git.stricted.de - GitHub/LineageOS/android_kernel_samsung

ASoC: wm_adsp: Avoid attempt to free buffers that might still be in use

commit 9da7a5a9fdeeb76b2243f6b473363a7e6147ab6f upstream.

We should not free any buffers associated with writing out coefficients
to the DSP until all the async writes have completed. This patch updates
the out of memory path when allocating a new buffer to include a call to
regmap_async_complete.

Reported-by: JS Park <aitdark.park@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ASoC: sgtl5000: Fix SMALL_POP bit definition

commit c251ea7bd7a04f1f2575467e0de76e803cf59149 upstream.

On a mx28evk with a sgtl5000 codec we notice a loud 'click' sound to happen
5 seconds after the end of a playback.

The SMALL_POP bit should fix this, but its definition is incorrect:
according to the sgtl5000 manual it is bit 0 of CHIP_REF_CTRL register, not
bit 1.

Fix the definition accordingly and enable the bit as intended per the code
comment.

After applying this change, no loud 'click' sound is heard after playback

Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

PCI/MSI: Add device flag indicating that 64-bit MSIs don't work

commit f144d1496b47e7450f41b767d0d91c724c2198bc upstream.

This can be set by quirks/drivers to be used by the architecture code
that assigns the MSI addresses.

We additionally add verification in the core MSI code that the values
assigned by the architecture do satisfy the limitation in order to fail
gracefully if they don't (ie. the arch hasn't been updated to deal with
that quirk yet).

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ipx: fix locking regression in ipx_sendmsg and ipx_recvmsg

[ Upstream commit 01462405f0c093b2f8dfddafcadcda6c9e4c5cdf ]

This fixes an old regression introduced by commit
b0d0d915 (ipx: remove the BKL).

When a recvmsg syscall blocks waiting for new data, no data can be sent on the
same socket with sendmsg because ipx_recvmsg() sleeps with the socket locked.

This breaks mars-nwe (NetWare emulator):
- the ncpserv process reads the request using recvmsg
- ncpserv forks and spawns nwconn
- ncpserv calls a (blocking) recvmsg and waits for new requests
- nwconn deadlocks in sendmsg on the same socket

Commit b0d0d915 has simply replaced BKL locking with
lock_sock/release_sock. Unlike now, BKL got unlocked while
sleeping, so a blocking recvmsg did not block a concurrent
sendmsg.

Only keep the socket locked while actually working with the socket data and
release it prior to calling skb_recv_datagram().

Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

pptp: fix stack info leak in pptp_getname()

[ Upstream commit a5f6fc28d6e6cc379c6839f21820e62262419584 ]

pptp_getname() only partially initializes the stack variable sa,
particularly only fills the pptp part of the sa_addr union. The code
thereby discloses 16 bytes of kernel stack memory via getsockname().

Fix this by memset(0)'ing the union before.

Cc: Dmitry Kozlov <xeb@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

qmi_wwan: Add support for HP lt4112 LTE/HSPA+ Gobi 4G Modem

[ Upstream commit bb2bdeb83fb125c95e47fc7eca2a3e8f868e2a74 ]

Added the USB VID/PID for the HP lt4112 LTE/HSPA+ Gobi 4G Modem (Huawei me906e)

Signed-off-by: Martin Hauke <mardnh@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ieee802154: fix error handling in ieee802154fake_probe()

[ Upstream commit 8c2dd54485ccee7fc4086611e188478584758c8d ]

In case of any failure ieee802154fake_probe() just calls unregister_netdev().
But it does not look safe to unregister netdevice before it was registered.

The patch implements straightforward resource deallocation in case of
failure in ieee802154fake_probe().

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ipv4: Fix incorrect error code when adding an unreachable route

[ Upstream commit 49dd18ba4615eaa72f15c9087dea1c2ab4744cf5 ]

Trying to add an unreachable route incorrectly returns -ESRCH if
if custom FIB rules are present:

[root@localhost ~]# ip route add 74.125.31.199 dev eth0 via 1.2.3.4
RTNETLINK answers: Network is unreachable
[root@localhost ~]# ip rule add to 55.66.77.88 table 200
[root@localhost ~]# ip route add 74.125.31.199 dev eth0 via 1.2.3.4
RTNETLINK answers: No such process
[root@localhost ~]#

Commit 83886b6b636173b206f475929e58fac75c6f2446 ("[NET]: Change "not found"
return value for rule lookup") changed fib_rules_lookup()
to use -ESRCH as a "not found" code internally, but for user space it
should be translated into -ENETUNREACH. Handle the translation centrally in
ipv4-specific fib_lookup(), leaving the DECnet case alone.

On a related note, commit b7a71b51ee37d919e4098cd961d59a883fd272d8
("ipv4: removed redundant conditional") removed a similar translation from
ip_route_input_slow() prematurely AIUI.

Fixes: b7a71b51ee37 ("ipv4: removed redundant conditional")
Signed-off-by: Panu Matilainen <pmatilai@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

inetdevice: fixed signed integer overflow

[ Upstream commit 84bc88688e3f6ef843aa8803dbcd90168bb89faf ]

There could be a signed overflow in the following code.

The expression, (32-logmask) is comprised between 0 and 31 included.
It may be equal to 31.
In such a case the left shift will produce a signed integer overflow.
According to the C99 Standard, this is an undefined behavior.
A simple fix is to replace the signed int 1 with the unsigned int 1U.

Signed-off-by: Vincent BENAYOUN <vincent.benayoun@trust-in-soft.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

sparc64: Fix constraints on swab helpers.

[ Upstream commit 5a2b59d3993e8ca4f7788a48a23e5cb303f26954 ]

We are reading the memory location, so we have to have a memory
constraint in there purely for the sake of showing the data flow
to the compiler.

Reported-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

uprobes, x86: Fix _TIF_UPROBE vs _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME

commit 82975bc6a6df743b9a01810fb32cb65d0ec5d60b upstream.

x86 call do_notify_resume on paranoid returns if TIF_UPROBE is set but
not on non-paranoid returns. I suspect that this is a mistake and that
the code only works because int3 is paranoid.

Setting _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME in the uprobe code was probably a workaround
for the x86 bug. With that bug fixed, we can remove _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME
from the uprobes code.

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86, mm: Set NX across entire PMD at boot

commit 45e2a9d4701d8c624d4a4bcdd1084eae31e92f58 upstream.

When setting up permissions on kernel memory at boot, the end of the
PMD that was split from bss remained executable. It should be NX like
the rest. This performs a PMD alignment instead of a PAGE alignment to
get the correct span of memory.

Before:
---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
...
0xffffffff8202d000-0xffffffff82200000  1868K     RW       GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82200000-0xffffffff82c00000    10M     RW   PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff82c00000-0xffffffff82df5000  2004K     RW       GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82df5000-0xffffffff82e00000    44K     RW       GLB x  pte
0xffffffff82e00000-0xffffffffc0000000   978M                     pmd

After:
---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
...
0xffffffff8202d000-0xffffffff82200000  1868K     RW       GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82200000-0xffffffff82e00000    12M     RW   PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff82e00000-0xffffffffc0000000   978M                     pmd

[ tglx: Changed it to roundup(_brk_end, PMD_SIZE) and added a comment.
        We really should unmap the reminder along with the holes
        caused by init,initdata etc. but thats a different issue ]

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114194737.GA3091@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86: Require exact match for 'noxsave' command line option

commit 2cd3949f702692cf4c5d05b463f19cd706a92dd3 upstream.

