From 197e7e521384a23b9e585178f3f11c9fa08274b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 13:26:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Sanitize 'move_pages()' permission checks The 'move_paghes()' system call was introduced long long ago with the same permission checks as for sending a signal (except using CAP_SYS_NICE instead of CAP_SYS_KILL for the overriding capability). That turns out to not be a great choice - while the system call really only moves physical page allocations around (and you need other capabilities to do a lot of it), you can check the return value to map out some the virtual address choices and defeat ASLR of a binary that still shares your uid. So change the access checks to the more common 'ptrace_may_access()' model instead. This tightens the access checks for the uid, and also effectively changes the CAP_SYS_NICE check to CAP_SYS_PTRACE, but it's unlikely that anybody really _uses_ this legacy system call any more (we hav ebetter NUMA placement models these days), so I expect nobody to notice. Famous last words. Reported-by: Otto Ebeling Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman Cc: Willy Tarreau Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- mm/migrate.c | 11 +++-------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/migrate.c b/mm/migrate.c index d68a41da6abb..e84eeb4e4356 100644 --- a/mm/migrate.c +++ b/mm/migrate.c @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -1652,7 +1653,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(move_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, nr_pages, const int __user *, nodes, int __user *, status, int, flags) { - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; struct task_struct *task; struct mm_struct *mm; int err; @@ -1676,14 +1676,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(move_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, nr_pages, /* * Check if this process has the right to modify the specified - * process. The right exists if the process has administrative - * capabilities, superuser privileges or the same - * userid as the target process. + * process. Use the regular "ptrace_may_access()" checks. */ - tcred = __task_cred(task); - if (!uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->suid) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) && - !uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) && !uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) { + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) { rcu_read_unlock(); err = -EPERM; goto out; -- 2.20.1