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[PATCH] sysctl: remove the proc_dir_entry member for the sysctl tables
[GitHub/mt8127/android_kernel_alcatel_ttab.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
CommitLineData
1da177e4
LT		 1/*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
7420ed23
VY		 15 * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
16 * Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
1da177e4
LT		 17 *
18 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
19 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
20 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
21 */
22
1da177e4
LT		 23#include <linux/module.h>
24#include <linux/init.h>
25#include <linux/kernel.h>
26#include <linux/ptrace.h>
27#include <linux/errno.h>
28#include <linux/sched.h>
29#include <linux/security.h>
30#include <linux/xattr.h>
31#include <linux/capability.h>
32#include <linux/unistd.h>
33#include <linux/mm.h>
34#include <linux/mman.h>
35#include <linux/slab.h>
36#include <linux/pagemap.h>
37#include <linux/swap.h>
38#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
39#include <linux/spinlock.h>
40#include <linux/syscalls.h>
41#include <linux/file.h>
42#include <linux/namei.h>
43#include <linux/mount.h>
44#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
45#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
46#include <linux/kd.h>
47#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49#include <linux/tty.h>
50#include <net/icmp.h>
51#include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
52#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53#include <asm/uaccess.h>
1da177e4
LT		 54#include <asm/ioctls.h>
55#include <linux/bitops.h>
56#include <linux/interrupt.h>
57#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58#include <linux/netlink.h>
59#include <linux/tcp.h>
60#include <linux/udp.h>
2ee92d46 61#include <linux/dccp.h>
1da177e4
LT		 62#include <linux/quota.h>
63#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
65#include <linux/parser.h>
66#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
67#include <net/ipv6.h>
68#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
69#include <linux/personality.h>
70#include <linux/sysctl.h>
71#include <linux/audit.h>
6931dfc9 72#include <linux/string.h>
877ce7c1 73#include <linux/selinux.h>
23970741 74#include <linux/mutex.h>
1da177e4
LT		 75
76#include "avc.h"
77#include "objsec.h"
78#include "netif.h"
d28d1e08 79#include "xfrm.h"
7420ed23 80#include "selinux_netlabel.h"
1da177e4
LT		 81
82#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
83#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
84
85extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
86extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
4e5ab4cb 87extern int selinux_compat_net;
1da177e4
LT		 88
89#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
90int selinux_enforcing = 0;
91
92static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
93{
94 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
95 return 1;
96}
97__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
98#endif
99
100#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
101int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
102
103static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
104{
105 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
106 return 1;
107}
108__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
30d55280
SS		 109#else
110int selinux_enabled = 1;
1da177e4
LT		 111#endif
112
113/* Original (dummy) security module. */
114static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
115
116/* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
117 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
118 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
119 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
120static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
121
122/* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
123 before the policy was loaded. */
124static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
125static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
126
e18b890b 127static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
7cae7e26 128
8c8570fb
DK		 129/* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
130 length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
131static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
132{
133 char *context;
134 unsigned len;
135 int rc;
136
137 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
138 if (rc)
139 return rc;
140
141 if (!buffer || !size)
142 goto getsecurity_exit;
143
144 if (size < len) {
145 len = -ERANGE;
146 goto getsecurity_exit;
147 }
148 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
149
150getsecurity_exit:
151 kfree(context);
152 return len;
153}
154
1da177e4
LT		 155/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
156
157static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
158{
159 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
160
89d155ef 161 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1da177e4
LT		 162 if (!tsec)
163 return -ENOMEM;
164
1da177e4
LT		 165 tsec->task = task;
166 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
167 task->security = tsec;
168
169 return 0;
170}
171
172static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
173{
174 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
1da177e4
LT		 175 task->security = NULL;
176 kfree(tsec);
177}
178
179static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
180{
181 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
182 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
183
c3762229 184 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
1da177e4
LT		 185 if (!isec)
186 return -ENOMEM;
187
23970741 188 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
1da177e4 189 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
1da177e4
LT		 190 isec->inode = inode;
191 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
192 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
9ac49d22 193 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
1da177e4
LT		 194 inode->i_security = isec;
195
196 return 0;
197}
198
199static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
200{
201 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
202 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
203
1da177e4
LT		 204 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
205 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
206 list_del_init(&isec->list);
207 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
208
209 inode->i_security = NULL;
7cae7e26 210 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
1da177e4
LT		 211}
212
213static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
214{
215 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
216 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
217
26d2a4be 218 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1da177e4
LT		 219 if (!fsec)
220 return -ENOMEM;
221
1da177e4 222 fsec->file = file;
9ac49d22
SS		 223 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
224 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
1da177e4
LT		 225 file->f_security = fsec;
226
227 return 0;
228}
229
230static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
231{
232 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1da177e4
LT		 233 file->f_security = NULL;
234 kfree(fsec);
235}
236
237static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
238{
239 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
240
89d155ef 241 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1da177e4
LT		 242 if (!sbsec)
243 return -ENOMEM;
244
bc7e982b 245 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
1da177e4