We have some very similarly named command-line options:

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:__setup("noxsave", x86_xsave_setup);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:__setup("noxsaveopt", x86_xsaveopt_setup);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:__setup("noxsaves", x86_xsaves_setup);

__setup() is designed to match options that take arguments, like
"foo=bar" where you would have:

__setup("foo", x86_foo_func...);

The problem is that "noxsave" actually _matches_ "noxsaves" in
the same way that "foo" matches "foo=bar". If you boot an old
kernel that does not know about "noxsaves" with "noxsaves" on the
command line, it will interpret the argument as "noxsave", which
is not what you want at all.

This makes the "noxsave" handler only return success when it finds
an *exact* match.

[ tglx: We really need to make __setup() more robust. ]

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141111220133.FE053984@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86_64, traps: Rework bad_iret

commit b645af2d5905c4e32399005b867987919cbfc3ae upstream.

It's possible for iretq to userspace to fail.  This can happen because
of a bad CS, SS, or RIP.

Historically, we've handled it by fixing up an exception from iretq to
land at bad_iret, which pretends that the failed iret frame was really
the hardware part of #GP(0) from userspace.  To make this work, there's
an extra fixup to fudge the gs base into a usable state.

This is suboptimal because it loses the original exception.  It's also
buggy because there's no guarantee that we were on the kernel stack to
begin with.  For example, if the failing iret happened on return from an
NMI, then we'll end up executing general_protection on the NMI stack.
This is bad for several reasons, the most immediate of which is that
general_protection, as a non-paranoid idtentry, will try to deliver
signals and/or schedule from the wrong stack.

This patch throws out bad_iret entirely.  As a replacement, it augments
the existing swapgs fudge into a full-blown iret fixup, mostly written
in C.  It's should be clearer and more correct.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS

commit 6f442be2fb22be02cafa606f1769fa1e6f894441 upstream.

On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.

On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.

This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.

This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86_64, traps: Fix the espfix64 #DF fixup and rewrite it in C

commit af726f21ed8af2cdaa4e93098dc211521218ae65 upstream.

There's nothing special enough about the espfix64 double fault fixup to
justify writing it in assembly. Move it to C.

This also fixes a bug: if the double fault came from an IST stack, the
old asm code would return to a partially uninitialized stack frame.

Fixes: 3891a04aafd668686239349ea58f3314ea2af86b
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

MIPS: Loongson: Make platform serial setup always built-in.

commit 26927f76499849e095714452b8a4e09350f6a3b9 upstream.

If SERIAL_8250 is compiled as a module, the platform specific setup
for Loongson will be a module too, and it will not work very well.
At least on Loongson 3 it will trigger a build failure,
since loongson_sysconf is not exported to modules.

Fix by making the platform specific serial code always built-in.

Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Reported-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Cc: Markos Chandras <Markos.Chandras@imgtec.com>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8533/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

MIPS: oprofile: Fix backtrace on 64-bit kernel

commit bbaf113a481b6ce32444c125807ad3618643ce57 upstream.

Fix incorrect cast that always results in wrong address for the new
frame on 64-bit kernels.

Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nsn.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8110/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

bcmdhd_1_77_nn: Fix android version check

bcmdhd_1_77_nn: Import nougat driver from A510FXXU7CRJ4 and switch to building it for the BCM4343

arm64: regernate lineageos_a3xelte_defconfig

Merge in Samsung changes from A510FXXU7CRJ4

KEYS: prevent KEYCTL_READ on negative key

commit 37863c43b2c6464f252862bf2e9768264e961678 upstream.

Because keyctl_read_key() looks up the key with no permissions
requested, it may find a negatively instantiated key.  If the key is
also possessed, we went ahead and called ->read() on the key.  But the
key payload will actually contain the ->reject_error rather than the
normal payload.  Thus, the kernel oopses trying to read the
user_key_payload from memory address (int)-ENOKEY = 0x00000000ffffff82.

Fortunately the payload data is stored inline, so it shouldn't be
possible to abuse this as an arbitrary memory read primitive...

Reproducer:
    keyctl new_session
    keyctl request2 user desc '' @s
    keyctl read $(keyctl show | awk '/user: desc/ {print $1}')

It causes a crash like the following:
     BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff92
     IP: user_read+0x33/0xa0
     PGD 36a54067 P4D 36a54067 PUD 0
     Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
     CPU: 0 PID: 211 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1 #337
     Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
     task: ffff90aa3b74c3c0 task.stack: ffff9878c0478000
     RIP: 0010:user_read+0x33/0xa0
     RSP: 0018:ffff9878c047bee8 EFLAGS: 00010246
     RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff90aa3d7da340 RCX: 0000000000000017
     RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffff82 RDI: ffff90aa3d7da340
     RBP: ffff9878c047bf00 R08: 00000024f95da94f R09: 0000000000000000
     R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
     R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
     FS:  00007f58ece69740(0000) GS:ffff90aa3e200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
     CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
     CR2: 00000000ffffff92 CR3: 0000000036adc001 CR4: 00000000003606f0
     Call Trace:
      keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xe0
      SyS_keyctl+0x99/0x120
      entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
     RIP: 0033:0x7f58ec787bb9
     RSP: 002b:00007ffc8d401678 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
     RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc8d402800 RCX: 00007f58ec787bb9
     RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000174a63ac RDI: 000000000000000b
     RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007ffc8d402809 R09: 0000000000000020
     R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffc8d402800
     R13: 00007ffc8d4016e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
     Code: e5 41 55 49 89 f5 41 54 49 89 d4 53 48 89 fb e8 a4 b4 ad ff 85 c0 74 09 80 3d b9 4c 96 00 00 74 43 48 8b b3 20 01 00 00 4d 85 ed <0f> b7 5e 10 74 29 4d 85 e4 74 24 4c 39 e3 4c 89 e2 4c 89 ef 48
     RIP: user_read+0x33/0xa0 RSP: ffff9878c047bee8
     CR2: 00000000ffffff92

Change-Id: Icb005a3f0f766690ff7303339372c369d2e2ca69
Fixes: 61ea0c0ba904 ("KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for possession")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>

KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length

commit 5649645d725c73df4302428ee4e02c869248b4c5 upstream.

sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a
NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's
->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods. Various key
types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did
not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a
NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was
present. Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero
rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail
with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified.

Change-Id: I1f7328e3f7677cee5b3e5ba3969b5f0f9a9d4927
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

KEYS: Change the name of the dead type to ".dead" to prevent user access

This fixes CVE-2017-6951.

Userspace should not be able to do things with the "dead" key type as it
doesn't have some of the helper functions set upon it that the kernel
needs. Attempting to use it may cause the kernel to crash.

Fix this by changing the name of the type to ".dead" so that it's rejected
up front on userspace syscalls by key_get_type_from_user().

Though this doesn't seem to affect recent kernels, it does affect older
ones, certainly those prior to:

commit c06cfb08b88dfbe13be44a69ae2fdc3a7c902d81
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue Sep 16 17:36:06 2014 +0100
KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse

which went in before 3.18-rc1.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()

commit 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add upstream

With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a
data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected,
e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a
master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end
of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also
clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.]

Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.4.y
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@android.com>

xfrm: policy: check policy direction value

The 'dir' parameter in xfrm_migrate() is a user-controlled byte which is used
as an array index. This can lead to an out-of-bound access, kernel lockup and
DoS. Add a check for the 'dir' value.

This fixes CVE-2017-11600.

Change-Id: I7ce3c3cc90e352d854ddb6361730918fe143b6ec
References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1474928
Fixes: 80c9abaabf42 ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.21-rc1
Reported-by: "bo Zhang" <zhangbo5891001@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>

BACKPORT: packet: in packet_do_bind, test fanout with bind_lock held

[ Upstream commit 4971613c1639d8e5f102c4e797c3bf8f83a5a69e ]

Once a socket has po->fanout set, it remains a member of the group
until it is destroyed. The prot_hook must be constant and identical
across sockets in the group.

If fanout_add races with packet_do_bind between the test of po->fanout
and taking the lock, the bind call may make type or dev inconsistent
with that of the fanout group.

Hold po->bind_lock when testing po->fanout to avoid this race.

I had to introduce artificial delay (local_bh_enable) to actually
observe the race.

Bug: 69160446
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Change-Id: I899f9b6bcbd1d4b033388ef22c472857574bfc30
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marissa Wall <marissaw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Siqi Lin <siqilin@google.com>

UPSTREAM: packet: fix tp_reserve race in packet_set_ring

[ Upstream commit c27927e372f0785f3303e8fad94b85945e2c97b7 ]

Updates to tp_reserve can race with reads of the field in
packet_set_ring. Avoid this by holding the socket lock during
updates in setsockopt PACKET_RESERVE.

This bug was discovered by syzkaller.

Fixes: 8913336a7e8d ("packet: add PACKET_RESERVE sockopt")
Bug: 68806121
Change-Id: Ifbceac3542a1b7f25290c3e21008fa76c59fe391
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Marissa Wall <marissaw@google.com>

UPSTREAM: packet: hold bind lock when rebinding to fanout hook

[ Upstream commit 008ba2a13f2d04c947adc536d19debb8fe66f110 ]

Packet socket bind operations must hold the po->bind_lock. This keeps
po->running consistent with whether the socket is actually on a ptype
list to receive packets.

fanout_add unbinds a socket and its packet_rcv/tpacket_rcv call, then
binds the fanout object to receive through packet_rcv_fanout.

Make it hold the po->bind_lock when testing po->running and rebinding.
Else, it can race with other rebind operations, such as that in
packet_set_ring from packet_rcv to tpacket_rcv. Concurrent updates
can result in a socket being added to a fanout group twice, causing
use-after-free KASAN bug reports, among others.

Reported independently by both trinity and syzkaller.
Verified that the syzkaller reproducer passes after this patch.

Bug: 69160446
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Change-Id: I6817d1f12654dd682a962cfd4645006a7315360d
Reported-by: nixioaming <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marissa Wall <marissaw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Siqi Lin <siqilin@google.com>

UPSTREAM: packet: fix races in fanout_add()

commit d199fab63c11998a602205f7ee7ff7c05c97164b upstream.

Multiple threads can call fanout_add() at the same time.

We need to grab fanout_mutex earlier to avoid races that could
lead to one thread freeing po->rollover that was set by another thread.

Do the same in fanout_release(), for peace of mind, and to help us
finding lockdep issues earlier.

[js] no rollover in 3.12

Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 2a272abc4e543f488b3a73292ee75a06f20d077a)
Bug: 37897645
Change-Id: I3b021869ee26b88d10f4d6408ce34d351543ce74

UPSTREAM: net/packet: fix overflow in check for tp_reserve

When calculating po->tp_hdrlen + po->tp_reserve the result can overflow.

Fix by checking that tp_reserve <= INT_MAX on assign.

Bug: 36725304
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit bcc5364bdcfe131e6379363f089e7b4108d35b70)

Change-Id: I17af0b50ea5b1caa8349e216b88ef57f5287de3c

UPSTREAM: net/packet: fix overflow in check for tp_frame_nr

When calculating rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr the result
can overflow.

Add a check that tp_block_size * tp_block_nr <= UINT_MAX.

Since frames_per_block <= tp_block_size, the expression would
never overflow.

Bug: 36725304
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 8f8d28e4d6d815a391285e121c3a53a0b6cb9e7b)

Change-Id: I86e923ec03855dd7c8faaddc861a6211d03f0bc2

ANDROID: qtaguid: Fix the UAF probelm with tag_ref_tree

When multiple threads is trying to tag/delete the same socket at the
same time, there is a chance the tag_ref_entry of the target socket to
be null before the uid_tag_data entry is freed. It is caused by the
ctrl_cmd_tag function where it doesn't correctly grab the spinlocks
when tagging a socket.

Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Bug: 65853158
Change-Id: I5d89885918054cf835370a52bff2d693362ac5f0
Git-repo: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/msm
Git-commit: a6661da56dc61b67cc65222b71896a775ceb17be
Signed-off-by: Dennis Cagle <dcagle@codeaurora.org>

ipx: call ipxitf_put() in ioctl error path

We should call ipxitf_put() if the copy_to_user() fails.

Change-Id: I861de4cc5255c83e45b8d0a2a7e30f0a47bc65cd
Reported-by: 李强 <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

BACKPORT: ip6_gre: fix ip6gre_err() invalid reads

Andrey Konovalov reported out of bound accesses in ip6gre_err()

If GRE flags contains GRE_KEY, the following expression
*(((__be32 *)p) + (grehlen / 4) - 1)

accesses data ~40 bytes after the expected point, since
grehlen includes the size of IPv6 headers.

Let's use a "struct gre_base_hdr *greh" pointer to make this
code more readable.

p[1] becomes greh->protocol.
grhlen is the GRE header length.

Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Pereira <rpere@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7892032cfe67f4bde6fc2ee967e45a8fbaf33756)
Bug:37871211
Change-Id: I839afd0948805b98e1aa6cbaca56f2e443f303af

tcp: detect malicious patterns in tcp_collapse_ofo_queue()

3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 3d4bf93ac12003f9b8e1e2de37fe27983deebdcf ]

In case an attacker feeds tiny packets completely out of order,
tcp_collapse_ofo_queue() might scan the whole rb-tree, performing
expensive copies, but not changing socket memory usage at all.

1) Do not attempt to collapse tiny skbs.
2) Add logic to exit early when too many tiny skbs are detected.

We prefer not doing aggressive collapsing (which copies packets)
for pathological flows, and revert to tcp_prune_ofo_queue() which
will be less expensive.

In the future, we might add the possibility of terminating flows
that are proven to be malicious.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0

commit 499350a5a6e7512d9ed369ed63a4244b6536f4f8 upstream.

When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>

Revert "net: increase fragment memory usage limits"

This reverts commit c2a936600f78aea00d3312ea4b66a79a4619f9b4.

iovec: make sure the caller actually wants anything in memcpy_fromiovecend

Based on upstream change 06ebb06d49486676272a3c030bfeef4bd969a8e6

One more instance when the caller requests 0 bytes instead of running
off and dereferencing potentially invalid iovecs.

Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Bug: 36279469
Change-Id: Ib8d529e17c07c77357ab70bd6a2d7e305d6b27f0

netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets

commit b71812168571fa55e44cdd0254471331b9c4c4c6 upstream.

We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.

The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.

Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.

Reported-by: <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Bug: 77902350
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: I01c7b86ed219c461113208c575148fe84f96317a

BACKPORT: Sanitize 'move_pages()' permission checks

The 'move_paghes()' system call was introduced long long ago with the
same permission checks as for sending a signal (except using
CAP_SYS_NICE instead of CAP_SYS_KILL for the overriding capability).

That turns out to not be a great choice - while the system call really
only moves physical page allocations around (and you need other
capabilities to do a lot of it), you can check the return value to map
out some the virtual address choices and defeat ASLR of a binary that
still shares your uid.

So change the access checks to the more common 'ptrace_may_access()'
model instead.

This tightens the access checks for the uid, and also effectively
changes the CAP_SYS_NICE check to CAP_SYS_PTRACE, but it's unlikely that
anybody really _uses_ this legacy system call any more (we hav ebetter
NUMA placement models these days), so I expect nobody to notice.

Famous last words.

Reported-by: Otto Ebeling <otto.ebeling@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Bug: 65468230
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
cherry-picked from: 197e7e521384a23b9e585178f3f11c9fa08274b9

This branch does not have the PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS flag but its
default behavior is the same as PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS. So use
PTRACE_MODE_READ instead of PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS.

Change-Id: I75364561d91155c01f78dd62cdd41c5f0f418854

ANDROID: lib: vsprintf: Add "%paP" option

Add %paP for physical address that need to always be shown, regardless
of kptr restrictions.

Bug: 37723342
Bug: 30368199
Change-Id: I4884854d9465be89f366d4d7b56c825918b91599
Signed-off-by: Chris Fries <cfries@google.com>

ANDROID: lib: vsprintf: default kptr_restrict to the maximum value

Set the initial value of kptr_restrict to the maximum
setting rather than the minimum setting, to ensure that
early boot logging is not leaking information.

BUG: 30368199
Change-Id: If738e3b2ff85b737127daf16f2f3a722e616f389
Signed-off-by: Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>

ANDROID: lib: vsprintf: physical address kernel pointer filtering options

Add the kptr_restrict setting of 4 which results in %pa and
%p[rR] values being replaced by zeros.

BUG: 30368199
Change-Id: I2cfac7cd0d9c05dbad07c683fac79aea8c2ba59d
Signed-off-by: Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>

ANDROID: lib: vsprintf: additional kernel pointer filtering options

Add the kptr_restrict setting of 3 which results in both
%p and %pK values being replaced by zeros.

Add an additional %pP value inspired by the Grsecurity
option which explicitly whitelists pointers for output.

This patch is based on work by William Roberts
<william.c.roberts@intel.com>

BUG: 30368199
Change-Id: Ic5cef86617f7758514271edd67199683d2c4e2bb
Signed-off-by: Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>

BACKPORT: ASN.1: fix out-of-bounds read when parsing indefinite length item

In asn1_ber_decoder(), indefinitely-sized ASN.1 items were being passed
to the action functions before their lengths had been computed, using
the bogus length of 0x80 (ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH).  This resulted in
reading data past the end of the input buffer, when given a specially
crafted message.

Fix it by rearranging the code so that the indefinite length is resolved
before the action is called.

This bug was originally found by fuzzing the X.509 parser in userspace
using libFuzzer from the LLVM project.

KASAN report (cleaned up slightly):

    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy ./include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in x509_fabricate_name.constprop.1+0x1a4/0x940 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:366
    Read of size 128 at addr ffff880035dd9eaf by task keyctl/195

    CPU: 1 PID: 195 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
    Call Trace:
     __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
     dump_stack+0xd1/0x175 lib/dump_stack.c:53
     print_address_description+0x78/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252
     kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
     kasan_report+0x23f/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
     memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:302
     memcpy ./include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
     x509_fabricate_name.constprop.1+0x1a4/0x940 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:366
     asn1_ber_decoder+0xb4a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:447
     x509_cert_parse+0x1c7/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:89
     x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
     asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
     key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
     SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
     SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96

    Allocated by task 195:
     __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab.c:3675 [inline]
     __kmalloc_node+0x47/0x60 mm/slab.c:3682
     kvmalloc ./include/linux/mm.h:540 [inline]
     SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:104 [inline]
     SyS_add_key+0x19e/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96

Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e0058f3a874ebb48b25be7ff79bc3b4e59929f90)

Bug: 73827422
Change-Id: Ib1278bd75b3be8e41b2ab0dc3a750d52006acc4b
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>

UPSTREAM: KEYS: fix out-of-bounds read during ASN.1 parsing

syzkaller with KASAN reported an out-of-bounds read in
asn1_ber_decoder().  It can be reproduced by the following command,
assuming CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y:

    keyctl add asymmetric desc $'\x30\x30' @s

The bug is that the length of an ASN.1 data value isn't validated in the
case where it is encoded using the short form, causing the decoder to
read past the end of the input buffer.  Fix it by validating the length.

The bug report was:

    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in asn1_ber_decoder+0x10cb/0x1730 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233
    Read of size 1 at addr ffff88003cccfa02 by task syz-executor0/6818

    CPU: 1 PID: 6818 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7-00008-g5f479447d983 #2
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    Call Trace:
     __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
     dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b lib/dump_stack.c:52
     print_address_description+0x79/0x2a0 mm/kasan/report.c:252
     kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
     kasan_report+0x236/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
     __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
     asn1_ber_decoder+0x10cb/0x1730 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233
     x509_cert_parse+0x1db/0x650 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:89
     x509_key_preparse+0x64/0x7a0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
     asymmetric_key_preparse+0xcb/0x1a0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
     key_create_or_update+0x347/0xb20 security/keys/key.c:855
     SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
     SyS_add_key+0x1cd/0x340 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
    RIP: 0033:0x447c89
    RSP: 002b:00007fca7a5d3bd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f8
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fca7a5d46cc RCX: 0000000000447c89
    RDX: 0000000020006f4a RSI: 0000000020006000 RDI: 0000000020001ff5
    RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: fffffffffffffffd R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fca7a5d49c0 R15: 00007fca7a5d4700

Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2eb9eabf1e868fda15808954fb29b0f105ed65f1)

Bug: 73827422
Change-Id: I3c57fd16ebc63214c4225e85004b1339fbc41728
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>

futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation

3.2.100-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>

commit fbe0e839d1e22d88810f3ee3e2f1479be4c0aa4a upstream.

UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:

UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'

Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.

Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

UPSTREAM: USB: serial: console: fix use-after-free after failed setup

commit 299d7572e46f98534033a9e65973f13ad1ce9047

Make sure to reset the USB-console port pointer when console setup fails
in order to avoid having the struct usb_serial be prematurely freed by
the console code when the device is later disconnected.

Bug: 69050921
Change-Id: I46e86fddd10611a30e7f4ab62ba07dc6eccc0312
Fixes: 73e487fdb75f ("[PATCH] USB console: fix disconnection issues")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.18
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>

ANDROID: usb: gadget: f_mtp: Return error if count is negative

If the user passes in a negative file size in a int64,
this will compare to be smaller than buffer length,
and it will get truncated to form a read length that
is larger than the buffer length.

