From eaa06bfba8eabd44ce952758046492eebc973bbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 01:24:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets commit b71812168571fa55e44cdd0254471331b9c4c4c6 upstream. We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the total size. Also check that they are in ascending order. The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing. Briefly tested with simple ruleset of -A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary. Reported-by: Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c index 3b3dcf719e07..16eb99458df4 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -2053,7 +2053,9 @@ static int ebt_size_mwt(struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32, if (match_kern) match_kern->match_size = ret; - WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left); + if (WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left)) + return -EINVAL; + match32 = (struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *) buf; } @@ -2109,6 +2111,15 @@ static int size_entry_mwt(struct ebt_entry *entry, const unsigned char *base, * * offsets are relative to beginning of struct ebt_entry (i.e., 0). */ + for (i = 0; i < 4 ; ++i) { + if (offsets[i] >= *total) + return -EINVAL; + if (i == 0) + continue; + if (offsets[i-1] > offsets[i]) + return -EINVAL; + } + for (i = 0, j = 1 ; j < 4 ; j++, i++) { struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32; unsigned int size; -- 2.20.1