LT		 246 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
248 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1da177e4
LT		 249 sbsec->sb = sb;
250 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
251 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
c312feb2 252 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1da177e4
LT		 253 sb->s_security = sbsec;
254
255 return 0;
256}
257
258static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
259{
260 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
261
1da177e4
LT		 262 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
263 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
264 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
265 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
266
267 sb->s_security = NULL;
268 kfree(sbsec);
269}
270
7d877f3b 271static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
1da177e4
LT		 272{
273 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
274
89d155ef 275 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
1da177e4
LT		 276 if (!ssec)
277 return -ENOMEM;
278
1da177e4
LT		 279 ssec->sk = sk;
280 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
892c141e 281 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1da177e4
LT		 282 sk->sk_security = ssec;
283
99f59ed0
PM		 284 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(ssec, family);
285
1da177e4
LT		 286 return 0;
287}
288
289static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
290{
291 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
292
1da177e4
LT		 293 sk->sk_security = NULL;
294 kfree(ssec);
295}
1da177e4
LT		 296
297/* The security server must be initialized before
298 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
299extern int ss_initialized;
300
301/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
302
303static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
304 "uses xattr",
305 "uses transition SIDs",
306 "uses task SIDs",
307 "uses genfs_contexts",
308 "not configured for labeling",
309 "uses mountpoint labeling",
310};
311
312static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
313
314static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
315{
316 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
317}
318
319enum {
320 Opt_context = 1,
321 Opt_fscontext = 2,
322 Opt_defcontext = 4,
0808925e 323 Opt_rootcontext = 8,
1da177e4
LT		 324};
325
326static match_table_t tokens = {
327 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
328 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
329 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
0808925e 330 {Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"},
1da177e4
LT		 331};
332
333#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
334
c312feb2
EP		 335static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
336 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
337 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
338{
339 int rc;
340
341 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
342 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
343 if (rc)
344 return rc;
345
346 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
347 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
348 return rc;
349}
350
0808925e
EP		 351static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
352 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
353 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
354{
355 int rc;
356 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
357 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
358 if (rc)
359 return rc;
360
361 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
362 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
363 return rc;
364}
365
1da177e4
LT		 366static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
367{
368 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
0808925e 369 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
1da177e4
LT		 370 const char *name;
371 u32 sid;
372 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
373 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
374 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
375
376 if (!data)
377 goto out;
378
379 name = sb->s_type->name;
380
381 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
382
383 /* NFS we understand. */
384 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
385 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
386
387 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
388 goto out;
389
390 if (d->context[0]) {
391 context = d->context;
392 seen |= Opt_context;
393 }
394 } else
395 goto out;
396
397 } else {
398 /* Standard string-based options. */
399 char *p, *options = data;
400
3528a953 401 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
1da177e4
LT		 402 int token;
403 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
404
405 if (!*p)
406 continue;
407
408 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
409
410 switch (token) {
411 case Opt_context:
c312feb2 412 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
1da177e4
LT		 413 rc = -EINVAL;
414 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
415 goto out_free;
416 }
417 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
418 if (!context) {
419 rc = -ENOMEM;
420 goto out_free;
421 }
422 if (!alloc)
423 alloc = 1;
424 seen |= Opt_context;
425 break;
426
427 case Opt_fscontext:
c312feb2 428 if (seen & Opt_fscontext) {
1da177e4
LT		 429 rc = -EINVAL;
430 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
431 goto out_free;
432 }
c312feb2
EP		 433 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
434 if (!fscontext) {
1da177e4
LT		 435 rc = -ENOMEM;
436 goto out_free;
437 }
438 if (!alloc)
439 alloc = 1;
440 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
441 break;
442
0808925e
EP		 443 case Opt_rootcontext:
444 if (seen & Opt_rootcontext) {
445 rc = -EINVAL;
446 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
447 goto out_free;
448 }
449 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
450 if (!rootcontext) {
451 rc = -ENOMEM;
452 goto out_free;
453 }
454 if (!alloc)
455 alloc = 1;
456 seen |= Opt_rootcontext;
457 break;
458
1da177e4
LT		 459 case Opt_defcontext:
460 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
461 rc = -EINVAL;
462 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
463 "defcontext option is invalid "
464 "for this filesystem type\n");
465 goto out_free;
466 }
467 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
468 rc = -EINVAL;
469 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
470 goto out_free;
471 }
472 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
473 if (!defcontext) {
474 rc = -ENOMEM;
475 goto out_free;
476 }
477 if (!alloc)
478 alloc = 1;
479 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
480 break;
481
482 default:
483 rc = -EINVAL;
484 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
485 "option\n");
486 goto out_free;
487
488 }
489 }
490 }
491
492 if (!seen)
493 goto out;
494
c312feb2
EP		 495 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
496 if (fscontext) {
497 rc = security_context_to_sid(fscontext, strlen(fscontext), &sid);
1da177e4
LT		 498 if (rc) {
499 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
500 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
c312feb2 501 fscontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
1da177e4
LT		 502 goto out_free;
503 }
504
c312feb2 505 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
1da177e4
LT		 506 if (rc)
507 goto out_free;
508
c312feb2
EP		 509 sbsec->sid = sid;
510 }
511
512 /*
513 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
514 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
515 * the superblock context if not already set.
