Merge tag 'v3.10.55' into update
[GitHub/mt8127/android_kernel_alcatel_ttab.git] / include / linux / capability.h
CommitLineData
1da177e4
LT
1/*
2 * This is <linux/capability.h>
3 *
b5376771 4 * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
1da177e4
LT
5 * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
6 * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
7 *
8 * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
9 *
bcf56442 10 * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
b5376771 11 */
1da177e4
LT
12#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
13#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
14
607ca46e 15#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
e338d263 16
ca05a99a
AM
17
18#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
19#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
1da177e4 20
9fa91d99 21extern int file_caps_enabled;
9fa91d99 22
1da177e4 23typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
ca05a99a 24 __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
1da177e4
LT
25} kernel_cap_t;
26
c0b00441
EP
27/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
28struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
29 __u32 magic_etc;
30 kernel_cap_t permitted;
31 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
32};
33
e338d263 34#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
1da177e4
LT
35#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
36
1da177e4 37
935d8aab 38struct file;
1a48e2ac 39struct inode;
3486740a
SH
40struct dentry;
41struct user_namespace;
42
3486740a
SH
43struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
44
45extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
3486740a
SH
46extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
47
1da177e4
LT
48/*
49 * Internal kernel functions only
50 */
b5376771 51
e338d263 52#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
ca05a99a 53 for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
e338d263 54
0ad30b8f
SH
55/*
56 * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
57 *
58 * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
59 * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
60 *
61 * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
62 *
63 * We could also define fsmask as follows:
64 * 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
65 * 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
66 */
67
e338d263 68# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
0ad30b8f 69 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \
e338d263
AM
70 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
71 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
72 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
73 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
74
e114e473
CS
75# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
76
ca05a99a 77#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
e338d263
AM
78# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
79#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
80
76f01555
EP
81#define CAP_LAST_U32 ((_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) - 1)
82#define CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) -1)
83
25f2ea9f 84# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
76f01555 85# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK }})
0ad30b8f
SH
86# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
87 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
88 CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
76a67ec6 89# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
0ad30b8f
SH
90 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
91 CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
e338d263 92
ca05a99a 93#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
e338d263 94
e338d263 95# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
e338d263
AM
96
97#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
98#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
99#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
100
101#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \
102do { \
103 unsigned __capi; \
104 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
105 c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \
106 } \
107} while (0)
108
109#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \
110do { \
111 unsigned __capi; \
112 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
113 c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \
114 } \
115} while (0)
116
117static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
118 const kernel_cap_t b)
119{
120 kernel_cap_t dest;
121 CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
122 return dest;
123}
1da177e4 124
e338d263
AM
125static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
126 const kernel_cap_t b)
127{
128 kernel_cap_t dest;
129 CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
130 return dest;
131}
1da177e4 132
e338d263
AM
133static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
134 const kernel_cap_t drop)
135{
136 kernel_cap_t dest;
137 CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
138 return dest;
139}
1da177e4 140
e338d263
AM
141static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
142{
143 kernel_cap_t dest;
144 CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
145 return dest;
146}
1da177e4 147
e338d263
AM
148static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
149{
150 unsigned __capi;
151 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
152 if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
153 return 0;
154 }
155 return 1;
156}
1da177e4 157
9d36be76
EP
158/*
159 * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
160 * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
161 * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
162 * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
163 * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
164 */
e338d263
AM
165static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
166{
167 kernel_cap_t dest;
168 dest = cap_drop(a, set);
169 return cap_isclear(dest);
170}
1da177e4 171
e338d263 172/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
1da177e4 173
e338d263 174static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
1da177e4 175{
e338d263
AM
176 const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
177 return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
1da177e4
LT
178}
179
e338d263 180static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
1da177e4 181{
e338d263
AM
182 const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
183 return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
1da177e4
LT
184}
185
e338d263
AM
186static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
187 const kernel_cap_t permitted)
1da177e4 188{
e338d263
AM
189 const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
190 return cap_combine(a,
191 cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
1da177e4
LT
192}
193
e338d263 194static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
1da177e4 195{
e338d263
AM
196 const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
197 return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
1da177e4
LT
198}
199
e338d263
AM
200static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
201 const kernel_cap_t permitted)
202{
203 const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
204 return cap_combine(a,
205 cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
206}
1da177e4 207
3263245d
SH
208extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
209extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
210 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
211extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
7b61d648
EP
212extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
213 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
3486740a
SH
214extern bool capable(int cap);
215extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
47a150ed 216extern bool nsown_capable(int cap);
4f80c6c1 217extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
935d8aab 218extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
c59ede7b 219
851f7ff5 220/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
851f7ff5
EP
221extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
222
1da177e4 223#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */