aio/vfs: cleanup of rw_copy_check_uvector() and compat_rw_copy_check_uvector()
authorChristopher Yeoh <cyeoh@au1.ibm.com>
Thu, 31 May 2012 23:26:42 +0000 (16:26 -0700)
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fri, 1 Jun 2012 00:49:32 +0000 (17:49 -0700)
commitac34ebb3a67e699edcb5ac72f19d31679369dfaa
tree21785208005952128545c0d7804c2dddf177766f
parentee62c6b2dc93c09585b51fad18449dc5edb9977f
aio/vfs: cleanup of rw_copy_check_uvector() and compat_rw_copy_check_uvector()

A cleanup of rw_copy_check_uvector and compat_rw_copy_check_uvector after
changes made to support CMA in an earlier patch.

Rather than having an additional check_access parameter to these
functions, the first paramater type is overloaded to allow the caller to
specify CHECK_IOVEC_ONLY which means check that the contents of the iovec
are valid, but do not check the memory that they point to.  This is used
by process_vm_readv/writev where we need to validate that a iovec passed
to the syscall is valid but do not want to check the memory that it points
to at this point because it refers to an address space in another process.

Signed-off-by: Chris Yeoh <yeohc@au1.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
fs/aio.c
fs/compat.c
fs/read_write.c
include/linux/compat.h
include/linux/fs.h
mm/process_vm_access.c
security/keys/compat.c
security/keys/keyctl.c