516 */
517 if (context) {
518 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
519 if (rc) {
520 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
521 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
522 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
523 goto out_free;
524 }
525
b04ea3ce
EP		 526 if (!fscontext) {
527 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
528 if (rc)
529 goto out_free;
c312feb2 530 sbsec->sid = sid;
b04ea3ce
EP		 531 } else {
532 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
533 if (rc)
534 goto out_free;
535 }
c312feb2 536 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
1da177e4 537
c312feb2 538 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
1da177e4
LT		 539 }
540
0808925e
EP		 541 if (rootcontext) {
542 struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
543 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
544 rc = security_context_to_sid(rootcontext, strlen(rootcontext), &sid);
545 if (rc) {
546 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
547 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
548 rootcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
549 goto out_free;
550 }
551
552 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
553 if (rc)
554 goto out_free;
555
556 isec->sid = sid;
557 isec->initialized = 1;
558 }
559
1da177e4
LT		 560 if (defcontext) {
561 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
562 if (rc) {
563 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
564 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
565 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
566 goto out_free;
567 }
568
569 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
570 goto out_free;
571
0808925e 572 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
1da177e4
LT		 573 if (rc)
574 goto out_free;
575
576 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
577 }
578
579out_free:
580 if (alloc) {
581 kfree(context);
582 kfree(defcontext);
c312feb2 583 kfree(fscontext);
0808925e 584 kfree(rootcontext);
1da177e4
LT		 585 }
586out:
587 return rc;
588}
589
590static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
591{
592 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
593 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
594 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
595 int rc = 0;
596
bc7e982b 597 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
1da177e4
LT		 598 if (sbsec->initialized)
599 goto out;
600
601 if (!ss_initialized) {
602 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
603 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
604 server is ready to handle calls. */
605 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
606 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
607 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
608 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
609 goto out;
610 }
611
612 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
613 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
614 if (rc) {
615 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
616 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
617 goto out;
618 }
619
620 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
621 if (rc)
622 goto out;
623
624 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
625 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
626 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
627 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
628 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
629 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
630 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
631 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
632 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
633 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
634 goto out;
635 }
636 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
637 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
638 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
639 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
640 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
641 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
642 else
643 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
644 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
645 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
646 goto out;
647 }
648 }
649
650 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
651 sbsec->proc = 1;
652
653 sbsec->initialized = 1;
654
655 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
656 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
657 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
658 }
659 else {
660 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
661 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
662 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
663 }
664
665 /* Initialize the root inode. */
666 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
667
668 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
669 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
670 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
671 populates itself. */
672 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
673next_inode:
674 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
675 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
676 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
677 struct inode_security_struct, list);
678 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
679 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
680 inode = igrab(inode);
681 if (inode) {
682 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
683 inode_doinit(inode);
684 iput(inode);
685 }
686 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
687 list_del_init(&isec->list);
688 goto next_inode;
689 }
690 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
691out:
bc7e982b 692 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
1da177e4
LT		 693 return rc;
694}
695
696static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
697{
698 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
699 case S_IFSOCK:
700 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
701 case S_IFLNK:
702 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
703 case S_IFREG:
704 return SECCLASS_FILE;
705 case S_IFBLK:
706 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
707 case S_IFDIR:
708 return SECCLASS_DIR;
709 case S_IFCHR:
710 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
711 case S_IFIFO:
712 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
713
714 }
715
716 return SECCLASS_FILE;
717}
718
13402580
JM		 719static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
720{
721 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
722}
723
724static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
725{
726 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
727}
728
1da177e4
LT		 729static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
730{
731 switch (family) {
732 case PF_UNIX:
733 switch (type) {
734 case SOCK_STREAM:
735 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
736 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
737 case SOCK_DGRAM:
738 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
739 }
740 break;
741 case PF_INET:
742 case PF_INET6:
743 switch (type) {
744 case SOCK_STREAM:
13402580
JM		 745 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
746 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
747 else
748 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1da177e4 749 case SOCK_DGRAM:
13402580
JM		 750 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
751 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
752 else
753 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
2ee92d46
JM		 754 case SOCK_DCCP:
755 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
13402580 756 default:
1da177e4
LT		 757 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
758 }
759 break;
760 case PF_NETLINK:
761 switch (protocol) {
762 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
763 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
764 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
765 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
216efaaa 766 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1da177e4
LT		 767 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
768 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
769 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
770 case NETLINK_XFRM:
771 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
772 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
773 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
774 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
775 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
776 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
777 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
778 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
779 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
0c9b7942
JM		 780 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
781 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1da177e4
LT		 782 default:
783 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
784 }
785 case PF_PACKET:
786 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
787 case PF_KEY:
788 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
3e3ff15e
CP		 789 case PF_APPLETALK:
790 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1da177e4
LT		 791 }
792
793 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
794}
795
796#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
797static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
798 u16 tclass,
799 u32 *sid)
800{
801 int buflen, rc;
802 char *buffer, *path, *end;
803
804 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
805 if (!buffer)
806 return -ENOMEM;
807
808 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
809 end = buffer+buflen;
810 *--end = '\0';
811 buflen--;
812 path = end-1;
813 *path = '/';
814 while (de && de != de->parent) {
815 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
816 if (buflen < 0)
817 break;
818 end -= de->namelen;
819 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
820 *--end = '/';
821 path = end;
822 de = de->parent;
823 }
824 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
825 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
826 return rc;
827}
828#else
829static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
830 u16 tclass,
831 u32 *sid)
832{
833 return -EINVAL;
834}
835#endif
836
837/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
838static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
839{
840 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
841 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
842 u32 sid;
843 struct dentry *dentry;
844#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
845 char *context = NULL;
846 unsigned len = 0;
847 int rc = 0;
1da177e4
LT		 848
849 if (isec->initialized)
850 goto out;
851
23970741 852 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1da177e4 853 if (isec->initialized)
23970741 854 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT		 855
856 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
857 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
858 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
859 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
860 server is ready to handle calls. */
861 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