To fix, return -EINVAL if the count argument is negative,
so the loop will never happen.

Bug: 37429972
Test: Test with PoC
Change-Id: I5d52e38e6fbe2c17eb8c493f9eb81df6cfd780a4
Signed-off-by: Jerry Zhang <zhangjerry@google.com>

UPSTREAM: USB: fix out-of-bounds in usb_set_configuration

commit bd7a3fe770ebd8391d1c7d072ff88e9e76d063eb

Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for a USB interface
association descriptor. He writes:
It seems there's no proper size check of a USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION
descriptor. It's only checked that the size is >= 2 in
usb_parse_configuration(), so find_iad() might do out-of-bounds access
to intf_assoc->bInterfaceCount.

And he's right, we don't check for crazy descriptors of this type very well, so
resolve this problem. Yet another issue found by syzkaller...

Bug: 69052055
Change-Id: I2cc3b5a66d16abd0fc567d69457fc90a45eb12d8
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

UPSTREAM: USB: core: fix out-of-bounds access bug in usb_get_bos_descriptor()

commit 1c0edc3633b56000e18d82fc241e3995ca18a69e

Andrey used the syzkaller fuzzer to find an out-of-bounds memory
access in usb_get_bos_descriptor(). The code wasn't checking that the
next usb_dev_cap_header structure could fit into the remaining buffer
space.

This patch fixes the error and also reduces the bNumDeviceCaps field
in the header to match the actual number of capabilities found, in
cases where there are fewer than expected.

Bug: 69052675
Change-Id: Ica990541695ce5ba46ca8d2bd01e8230dcf5dcd4
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

staging: android: ashmem: fix a race condition in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl

A lock-unlock is missing in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl which can result in a
race condition when mmap is called. After the !asma->file check, before
setting asma->size, asma->file can be set in mmap. That would result in
having different asma->size than the mapped memory size. Combined with
ASHMEM_UNPIN ioctl and shrinker invocation, this can result in memory
corruption.

Bug: 66954097
Signed-off-by: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors@google.com>
Change-Id: Ia52312a75ade30bc94be6b94420f17f34e0c1f86
CVE-2017-13216
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
(cherry picked from commit b150b0606691a89adfd4729238a1c92b8011a207)

Input: gtco - fix potential out-of-bound access

On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 01:04:03PM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 7:28 AM, Dmitry Torokhov
> <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> wrote:
> > parse_hid_report_descriptor() has a while (i < length) loop, which
> > only guarantees that there's at least 1 byte in the buffer, but the
> > loop body can read multiple bytes which causes out-of-bounds access.
> >
> > Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
> > ---
> >  drivers/input/tablet/gtco.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++-------
> >  1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/input/tablet/gtco.c b/drivers/input/tablet/gtco.c
> > index b796e891e2ee..0351203b8c24 100644
> > --- a/drivers/input/tablet/gtco.c
> > +++ b/drivers/input/tablet/gtco.c
> > @@ -230,13 +230,24 @@ static void parse_hid_report_descriptor(struct gtco *device, char * report,
> >
> >         /* Walk  this report and pull out the info we need */
> >         while (i < length) {
> > -               prefix = report[i];
> > -
> > -               /* Skip over prefix */
> > -               i++;
> > +               prefix = report[i++];
> >
> >                 /* Determine data size and save the data in the proper variable */
> > -               size = PREF_SIZE(prefix);
> > +               if (PREF_SIZE(prefix) < 1) {
>
> AFAIU PREF_SIZE(prefix) == 0 is a perfectly valid item data size.

Fair enough. How about the below instead then?

ipv6: fix udpv6 sendmsg crash caused by too small MTU

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mike Maloney <maloney@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 749439bfac6e1a2932c582e2699f91d329658196 ]

The logic in __ip6_append_data() assumes that the MTU is at least large
enough for the headers.  A device's MTU may be adjusted after being
added while sendmsg() is processing data, resulting in
__ip6_append_data() seeing any MTU.  For an mtu smaller than the size of
the fragmentation header, the math results in a negative 'maxfraglen',
which causes problems when refragmenting any previous skb in the
skb_write_queue, leaving it possibly malformed.

Instead sendmsg returns EINVAL when the mtu is calculated to be less
than IPV6_MIN_MTU.

Found by syzkaller:
kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2064!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
   (ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 14216 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4+ #2
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
task: ffff8801d0b68580 task.stack: ffff8801ac6b8000
RIP: 0010:__skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2064 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__ip6_make_skb+0x18cf/0x1f70 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1617
RSP: 0018:ffff8801ac6bf570 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000028 RCX: ffffc90003cce000
RDX: 00000000000001b8 RSI: ffffffff839df06f RDI: ffff8801d9478ca0
RBP: ffff8801ac6bf780 R08: ffff8801cc3f1dbc R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8801ac6bf7a0 R11: 43cb4b7b1948a9e7 R12: ffff8801cc3f1dc8
R13: ffff8801cc3f1d40 R14: 0000000000001036 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS:  00007f43d740c700(0000) GS:ffff8801dc100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f7834984000 CR3: 00000001d79b9000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
ip6_finish_skb include/net/ipv6.h:911 [inline]
udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x255/0x390 net/ipv6/udp.c:1093
udpv6_sendmsg+0x280d/0x31a0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1363
inet_sendmsg+0x11f/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643
SYSC_sendto+0x352/0x5a0 net/socket.c:1750
SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1718
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4512e9
RSP: 002b:00007f43d740bc08 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000007180a8 RCX: 00000000004512e9
RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020d08000 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 00000000209c1000 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: 0000000000040800 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00000000004b9c69
R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000005 R15: 00000000202c2000
Code: 9e 01 fe e9 c5 e8 ff ff e8 7f 9e 01 fe e9 4a ea ff ff 48 89 f7 e8 52 9e 01 fe e9 aa eb ff ff e8 a8 b6 cf fd 0f 0b e8 a1 b6 cf fd <0f> 0b 49 8d 45 78 4d 8d 45 7c 48 89 85 78 fe ff ff 49 8d 85 ba
RIP: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2064 [inline] RSP: ffff8801ac6bf570
RIP: __ip6_make_skb+0x18cf/0x1f70 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1617 RSP: ffff8801ac6bf570

Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Maloney <maloney@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket message is big enough to hold an IP header

raw_send_hdrinc() and rawv6_send_hdrinc() expect that the buffer copied
from the userspace contains the IPv4/IPv6 header, so if too few bytes are
copied, parts of the header may remain uninitialized.

This bug has been detected with KMSAN.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>

sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit df80cd9b28b9ebaa284a41df611dbf3a2d05ca74 ]

Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.

As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.

This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:

  socket$inet6_sctp()
  bind$inet6()
  sendto$inet6()
  unshare(0x40000000)
  getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
  getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()

This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.

Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.

Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

arm64: issue isb when trapping CNTVCT_EL0 access

Change-Id: I6005a6e944494257bfc2243fde2f7a09c3fd76c6
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraju@codeaurora.org>

v4l2: Refactor, fix security bug in compat ioctl32

The 32-bit compat v4l2 ioctl is implemented based on its 64-bit
equivalent. It converts 32-bit data structures into its 64-bit
equivalents and needs to provide the data to the 64-bit ioctl in user
space memory which is commonly allocated using
compat_alloc_user_space(). However, due to how that function is
implemented, it can only be called a single time for every syscall
invocation. Supposedly to avoid this limitation, the existing code uses
a mix of memory from the kernel stack and memory allocated through
compat_alloc_user_space(). Under normal circumstances, this would not
work, because the 64-bit ioctl expects all pointers to point to user
space memory. As a workaround, set_fs(KERNEL_DS) is called to
temporarily disable this extra safety check and allow kernel pointers.
However, this might introduce a security vulnerability: The
result of the 32-bit to 64-bit conversion is writeable by user space
because the output buffer has been allocated via
compat_alloc_user_space(). A malicious user space process could then
manipulate pointers inside this output buffer, and due to the previous
set_fs(KERNEL_DS) call, functions like get_user() or put_user() no longer
prevent kernel memory access.

The new approach is to pre-calculate the total amount of user space
memory that is needed, allocate it using compat_alloc_user_space() and
then divide up the allocated memory to accommodate all data structures
that need to be converted.

An alternative approach would have been to retain the union type karg
that they allocated on the kernel stack in do_video_ioctl(), copy all
data from user space into karg and then back to user space. However,
we decided against this approach because it does not align with other
compat syscall implementations. Instead, we tried to replicate the
get_user/put_user pairs as found in other places in the kernel:

if (get_user(clipcount, &up->clipcount) ||
put_user(clipcount, &kp->clipcount)) return -EFAULT;

BUG: 34624167
Change-Id: Ica92695d8ddf60c0a067ea2f833f22a71710932e
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mentz <danielmentz@google.com>
Reported-by: C0RE Team

UPSTREAM: HID: usbhid: fix out-of-bounds bug

commit f043bfc98c193c284e2cd768fefabe18ac2fed9b

The hid descriptor identifies the length and type of subordinate
descriptors for a device. If the received hid descriptor is smaller than
the size of the struct hid_descriptor, it is possible to cause
out-of-bounds.

In addition, if bNumDescriptors of the hid descriptor have an incorrect
value, this can also cause out-of-bounds while approaching hdesc->desc[n].

So check the size of hid descriptor and bNumDescriptors.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006c5f8edf by task kworker/1:2/1261

CPU: 1 PID: 1261 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted
4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #169
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1004
hid_add_device+0x16b/0xb30 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2944
usbhid_probe+0xc28/0x1100 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1369
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431

Bug: 69052348
Change-Id: I4239036291a1722baa83274fc730060527231db9
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaejoong Kim <climbbb.kim@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

clocksource: arch_timer: make virtual counter access configurable

Bug: 68266545
Change-Id: Ibdb1fd768b748002b90bfc165612c12c8311f8a2

UPSTREAM: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release

范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.

In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.

(cherry-picked from ae6650163c66a7eff1acd6eb8b0f752dcfa8eba5)

Bug: 72867809
Change-Id: Iada5ceba515f0137db8c95d0746e8ffc753037f3
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Marissa Wall <marissaw@google.com>

crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed

commit af3ff8045bbf3e32f1a448542e73abb4c8ceb6f1 upstream.

Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash
algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))"
through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC
being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being
called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow.

This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real
problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3)
because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer,
and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that,
but SHA-3 is not.  However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent
hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything.

Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed.  Then update the HMAC
template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed.

Here is a reproducer:

    #include <linux/if_alg.h>
    #include <sys/socket.h>

    int main()
    {
        int algfd;
        struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
            .salg_type = "hash",
            .salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))",
        };
        char key[4096] = { 0 };

        algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
        bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
        setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
    }

Here was the KASAN report from syzbot:

    BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341  [inline]
    BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0  crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
    Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044

    CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25
    Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS  Google 01/01/2011
    Call Trace:
      __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
      dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
      print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
      kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
      kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
      check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
      check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
      memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
      memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
      sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
      crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109
      shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151
      crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
      hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152
      crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
      shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172
      crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186
      hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66
      crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64
      shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207
      crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200
      hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446
      alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline]
      alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254
      SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline]
      SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830
      entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96

Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Bug: 71752561
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: Ib101c789fc49f1a80cffeedd78f166956a35287b

crypto: algif_skcipher - Load TX SG list after waiting

We need to load the TX SG list in sendmsg(2) after waiting for
incoming data, not before.

connoro@google.com: backport to 3.18,where the relevant logic is
located in skcipher_recvmsg() rather than skcipher_recvmsg_sync()

Change-Id: I4e18b385fe50c844cd62a2eb20122036ea4dfe09
Git-commit: 36c84b22ac8aa041cbdfbe48a55ebb32e3521704
Git-repo: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common.git
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kishor PK <kpbhat@codeaurora.org>

BACKPORT: arm64: Add CNTFRQ_EL0 trap handler

We now trap accesses to CNTVCT_EL0 when the counter is broken
enough to require the kernel to mediate the access. But it
turns out that some existing userspace (such as OpenMPI) do
probe for the counter frequency, leading to an UNDEF exception
as CNTVCT_EL0 and CNTFRQ_EL0 share the same control bit.

The fix is to handle the exception the same way we do for CNTVCT_EL0.

Fixes: a86bd139f2ae ("arm64: arch_timer: Enable CNTVCT_EL0 trap if workaround is enabled")
Reported-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9842119a238bfb92cbab63258dabb54f0e7b111b)

Change-Id: Ie5a9a93fcca238d6097ecacd6df0e540be90220b
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraju@codeaurora.org>

BACKPORT: arm64: Add CNTVCT_EL0 trap handler

Since people seem to make a point in breaking the userspace visible
counter, we have no choice but to trap the access. Add the required
handler.

Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6126ce0588eb5a0752d5c8b5796a7fca324fd887)

Change-Id: I0705f47c85a78040df38df18f51a4a22500b904d
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraju@codeaurora.org>

ASoC: samsung-idma: Add limit check of offset and size in idma_mmap

UPSTREAM: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting

commit 124751d5e63c823092060074bd0abaae61aaa9c4 upstream.

USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe.  This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
   dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
   print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
   kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
   kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
   __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
   snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
   __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
   ....

  Allocated by task 1484:
   save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
   save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
   set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
   kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
   kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
   kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
   kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
   snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
   create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
   snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
   create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
   snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
   usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
   ....

  Freed by task 1484:
   save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
   save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
   set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
   kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
   slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
   slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
   slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
   kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
   snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
   snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
   __snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
   snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
   snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
   release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
   device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
   ....

Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.

In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.

