From 61c32659b12c44e62de32fbf99f7e4ca783dc38b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Frederic Weisbecker Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2010 01:39:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] tracing: New flag to allow non privileged users to use a trace event This adds a new trace event internal flag that allows them to be used in perf by non privileged users in case of task bound tracing. This is desired for syscalls tracepoint because they don't leak global system informations, like some other tracepoints. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Li Zefan Cc: Jason Baron --- include/linux/ftrace_event.h | 2 ++ kernel/perf_event.c | 9 --------- kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ftrace_event.h b/include/linux/ftrace_event.h index 8beabb958f61..312dce7e0d52 100644 --- a/include/linux/ftrace_event.h +++ b/include/linux/ftrace_event.h @@ -154,12 +154,14 @@ enum { TRACE_EVENT_FL_ENABLED_BIT, TRACE_EVENT_FL_FILTERED_BIT, TRACE_EVENT_FL_RECORDED_CMD_BIT, + TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY_BIT, }; enum { TRACE_EVENT_FL_ENABLED = (1 << TRACE_EVENT_FL_ENABLED_BIT), TRACE_EVENT_FL_FILTERED = (1 << TRACE_EVENT_FL_FILTERED_BIT), TRACE_EVENT_FL_RECORDED_CMD = (1 << TRACE_EVENT_FL_RECORDED_CMD_BIT), + TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY = (1 << TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY_BIT), }; struct ftrace_event_call { diff --git a/kernel/perf_event.c b/kernel/perf_event.c index 517d827f4982..ee1e903f983c 100644 --- a/kernel/perf_event.c +++ b/kernel/perf_event.c @@ -4747,15 +4747,6 @@ static int perf_tp_event_init(struct perf_event *event) if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT) return -ENOENT; - /* - * Raw tracepoint data is a severe data leak, only allow root to - * have these. - */ - if ((event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) && - perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && - !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - err = perf_trace_init(event); if (err) return err; diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c index 39c059ca670e..19a359d5e6d5 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c @@ -21,17 +21,46 @@ typedef typeof(unsigned long [PERF_MAX_TRACE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)]) /* Count the events in use (per event id, not per instance) */ static int total_ref_count; +static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct ftrace_event_call *tp_event, + struct perf_event *p_event) +{ + /* No tracing, just counting, so no obvious leak */ + if (!(p_event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW)) + return 0; + + /* Some events are ok to be traced by non-root users... */ + if (p_event->attach_state == PERF_ATTACH_TASK) { + if (tp_event->flags & TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY) + return 0; + } + + /* + * ...otherwise raw tracepoint data can be a severe data leak, + * only allow root to have these. + */ + if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + return 0; +} + static int perf_trace_event_init(struct ftrace_event_call *tp_event, struct perf_event *p_event) { struct hlist_head __percpu *list; - int ret = -ENOMEM; + int ret; int cpu; + ret = perf_trace_event_perm(tp_event, p_event); + if (ret) + return ret; + p_event->tp_event = tp_event; if (tp_event->perf_refcount++ > 0) return 0; + ret = -ENOMEM; + list = alloc_percpu(struct hlist_head); if (!list) goto fail; -- 2.20.1