862 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
863 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
864 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
23970741 865 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT		 866 }
867
868 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
869 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
870 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
871 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
872 break;
873 }
874
875 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
876 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
877 if (opt_dentry) {
878 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
879 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
880 } else {
881 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
882 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
883 }
884 if (!dentry) {
885 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
886 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
887 inode->i_ino);
23970741 888 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT		 889 }
890
891 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
892 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
893 if (!context) {
894 rc = -ENOMEM;
895 dput(dentry);
23970741 896 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT		 897 }
898 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
899 context, len);
900 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
901 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
902 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
903 NULL, 0);
904 if (rc < 0) {
905 dput(dentry);
23970741 906 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT		 907 }
908 kfree(context);
909 len = rc;
910 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
911 if (!context) {
912 rc = -ENOMEM;
913 dput(dentry);
23970741 914 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT		 915 }
916 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
917 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
918 context, len);
919 }
920 dput(dentry);
921 if (rc < 0) {
922 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
923 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
924 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
925 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
926 kfree(context);
23970741 927 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT		 928 }
929 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
930 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
931 rc = 0;
932 } else {
f5c1d5b2
JM		 933 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
934 sbsec->def_sid);
1da177e4
LT		 935 if (rc) {
936 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
937 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
938 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
939 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
940 kfree(context);
941 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
942 rc = 0;
943 break;
944 }
945 }
946 kfree(context);
947 isec->sid = sid;
948 break;
949 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
950 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
951 break;
952 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
953 /* Default to the fs SID. */
954 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
955
956 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
957 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
958 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
959 sbsec->sid,
960 isec->sclass,
961 &sid);
962 if (rc)
23970741 963 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT		 964 isec->sid = sid;
965 break;
c312feb2
EP		 966 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
967 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
968 break;
1da177e4 969 default:
c312feb2 970 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1da177e4
LT		 971 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
972
973 if (sbsec->proc) {
974 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
975 if (proci->pde) {
976 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
977 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
978 isec->sclass,
979 &sid);
980 if (rc)
23970741 981 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT		 982 isec->sid = sid;
983 }
984 }
985 break;
986 }
987
988 isec->initialized = 1;
989
23970741
EP		 990out_unlock:
991 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1da177e4
LT		 992out:
993 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
994 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1da177e4
LT		 995 return rc;
996}
997
998/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
999static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1000{
1001 u32 perm = 0;
1002
1003 switch (sig) {
1004 case SIGCHLD:
1005 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1006 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1007 break;
1008 case SIGKILL:
1009 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1010 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1011 break;
1012 case SIGSTOP:
1013 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1014 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1015 break;
1016 default:
1017 /* All other signals. */
1018 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1019 break;
1020 }
1021
1022 return perm;
1023}
1024
1025/* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1026 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1027static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1028 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1029 u32 perms)
1030{
1031 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1032
1033 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1034 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1035 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1036 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1037}
1038
1039/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1040static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1041 int cap)
1042{
1043 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1044 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1045
1046 tsec = tsk->security;
1047
1048 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
1049 ad.tsk = tsk;
1050 ad.u.cap = cap;
1051
1052 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1053 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
1054}
1055
1056/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1057static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1058 u32 perms)
1059{
1060 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1061
1062 tsec = tsk->security;
1063
1064 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1065 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1066}
1067
1068/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1069 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1070 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1071static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1072 struct inode *inode,
1073 u32 perms,
1074 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1075{
1076 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1077 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1078 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1079
1080 tsec = tsk->security;
1081 isec = inode->i_security;
1082
1083 if (!adp) {
1084 adp = &ad;
1085 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1086 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1087 }
1088
1089 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1090}
1091
1092/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1093 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1094 pathname if needed. */
1095static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1096 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1097 struct dentry *dentry,
1098 u32 av)
1099{
1100 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1101 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1102 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1103 ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1104 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1105 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1106}
1107
1108/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1109 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1110 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1111 check a particular permission to the file.
1112 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1113 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1114 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1115 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
858119e1 1116static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1da177e4
LT		 1117 struct file *file,
1118 u32 av)
1119{
1120 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1121 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3d5ff529
JS		 1122 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
1123 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
1da177e4
LT		 1124 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1125 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1126 int rc;
1127
1128 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1129 ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1130 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1131
1132 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1133 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1134 SECCLASS_FD,
1135 FD__USE,
1136 &ad);
1137 if (rc)
1138 return rc;
1139 }
1140
1141 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1142 if (av)
1143 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1144
1145 return 0;
1146}
1147
1148/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1149static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1150 struct dentry *dentry,
1151 u16 tclass)
1152{
1153 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1154 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1155 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1156 u32 newsid;
1157 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1158 int rc;
1159
1160 tsec = current->security;
1161 dsec = dir->i_security;
1162 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1163
1164 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1165 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1166
1167 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1168 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1169 &ad);
1170 if (rc)
1171 return rc;
1172
1173 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1174 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1175 } else {
1176 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1177 &newsid);
1178 if (rc)
1179 return rc;
1180 }
1181
1182 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1183 if (rc)
1184 return rc;
1185
1186 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1187 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1188 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1189}
1190
4eb582cf
ML		 1191/* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1192static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1193 struct task_struct *ctx)
1194{
1195 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1196
1197 tsec = ctx->security;
1198
1199 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1200}
1201
1da177e4
LT		 1202#define MAY_LINK 0
