audit_core_dumps(siginfo->si_signo);
binfmt = mm->binfmt;
- if (!binfmt || !binfmt->core_dump)
+ if (!binfmt || !binfmt->core_dump) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "Skip process %d(%s) core dump(!binfmt?%s)\n",
+ task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm, (!binfmt) ? "yes":"no");
goto fail;
- if (!__get_dumpable(cprm.mm_flags))
+ }
+ if (!__get_dumpable(cprm.mm_flags)) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "Skip process %d(%s) core dump(mm_flags:%x)\n",
+ task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm, (unsigned int)cprm.mm_flags);
goto fail;
+ }
cred = prepare_creds();
- if (!cred)
+ if (!cred) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "Skip process %d(%s) core dump(prepare_creds failed)\n",
+ task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
goto fail;
+ }
/*
* We cannot trust fsuid as being the "true" uid of the process
* nor do we know its entire history. We only know it was tainted
put_files_struct(displaced);
if (!dump_interrupted()) {
file_start_write(cprm.file);
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "before %d core dump\n", current->pid);
core_dumped = binfmt->core_dump(&cprm);
file_end_write(cprm.file);
}
+ else
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "before %d core dump interrupted error\n", current->pid);
if (ispipe && core_pipe_limit)
wait_for_dump_helpers(cprm.file);
close_fail:
*/
int dump_write(struct file *file, const void *addr, int nr)
{
- return !dump_interrupted() &&
- access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, nr) &&
- file->f_op->write(file, addr, nr, &file->f_pos) == nr;
+ if (!dump_interrupted()) {
+ if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, nr)) {
+ int pipe_ret = file->f_op->write(file, addr, nr, &file->f_pos);
+ if (pipe_ret == nr) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (pipe_ret == -ERESTARTSYS) {
+ }
+ else {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "coredump(%d): pipe dump write error nr:%d, ret:%d\n", current->pid, nr, pipe_ret);
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "coredump(%d): access verify error\n", current->pid);
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "coredump(%d): interrupted error\n", current->pid);
+ }
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_write);