writing 'security.evm' HMAC value

commit 2fb1c9a4f2dbc2f0bd2431c7fa64d0b5483864e4 upstream.

Calculating the 'security.evm' HMAC value requires access to the
EVM encrypted key.  Only the kernel should have access to it.  This
patch prevents userspace tools(eg. setfattr, cp --preserve=xattr)
from setting/modifying the 'security.evm' HMAC value directly.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index cdbde1762189f56ebdcd133e3cf6fdfba37b3933..b9b2bebeb3505596041d11ac47468f523def36c4 100644 (file)
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -275,12 +275,20 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
  * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
  * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
  *
- * Updating 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
- * the current value is valid.
+ * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated,
+ * verify the existing value is valid.  As only the kernel should have
+ * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent
+ * userspace from writing HMAC value.  Writing 'security.evm' requires
+ * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
  */
 int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
                       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
+       const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
+
+       if ((strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0)
+           && (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC))
+               return -EPERM;
        return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
                                 xattr_value_len);
 }