1203#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1204#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1205
1206/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1207static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1208 struct dentry *dentry,
1209 int kind)
1210
1211{
1212 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1213 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1214 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1215 u32 av;
1216 int rc;
1217
1218 tsec = current->security;
1219 dsec = dir->i_security;
1220 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1221
1222 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1223 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1224
1225 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1226 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1227 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1228 if (rc)
1229 return rc;
1230
1231 switch (kind) {
1232 case MAY_LINK:
1233 av = FILE__LINK;
1234 break;
1235 case MAY_UNLINK:
1236 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1237 break;
1238 case MAY_RMDIR:
1239 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1240 break;
1241 default:
1242 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1243 return 0;
1244 }
1245
1246 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1247 return rc;
1248}
1249
1250static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1251 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1252 struct inode *new_dir,
1253 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1254{
1255 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1256 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1257 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1258 u32 av;
1259 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1260 int rc;
1261
1262 tsec = current->security;
1263 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1264 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1265 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1266 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1267
1268 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1269
1270 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1271 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1272 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1273 if (rc)
1274 return rc;
1275 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1276 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1277 if (rc)
1278 return rc;
1279 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1280 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1281 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1282 if (rc)
1283 return rc;
1284 }
1285
1286 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1287 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1288 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1289 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1290 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1291 if (rc)
1292 return rc;
1293 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1294 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1295 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1296 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1297 new_isec->sclass,
1298 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1299 if (rc)
1300 return rc;
1301 }
1302
1303 return 0;
1304}
1305
1306/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1307static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1308 struct super_block *sb,
1309 u32 perms,
1310 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1311{
1312 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1313 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1314
1315 tsec = tsk->security;
1316 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1317 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1318 perms, ad);
1319}
1320
1321/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1322static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1323{
1324 u32 av = 0;
1325
1326 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1327 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1328 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1329 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1330 av |= FILE__READ;
1331
1332 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1333 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1334 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1335 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1336
1337 } else {
1338 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1339 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1340 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1341 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1342 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1343 av |= DIR__READ;
1344 }
1345
1346 return av;
1347}
1348
1349/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1350static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1351{
1352 u32 av = 0;
1353
1354 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1355 av |= FILE__READ;
1356 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1357 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1358 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1359 else
1360 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1361 }
1362
1363 return av;
1364}
1365
1da177e4
LT		 1366/* Hook functions begin here. */
1367
1368static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1369{
1370 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1371 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1372 int rc;
1373
1374 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1375 if (rc)
1376 return rc;
1377
1378 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1379 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
341c2d80 1380 if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1da177e4
LT		 1381 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1382 return rc;
1383}
1384
1385static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1386 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1387{
1388 int error;
1389
1390 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1391 if (error)
1392 return error;
1393
1394 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1395}
1396
1397static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1398 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1399{
1400 int error;
1401
1402 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1403 if (error)
1404 return error;
1405
1406 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1407}
1408
1409static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1410 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1411{
1412 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1413}
1414
1415static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1416{
1417 int rc;
1418
1419 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1420 if (rc)
1421 return rc;
1422
1423 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1424}
1425
3fbfa981
EB		 1426static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1427{
1428 int buflen, rc;
1429 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1430
1431 rc = -ENOMEM;
1432 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1433 if (!buffer)
1434 goto out;
1435
1436 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1437 end = buffer+buflen;
1438 *--end = '\0';
1439 buflen--;
1440 path = end-1;
1441 *path = '/';
1442 while (table) {
1443 const char *name = table->procname;
1444 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1445 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1446 if (buflen < 0)
1447 goto out_free;
1448 end -= namelen;
1449 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1450 *--end = '/';
1451 path = end;
1452 table = table->parent;
1453 }
1454 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1455out_free:
1456 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1457out:
1458 return rc;
1459}
1460
1da177e4
LT		 1461static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1462{
1463 int error = 0;
1464 u32 av;
1465 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1466 u32 tsid;
1467 int rc;
1468
1469 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1470 if (rc)
1471 return rc;
1472
1473 tsec = current->security;
1474
3fbfa981
EB		 1475 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1476 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1da177e4
LT		 1477 if (rc) {
1478 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1479 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1480 }
1481
1482 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1483 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1484 if(op == 001) {
1485 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1486 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1487 } else {
1488 av = 0;
1489 if (op & 004)
1490 av |= FILE__READ;
1491 if (op & 002)
1492 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1493 if (av)
1494 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1495 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1496 }
1497
1498 return error;
1499}
1500
1501static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1502{
1503 int rc = 0;
1504
1505 if (!sb)
1506 return 0;
1507
1508 switch (cmds) {
1509 case Q_SYNC:
1510 case Q_QUOTAON:
1511 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1512 case Q_SETINFO:
1513 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1514 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1515 sb,
1516 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1517 break;
1518 case Q_GETFMT:
1519 case Q_GETINFO:
1520 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1521 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1522 sb,
1523 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1524 break;
1525 default:
1526 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1527 break;
1528 }
1529 return rc;
1530}
1531
1532static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1533{
1534 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1535}
1536
1537static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1538{
1539 int rc;
1540
1541 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1542 if (rc)
1543 return rc;
1544
1545 switch (type) {
1546 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1547 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1548 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1549 break;
1550 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1551 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1552 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1553 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1554 break;
1555 case 0: /* Close log */
1556 case 1: /* Open log */
1557 case 2: /* Read from log */
1558 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1559 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1560 default:
1561 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1562 break;
1563 }
1564 return rc;
1565}
1566
1567/*
1568 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1569 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1570 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1571 *
1572 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1573 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1574 * the capability is granted.
1575 *
1576 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1577 * processes that allocate mappings.
