From 4233bab728f89ddb0421f2d64f10667b25b0be90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2019 23:05:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] bpf: restrict access to core bpf sysctls commit 2e4a30983b0f9b19b59e38bbf7427d7fdd480d98 upstream. Given BPF reaches far beyond just networking these days, it was never intended to allow setting and in some cases reading those knobs out of a user namespace root running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, thus tighten such access. Also the bpf_jit_enable = 2 debugging mode should only be allowed if kptr_restrict is not set since it otherwise can leak addresses to the kernel log. Dump a note to the kernel log that this is for debugging JITs only when enabled. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov [bwh: Backported to 4.14: We don't have bpf_dump_raw_ok(), so drop the condition based on it. This condition only made it a bit harder for a privileged user to do something silly.] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c index 6d39b4c01fc6..b57d29388e34 100644 --- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c +++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c @@ -251,6 +251,41 @@ static int proc_do_rss_key(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); } +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT +static int proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_enable(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + int ret, jit_enable = *(int *)table->data; + struct ctl_table tmp = *table; + + if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + tmp.data = &jit_enable; + ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + if (write && !ret) { + *(int *)table->data = jit_enable; + if (jit_enable == 2) + pr_warn("bpf_jit_enable = 2 was set! NEVER use this in production, only for JIT debugging!\n"); + } + return ret; +} + +# ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT +static int +proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + return proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); +} +# endif +#endif + static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_NET { @@ -326,7 +361,7 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = { .data = &bpf_jit_enable, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_enable, # ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON .extra1 = &one, .extra2 = &one, @@ -341,7 +376,7 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = { .data = &bpf_jit_harden, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0600, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted, .extra1 = &zero, .extra2 = &two, }, @@ -350,7 +385,7 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = { .data = &bpf_jit_kallsyms, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0600, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted, .extra1 = &zero, .extra2 = &one, }, -- 2.20.1