From de31796c052e47c99b1bb342bc70aa826733e862 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2017 16:23:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] bpf: fix integer overflows From: Alexei Starovoitov [ Upstream commit bb7f0f989ca7de1153bd128a40a71709e339fa03 ] There were various issues related to the limited size of integers used in the verifier: - `off + size` overflow in __check_map_access() - `off + reg->off` overflow in check_mem_access() - `off + reg->var_off.value` overflow or 32-bit truncation of `reg->var_off.value` in check_mem_access() - 32-bit truncation in check_stack_boundary() Make sure that any integer math cannot overflow by not allowing pointer math with large values. Also reduce the scope of "scalar op scalar" tracking. Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking") Reported-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 4 +-- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index 5d6de3b57758..73bec75b74c8 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ * In practice this is far bigger than any realistic pointer offset; this limit * ensures that umax_value + (int)off + (int)size cannot overflow a u64. */ -#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF (1ULL << 31) +#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF (1 << 29) /* Maximum variable size permitted for ARG_CONST_SIZE[_OR_ZERO]. This ensures * that converting umax_value to int cannot overflow. */ -#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ INT_MAX +#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ (1 << 29) /* Liveness marks, used for registers and spilled-regs (in stack slots). * Read marks propagate upwards until they find a write mark; they record that diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 5a30eda17c4f..c5ff809e86d0 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1789,6 +1789,41 @@ static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) return res > a; } +static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, + enum bpf_reg_type type) +{ + bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); + s64 val = reg->var_off.value; + s64 smin = reg->smin_value; + + if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) { + verbose("math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n", + reg_type_str[type], val); + return false; + } + + if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { + verbose("%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n", + reg_type_str[type], reg->off); + return false; + } + + if (smin == S64_MIN) { + verbose("math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n", + reg_type_str[type]); + return false; + } + + if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { + verbose("value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n", + smin, reg_type_str[type]); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a @@ -1854,6 +1889,10 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type; dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; + if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) || + !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type)) + return -EINVAL; + switch (opcode) { case BPF_ADD: /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow @@ -1984,6 +2023,9 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return -EACCES; } + if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type)) + return -EINVAL; + __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); @@ -2013,6 +2055,12 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off); dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); + if (!src_known && + opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) { + __mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg); + return 0; + } + switch (opcode) { case BPF_ADD: if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) || -- 2.20.1