1578 */
1579static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1580{
1581 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1582 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1583
1584 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1585 if (rc == 0)
1586 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1587 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1588 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1589 NULL);
1590
1591 if (rc == 0)
1592 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1593
1594 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1595}
1596
1597/* binprm security operations */
1598
1599static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1600{
1601 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1602
89d155ef 1603 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1da177e4
LT		 1604 if (!bsec)
1605 return -ENOMEM;
1606
1da177e4
LT		 1607 bsec->bprm = bprm;
1608 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1609 bsec->set = 0;
1610
1611 bprm->security = bsec;
1612 return 0;
1613}
1614
1615static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1616{
1617 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3d5ff529 1618 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1da177e4
LT		 1619 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1620 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1621 u32 newsid;
1622 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1623 int rc;
1624
1625 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1626 if (rc)
1627 return rc;
1628
1629 bsec = bprm->security;
1630
1631 if (bsec->set)
1632 return 0;
1633
1634 tsec = current->security;
1635 isec = inode->i_security;
1636
1637 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1638 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1639
28eba5bf 1640 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1da177e4 1641 tsec->create_sid = 0;
28eba5bf 1642 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
42c3e03e 1643 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1da177e4
LT		 1644
1645 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1646 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1647 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1648 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1649 } else {
1650 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1651 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1652 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1653 if (rc)
1654 return rc;
1655 }
1656
1657 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
3d5ff529
JS		 1658 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_path.mnt;
1659 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
1da177e4 1660
3d5ff529 1661 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1da177e4
LT		 1662 newsid = tsec->sid;
1663
1664 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1665 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1666 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1667 if (rc)
1668 return rc;
1669 } else {
1670 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1671 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1672 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1673 if (rc)
1674 return rc;
1675
1676 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1677 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1678 if (rc)
1679 return rc;
1680
1681 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1682 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1683
1684 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1685 bsec->sid = newsid;
1686 }
1687
1688 bsec->set = 1;
1689 return 0;
1690}
1691
1692static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1693{
1694 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1695}
1696
1697
1698static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1699{
1700 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1701 int atsecure = 0;
1702
1703 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1704 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1705 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1706 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1707 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1708 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1709 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1710 }
1711
1712 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1713}
1714
1715static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1716{
9a5f04bf 1717 kfree(bprm->security);
1da177e4 1718 bprm->security = NULL;
1da177e4
LT		 1719}
1720
1721extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1722extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1723
1724/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1725static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1726{
1727 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1728 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
b20c8122 1729 struct tty_struct *tty;
badf1662 1730 struct fdtable *fdt;
1da177e4 1731 long j = -1;
24ec839c 1732 int drop_tty = 0;
1da177e4 1733
b20c8122 1734 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
24ec839c 1735 tty = get_current_tty();
1da177e4
LT		 1736 if (tty) {
1737 file_list_lock();
2f512016 1738 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1da177e4
LT		 1739 if (file) {
1740 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1741 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1742 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1743 file may belong to another process and we are only
1744 interested in the inode-based check here. */
3d5ff529 1745 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1da177e4
LT		 1746 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1747 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
24ec839c 1748 drop_tty = 1;
1da177e4
LT		 1749 }
1750 }
1751 file_list_unlock();
24ec839c
PZ		 1752
1753 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1754 if (drop_tty)
1755 proc_set_tty(current, NULL);
1da177e4 1756 }
b20c8122 1757 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
1da177e4
LT		 1758
1759 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1760
1761 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1762
1763 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1764 for (;;) {
1765 unsigned long set, i;
1766 int fd;
1767
1768 j++;
1769 i = j * __NFDBITS;
badf1662 1770 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
bbea9f69 1771 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
1da177e4 1772 break;
badf1662 1773 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1da177e4
LT		 1774 if (!set)
1775 continue;
1776 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1777 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1778 if (set & 1) {
1779 file = fget(i);
1780 if (!file)
1781 continue;
1782 if (file_has_perm(current,
1783 file,
1784 file_to_av(file))) {
1785 sys_close(i);
1786 fd = get_unused_fd();
1787 if (fd != i) {
1788 if (fd >= 0)
1789 put_unused_fd(fd);
1790 fput(file);
1791 continue;
1792 }
1793 if (devnull) {
095975da 1794 get_file(devnull);
1da177e4
LT		 1795 } else {
1796 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
fc5d81e6
AM		 1797 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
1798 devnull = NULL;
1da177e4
LT		 1799 put_unused_fd(fd);
1800 fput(file);
1801 continue;
1802 }
1803 }
1804 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1805 }
1806 fput(file);
1807 }
1808 }
1809 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1810
1811 }
1812 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1813}
1814
1815static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1816{
1817 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1818 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1819 u32 sid;
1820 int rc;
1821
1822 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1823
1824 tsec = current->security;
1825
1826 bsec = bprm->security;
1827 sid = bsec->sid;
1828
1829 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1830 bsec->unsafe = 0;
1831 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1832 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1833 unchanged and kill. */
1834 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1835 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1836 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1837 if (rc) {
1838 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1839 return;
1840 }
1841 }
1842
1843 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1844 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1845 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1846 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1847 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1848 NULL);
1849 if (rc) {
1850 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1851 return;
1852 }
1853 }
1854 tsec->sid = sid;
1855 }
1856}
1857
1858/*
1859 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1860 */
1861static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1862{
1863 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1864 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1865 struct itimerval itimer;
1866 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1867 int rc, i;
1868
1869 tsec = current->security;
1870 bsec = bprm->security;
1871
1872 if (bsec->unsafe) {
1873 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1874 return;
1875 }
1876 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1877 return;
1878
1879 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1880 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1881
1882 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1883 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1884 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1885 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1886 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1887 will be checked against the new SID. */
1888 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1889 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1890 if (rc) {
1891 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1892 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1893 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1894 flush_signals(current);
1895 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1896 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1897 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
1898 recalc_sigpending();
1899 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1900 }
1901
1902 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1903 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1904 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1905 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1906 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1907 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1908 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1909 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1910 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1911 RLIMIT_STACK.*/
1912 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1913 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1914 if (rc) {
1915 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1916 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1917 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1918 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1919 }
1920 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1921 /*
1922 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1923 * to be refigured.
