From a0c5a3944ce121bb2417c771f77b18485cd84e18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vasiliy Kulikov Date: Sat, 6 Nov 2010 17:41:24 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] mtd: mtdchar: fix information leak to userland Structure mtd_info_user is copied to userland with padding byted between "type" and "flags" fields uninitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c b/drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c index 4759d827e8c7..cad8fcc7b239 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c @@ -601,6 +601,7 @@ static int mtd_ioctl(struct file *file, u_int cmd, u_long arg) } case MEMGETINFO: + memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info)); info.type = mtd->type; info.flags = mtd->flags; info.size = mtd->size; @@ -609,7 +610,6 @@ static int mtd_ioctl(struct file *file, u_int cmd, u_long arg) info.oobsize = mtd->oobsize; /* The below fields are obsolete */ info.ecctype = -1; - info.eccsize = 0; if (copy_to_user(argp, &info, sizeof(struct mtd_info_user))) return -EFAULT; break; -- 2.20.1