Bug: 69051382
Change-Id: Ibe5b1f714cd304cfefcd736d0bcfc168c54f8a48
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marissa Wall <marissaw@google.com>

UPSTREAM: ALSA: usb-audio: Check out-of-bounds access by corrupted buffer descriptor

commit bfc81a8bc18e3c4ba0cbaa7666ff76be2f998991

When a USB-audio device receives a maliciously adjusted or corrupted
buffer descriptor, the USB-audio driver may access an out-of-bounce
value at its parser.  This was detected by syzkaller, something like:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0
  Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006b83a9e8 by task kworker/0:1/24
  CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #224
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
  Call Trace:
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
   dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
   print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
   kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
   kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
   __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
   snd_usb_create_streams sound/usb/card.c:248
   usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0 sound/usb/card.c:605
   usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
   really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
   driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
   __device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
   bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
   __device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
   device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
   bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
   device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
   usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
   generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
   usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
   really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
   driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
   __device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
   bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
   __device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
   device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
   bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
   device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
   usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
   hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
   hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
   port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
   hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
   process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
   worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
   kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
   ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431

This patch adds the checks of out-of-bounce accesses at appropriate
places and bails out when it goes out of the given buffer.

Bug: 69051731
Change-Id: If4bed53e824123f7dc2df2cf0ec9ce98560cf259
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

UPSTREAM: ALSA: timer: Call notifier in the same spinlock

snd_timer_notify1() is called outside the spinlock and it retakes the
lock after the unlock. This is rather racy, and it's safer to move
snd_timer_notify() call inside the main spinlock.

The patch also contains a slight refactoring / cleanup of the code.
Now all start/stop/continue/pause look more symmetric and a bit better
readable.

Bug: 37240993
Change-Id: Ib90099f88c8b04928a8cdd2808cd9e16da6d519c
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Siqi Lin <siqilin@google.com>

UPSTREAM: ALSA: timer: Fix race between stop and interrupt

commit ed8b1d6d2c741ab26d60d499d7fbb7ac801f0f51 upstream.

A slave timer element also unlinks at snd_timer_stop() but it takes
only slave_active_lock. When a slave is assigned to a master,
however, this may become a race against the master's interrupt
handling, eventually resulting in a list corruption. The actual bug
could be seen with a syzkaller fuzzer test case in BugLink below.

As a fix, we need to take timeri->timer->lock when timer isn't NULL,
i.e. assigned to a master, while the assignment to a master itself is
protected by slave_active_lock.

Bug: 37240993
Change-Id: Ib6eae144d5fdc92546d2210bcd6bc56454ad3e42
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Y_Bm+7epAb=8Wi=AaWd+DYS7qawX52qxdCfOfY49vozQ@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Siqi Lin <siqilin@google.com>

UPSTREAM: ALSA: timer: Fix link corruption due to double start or stop

commit f784beb75ce82f4136f8a0960d3ee872f7109e09 upstream.

Although ALSA timer code got hardening for races, it still causes
use-after-free error.  This is however rather a corrupted linked list,
not actually the concurrent accesses.  Namely, when timer start is
triggered twice, list_add_tail() is called twice, too.  This ends
up with the link corruption and triggers KASAN error.

The simplest fix would be replacing list_add_tail() with
list_move_tail(), but fundamentally it's the problem that we don't
check the double start/stop correctly.  So, the right fix here is to
add the proper checks to snd_timer_start() and snd_timer_stop() (and
their variants).

Bug: 37240993
Change-Id: I86a327c4479fecf9b502ba6122c8ae67a2326754
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+ZyPRoMQjmawbvmCEDrkBD2BQuH7R09=eOkf5ESK8kJAw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Siqi Lin <siqilin@google.com>

UPSTREAM: ALSA: timer: Code cleanup

commit c3b1681375dc6e71d89a3ae00cc3ce9e775a8917 upstream.

This is a minor code cleanup without any functional changes:
- Kill keep_flag argument from _snd_timer_stop(), as all callers pass
only it false.
- Remove redundant NULL check in _snd_timer_stop().

Bug: 37240993
Change-Id: Idc3778ca1cd62b8c22e2a57b3c1130fe7b3d13f6
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Siqi Lin <siqilin@google.com>

BACKPORT: ALSA: timer: Handle disconnection more safely

[ Upstream commit 230323dac060123c340cf75997971145a42661ee ]

Currently ALSA timer device doesn't take the disconnection into
account very well; it merely unlinks the timer device at disconnection
callback but does nothing else.  Because of this, when an application
accessing the timer device is disconnected, it may release the
resource before actually closed.  In most cases, it results in a
warning message indicating a leftover timer instance like:
   ALSA: timer xxxx is busy?
But basically this is an open race.

This patch tries to address it.  The strategy is like other ALSA
devices: namely,
- Manage card's refcount at each open/close
- Wake up the pending tasks at disconnection
- Check the shutdown flag appropriately at each possible call

Note that this patch has one ugly hack to handle the wakeup of pending
tasks.  It'd be cleaner to introduce a new disconnect op to
snd_timer_instance ops.  But since it would lead to internal ABI
breakage and it eventually increase my own work when backporting to
stable kernels, I took a different path to implement locally in
timer.c.  A cleanup patch will follow at next for 4.5 kernel.

Bug: 37240993
Change-Id: I05c7f0e7d28b63fc343091f800ceae9ec2afe4a4
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109431
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Siqi Lin <siqilin@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit 230323dac060123c340cf75997971145a42661ee)

ALSA: timer: Fix wrong instance passed to slave callbacks

commit 117159f0b9d392fb433a7871426fad50317f06f7 upstream.

In snd_timer_notify1(), the wrong timer instance was passed for slave
ccallback function. This leads to the access to the wrong data when
an incompatible master is handled (e.g. the master is the sequencer
timer and the slave is a user timer), as spotted by syzkaller fuzzer.

This patch fixes that wrong assignment.

BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Y_Bm+7epAb=8Wi=AaWd+DYS7qawX52qxdCfOfY49vozQ@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ALSA: pcm: prevent UAF in snd_pcm_info

When the device descriptor is closed, the `substream->runtime` pointer
is freed. But another thread may be in the ioctl handler, case
SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_PCM_INFO. This case calls snd_pcm_info_user() which
calls snd_pcm_info() which accesses the now freed `substream->runtime`.

Bug: 36006981
Signed-off-by: Robb Glasser <rglasser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Change-Id: I445d24bc21dc0af6d9522a8daabe64969042236a

ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port

commit 71105998845fb012937332fe2e806d443c09e026 upstream.

There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing.  snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G    B          ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
   kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
  [<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
  [<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
  [<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
  [<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
  [<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
  [<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
  [<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
  .....

We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use.  Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.

This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.

Change-Id: Ib5c62082b3ba72f6a811f9f1e44a033f8a5e23e6
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ipv6: add option to drop unsolicited neighbor
advertisements

In certain 802.11 wireless deployments, there will be NA proxies
that use knowledge of the network to correctly answer requests.
To prevent unsolicitd advertisements on the shared medium from
being a problem, on such deployments wireless needs to drop them.

Enable this by providing an option called "drop_unsolicited_na".

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

ipv4: add option to drop gratuitous ARP packets

In certain 802.11 wireless deployments, there will be ARP proxies
that use knowledge of the network to correctly answer requests.
To prevent gratuitous ARP frames on the shared medium from being
a problem, on such deployments wireless needs to drop them.

Enable this by providing an option called "drop_gratuitous_arp".

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

ANDROID: sdcardfs: fix potential crash when reserved_mb is not zero

sdcardfs_mkdir() calls check_min_free_space(). When reserved_mb is not zero, a negative dentry will be passed to
ext4_statfs() at last and ext4_statfs() will crash. The parent dentry is positive. So we use the parent dentry to
check free space.