1924 */
1925 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1926 }
1927 }
1928
1929 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1930 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1931 wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1932}
1933
1934/* superblock security operations */
1935
1936static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1937{
1938 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1939}
1940
1941static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1942{
1943 superblock_free_security(sb);
1944}
1945
1946static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1947{
1948 if (plen > olen)
1949 return 0;
1950
1951 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1952}
1953
1954static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1955{
1956 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1957 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
0808925e
EP		 1958 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1959 match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len));
1da177e4
LT		 1960}
1961
1962static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1963{
1964 if (!*first) {
1965 **to = ',';
1966 *to += 1;
3528a953 1967 } else
1da177e4
LT		 1968 *first = 0;
1969 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1970 *to += len;
1971}
1972
3528a953
CO		 1973static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
1974 int len)
1975{
1976 int current_size = 0;
1977
1978 if (!*first) {
1979 **to = '|';
1980 *to += 1;
1981 }
1982 else
1983 *first = 0;
1984
1985 while (current_size < len) {
1986 if (*from != '"') {
1987 **to = *from;
1988 *to += 1;
1989 }
1990 from += 1;
1991 current_size += 1;
1992 }
1993}
1994
1da177e4
LT		 1995static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1996{
1997 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1998 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1999 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
3528a953 2000 int open_quote = 0;
1da177e4
LT		 2001
2002 in_curr = orig;
2003 sec_curr = copy;
2004
2005 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
2006 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
2007 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
2008 goto out;
2009 }
2010
2011 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2012 if (!nosec) {
2013 rc = -ENOMEM;
2014 goto out;
2015 }
2016
2017 nosec_save = nosec;
2018 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2019 in_save = in_end = orig;
2020
2021 do {
3528a953
CO		 2022 if (*in_end == '"')
2023 open_quote = !open_quote;
2024 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2025 *in_end == '\0') {
1da177e4
LT		 2026 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2027
2028 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
3528a953 2029 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1da177e4
LT		 2030 else
2031 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2032
2033 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2034 }
2035 } while (*in_end++);
2036
6931dfc9 2037 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
da3caa20 2038 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1da177e4
LT		 2039out:
2040 return rc;
2041}
2042
2043static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2044{
2045 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2046 int rc;
2047
2048 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2049 if (rc)
2050 return rc;
2051
2052 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2053 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
2054 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2055}
2056
726c3342 2057static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
1da177e4
LT		 2058{
2059 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2060
2061 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
726c3342
DH		 2062 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2063 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
1da177e4
LT		 2064}
2065
2066static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
2067 struct nameidata *nd,
2068 char * type,
2069 unsigned long flags,
2070 void * data)
2071{
2072 int rc;
2073
2074 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
2075 if (rc)
2076 return rc;
2077
2078 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2079 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
2080 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2081 else
2082 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
2083 FILE__MOUNTON);
2084}
2085
2086static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2087{
2088 int rc;
2089
2090 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2091 if (rc)
2092 return rc;
2093
2094 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2095 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2096}
2097
2098/* inode security operations */
2099
2100static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2101{
2102 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2103}
2104
2105static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2106{
2107 inode_free_security(inode);
2108}
2109
5e41ff9e
SS		 2110static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2111 char **name, void **value,
2112 size_t *len)
2113{
2114 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2115 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2116 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
570bc1c2 2117 u32 newsid, clen;
5e41ff9e 2118 int rc;
570bc1c2 2119 char *namep = NULL, *context;
5e41ff9e
SS		 2120
2121 tsec = current->security;
2122 dsec = dir->i_security;
2123 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
5e41ff9e
SS		 2124
2125 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2126 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2127 } else {
2128 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2129 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2130 &newsid);
2131 if (rc) {
2132 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2133 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2134 "ino=%ld)\n",
2135 __FUNCTION__,
2136 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2137 return rc;
2138 }
2139 }
2140
296fddf7
EP		 2141 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2142 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2143 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2144 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2145 isec->sid = newsid;
2146 isec->initialized = 1;
2147 }
5e41ff9e 2148
8aad3875 2149 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
25a74f3b
SS		 2150 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2151
570bc1c2
SS		 2152 if (name) {
2153 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
2154 if (!namep)
2155 return -ENOMEM;
2156 *name = namep;
2157 }
5e41ff9e 2158
570bc1c2
SS		 2159 if (value && len) {
2160 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2161 if (rc) {
2162 kfree(namep);
2163 return rc;
2164 }
2165 *value = context;
2166 *len = clen;
5e41ff9e 2167 }
5e41ff9e 2168
5e41ff9e
SS		 2169 return 0;
2170}
2171
1da177e4
LT		 2172static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2173{
2174 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2175}
2176
1da177e4
LT		 2177static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2178{
2179 int rc;
2180
2181 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2182 if (rc)
2183 return rc;
2184 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2185}
2186
1da177e4
LT		 2187static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2188{
2189 int rc;
2190
2191 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2192 if (rc)
2193 return rc;
2194 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2195}
2196
2197static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2198{
2199 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2200}
2201
1da177e4
LT		 2202static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2203{
2204 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2205}
2206
1da177e4
LT		 2207static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2208{
2209 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2210}
2211
2212static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2213{
2214 int rc;
2215
2216 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2217 if (rc)
2218 return rc;
2219
2220 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2221}
2222
1da177e4
LT		 2223static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2224 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2225{
2226 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2227}
2228
1da177e4
LT		 2229static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2230{
2231 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2232}
2233
2234static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2235{
2236 int rc;
2237
2238 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2239 if (rc)
2240 return rc;
2241 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2242}
2243
2244static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2245 struct nameidata *nd)
2246{
2247 int rc;
2248
2249 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2250 if (rc)
2251 return rc;
2252
2253 if (!mask) {
2254 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2255 return 0;
2256 }
2257
2258 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2259 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2260}
2261
2262static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2263{
2264 int rc;
2265
2266 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2267 if (rc)
2268 return rc;
2269
2270 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2271 return 0;
2272
2273 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2274 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2275 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2276
2277 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2278}
2279
2280static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2281{
2282 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2283}
2284
2285static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2286{
2287 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2288 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2289 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2290 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2291 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2292 u32 newsid;
2293 int rc = 0;
2294
2295 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2296 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2297 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2298 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2299 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2300 Restrict to administrator. */
2301 return -EPERM;
2302 }
2303
2304 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2305 ordinary setattr permission. */
2306 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2307 }
2308
2309 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2310 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2311 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2312
2313 if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2314 return -EPERM;
2315
2316 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2317 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2318
2319 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2320 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2321 if (rc)
2322 return rc;
2323
2324 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2325 if (rc)
2326 return rc;
2327
2328 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2329 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2330 if (rc)
2331 return rc;
2332
2333 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2334 isec->sclass);
2335 if (rc)
2336 return rc;
2337
2338 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2339 sbsec->sid,
2340 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2341 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2342 &ad);
2343}
2344
2345static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2346 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2347{
2348 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2349 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2350 u32 newsid;
2351 int rc;
2352
2353 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2354 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2355 return;
2356 }
2357
2358 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2359 if (rc) {
2360 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2361 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2362 return;
2363 }
2364
2365 isec->sid = newsid;
2366 return;
2367}
2368
2369static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2370{
1da177e4
LT		 2371 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2372}
2373
2374static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2375{
2376 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2377}
2378
2379static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2380{
2381 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2382 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2383 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2384 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2385 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2386 Restrict to administrator. */
2387 return -EPERM;
2388 }
2389
2390 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2391 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2392 permission for removexattr. */
2393 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2394 }
2395
2396 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2397 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2398 return -EACCES;
2399}
2400
8c8570fb
DK		 2401static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
2402{
2403 return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2404}
2405
d381d8a9
JM		 2406/*
2407 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2408 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2409 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2410 *
2411 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2412 */
7306a0b9 2413static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
1da177e4
LT		 2414{
2415 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
d381d8a9 2416
8c8570fb
DK		 2417 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2418 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
d381d8a9 2419
8c8570fb 2420 return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
1da177e4
LT		 2421}
2422
2423static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2424 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2425{
2426 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2427 u32 newsid;
2428 int rc;
2429
2430 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2431 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2432
2433 if (!value || !size)
2434 return -EACCES;
2435
2436 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2437 if (rc)
2438 return rc;
2439
2440 isec->sid = newsid;
2441 return 0;
2442}
2443
2444static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2445{
2446 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2447 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2448 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2449 return len;
2450}
2451
2452/* file security operations */
2453
2454static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2455{
7420ed23 2456 int rc;
3d5ff529 2457 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1da177e4
LT		 2458
2459 if (!mask) {
2460 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2461 return 0;
2462 }
2463
2464 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2465 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2466 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2467
7420ed23
VY		 2468 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2469 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2470 if (rc)
2471 return rc;
2472
2473 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
1da177e4
LT		 2474}
2475
2476static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2477{
2478 return file_alloc_security(file);
2479}
2480
2481static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2482{
2483 file_free_security(file);
2484}
2485
2486static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2487 unsigned long arg)
2488{
2489 int error = 0;
2490
2491 switch (cmd) {
2492 case FIONREAD:
2493 /* fall through */
2494 case FIBMAP:
2495 /* fall through */
2496 case FIGETBSZ:
2497 /* fall through */
2498 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2499 /* fall through */
2500 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2501 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2502 break;
2503
2504 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2505 /* fall through */
2506 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2507 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2508 break;
2509
2510 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2511 case FIONBIO:
2512 /* fall through */
2513 case FIOASYNC:
2514 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2515 break;
2516
2517 case KDSKBENT:
2518 case KDSKBSENT:
2519 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2520 break;
2521
2522 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2523 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2524 */
2525 default:
2526 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2527
2528 }
2529 return error;
2530}
2531
2532static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2533{
2534#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2535 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2536 /*
2537 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2538 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2539 * This has an additional check.
2540 */
2541 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2542 if (rc)
2543 return rc;
2544 }
2545#endif
2546
2547 if (file) {
2548 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2549 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2550
2551 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2552 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2553 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2554
2555 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2556 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2557
2558 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2559 }
2560 return 0;
2561}
2562
2563static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2564 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2565{
2566 int rc;
2567
2568 rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2569 if (rc)
2570 return rc;
2571
2572 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2573 prot = reqprot;
2574
2575 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2576 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2577}
2578
2579static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2580 unsigned long reqprot,
2581 unsigned long prot)
2582{
2583 int rc;
2584
2585 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2586 if (rc)
2587 return rc;
2588
2589 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2590 prot = reqprot;
2591
2592#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
db4c9641
SS		 2593 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2594 rc = 0;
2595 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2596 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2597 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2598 PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
2599 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2600 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2601 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2602 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2603 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2604 /*
2605 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2606 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2607 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2608 * modified content. This typically should only
2609 * occur for text relocations.
2610 */
2611 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2612 FILE__EXECMOD);
2613 }