Change-Id: I80ab9623fe59ba911f4cc9f0e029a1c6f7ee421b
Signed-off-by: Lianjun Huang <huanglianjun@vivo.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Keith <javelinanddart@gmail.com>

ANDROID: sdcardfs: Don't d_drop in d_revalidate

After d_revalidate returns 0, the vfs will call
d_invalidate, which will call d_drop itself, along
with other cleanup.

Bug: 78262592
Change-Id: Idbb30e008c05d62edf2217679cb6a5517d8d1a2c
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Keith <javelinanddart@gmail.com>

ANDROID: sdcardfs: Set s_root to NULL after putting

Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Keith <javelinanddart@gmail.com>
Bug: 77923821
Change-Id: I1705bfd146009561d2d1da5f0e6a342ec6932a1c

ANDROID: sdcardfs: d_make_root calls iput

d_make_root will call iput on failure, so we
shouldn't try to do that ourselves.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Keith <javelinanddart@gmail.com>
Bug: 77923821
Change-Id: I1abb4afb0f894ab917b7c6be8c833676f436beb7

ANDROID: sdcardfs: Check for private data earlier

When an sdcardfs dentry is destroyed, it may not yet
have its fsdata initialized. It must be checked before
we try to access the paths in its private data.

Additionally, when cleaning up the superblock after
a failure, we don't have our sb private data, so
check for that case.

Bug: 77923821
Change-Id: I89caf6e121ed86480b42024664453fe0031bbcf3
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Keith <javelinanddart@gmail.com>

ANDROID: sdcardfs: Fix sdcardfs to stop creating cases-sensitive duplicate entries.

sdcardfs_name_match gets a 'name' argument from the underlying FS.
This need not be null terminated string.
So in sdcardfs_name_match -> qstr_case_eq -> we should use
str_n_case_eq.

This happens because few of the entries in lower level FS may not be
NULL terminated and may have some garbage characters passed while
doing sdcardfs_name_match.

For e.g.
# dmesg |grep Download
[  103.646386] sdcardfs_name_match: q1->name=.nomedia, q1->len=8,
q2->name=Download\x17\x80\x03, q2->len=8
[  104.021340] sdcardfs_name_match: q1->name=.nomedia, q1->len=8,
q2->name=Download\x17\x80\x03, q2->len=8
[  105.196864] sdcardfs_name_match: q1->name=.nomedia, q1->len=8,
q2->name=Download\x17\x80\x03, q2->len=8
[  109.113521] sdcardfs_name_match: q1->name=logs, q1->len=4,
q2->name=Download\x17\x80\x03, q2->len=8

Now when we try to create a directory with different case for a such
files. SDCARDFS creates a entry if it could not find the underlying
entry in it's dcache.

To reproduce:-
1. bootup the device wait for some time after sdcardfs mounting to
   complete.
2. cd /storage/emulated/0
3. echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
4. mkdir download

We now start seeing two entries with name.
Download & download.

Change-Id: I976d92a220a607dd8cdb96c01c2041c5c2bc3326
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Keith <javelinanddart@gmail.com>
bug: 75987238

net: wireless: use bcmdhd_1_77 for BCM43455

net: wireless: bcmdhd_1_77: Heap overflow in wl_run_escan.

1) The default_chan_list buffer overflow is avoided by checking
n_nodfs index does not exceed num_chans, which is the length
of default_chan_list buffer.
2) The SSID length check 32(max limit) is done and then the SSID
name copied in extra buffer is null terminated. The extra buffer
is allocated a length of of 33 in wl_iw_ioctl.c.
3) Issue of chances of cumulative results->pkt_count length
exceeding allocated memory length of results->total_count is
avoided in this fix. change_array is the destination array
whose length is allocated to results->total_count.

Signed-off-by: Sudhir Kohalli <sudhir.kohalli@broadcom.com>
Bug: 34197514
Bug: 34199963
Bug: 34198729

Change-Id: I0cd268ab696daac938a99f451607a3f4b2cfaed3
[haggertk]: Partial patch - dhd_handle_swc_evt() changes not relevant,
this bcmdhd version does not contain that function
CVE-2017-0568
CVE-2017-0569
CVE-2017-0570
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>

net: wireless: bcmdhd_1_77: fix buffer overrun in wl_android_set_roampref

added boundary check not to override allocated buffer.
Specially when user input corrupted or manipulated.

Signed-off-by: Insun Song <insun.song@broadcom.com>
Change-Id: Id6196da10111517696eda5f186b1e2dd19f66085
Bug: 34469904
CVE-2017-0573
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>

bcmdhd_1_77: Fix android version check, VENDOR_PATH, and remove unused makefiles

bcmdhd_1_77: Import A320F (A320FLXXU2CRE3) Oreo driver

Update A3 display colour correction tables from the A320F (A320FLXXU2CRE3)

Change-Id: Iefa1444dac9760a689ef12e9125e738673f85945

arm64: update a3xeltexx dts files to fix device charging

Change-Id: I14e72bd7911184e0072946d9da4581c7771cd83b

arm64: import a3xeltexx defconfig

Change-Id: I13caafb8878d2cb449321b8493338e9a31be9d34

fs/exec: fix use after free in execve

"file" can be already freed if bprm->file is NULL after
search_binary_handler() return. binfmt_script will do exactly that for
example. If the VM reuses the file after fput run(), this will result in
a use ater free.

So obtain d_is_su before search_binary_handler() runs.

This should explain this crash:

[25333.009554] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000185
[..]
[25333.009918] [2: am:21861] PC is at do_execve+0x354/0x474

Change-Id: I2a8a814d1c0aa75625be83cb30432cf13f1a0681
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>

fs: readdir: Fix su hide patch for non-iterate filesystems

* 3.10 doesn't normally use iterate for filesystems,
  but it was backported in hopes of removing vfs_readdir()
* Because the romnt variable was only set for filesystems
  using iterate, the su hide patches were broken for many
  filesytems like ext4, which still use vfs_readdir()
  instead of iterate_dir() like their mainline counterparts
* Remove the iterate check around setting romnt to fix this

Change-Id: I26426683df0fd199a80f053294f352e31754bec5

kernel: Fix potential refcount leak in su check

Change-Id: I7e1ecb78bfc951bf645a1462988dcd93c4247a9b

kernel: Only expose su when daemon is running

It has been claimed that the PG implementation of 'su' has security
vulnerabilities even when disabled. Unfortunately, the people that
find these vulnerabilities often like to keep them private so they
can profit from exploits while leaving users exposed to malicious
hackers.

In order to reduce the attack surface for vulnerabilites, it is
therefore necessary to make 'su' completely inaccessible when it
is not in use (except by the root and system users).

Change-Id: I79716c72f74d0b7af34ec3a8054896c6559a181d

random32: include missing header file

Add missing include for timer.h.

Bug: 29621447
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>
Change-Id: I20f0369871c522d66af7e15a3b04efbb4fbf10e9

BACKPORT: ARM: wire up getrandom syscall

Clean cherry pick of eb6452537b280652eee66801ec97cc369e27e5d8.

Add the new getrandom syscall for ARM.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Bug: http://b/29621447
Change-Id: I6d50b57f3a61fbf9102c69103b9a5b7ebf239860
(cherry picked from commit eb6452537b280652eee66801ec97cc369e27e5d8)