Arnd Bergmann [Thu, 18 Jan 2018 13:16:38 +0000 (14:16 +0100)]
scsi: fas216: fix sense buffer initialization
[ Upstream commit
96d5eaa9bb74d299508d811d865c2c41b38b0301 ]
While testing with the ARM specific memset() macro removed, I ran into a
compiler warning that shows an old bug:
drivers/scsi/arm/fas216.c: In function 'fas216_rq_sns_done':
drivers/scsi/arm/fas216.c:2014:40: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'memset' call is the same expression as the destination; did you mean to provide an explicit length? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]
It turns out that the definition of the scsi_cmd structure changed back
in linux-2.6.25, so now we clear only four bytes (sizeof(pointer))
instead of 96 (SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE). I did not check whether we
actually need to initialize the buffer here, but it's clear that if we
do it, we should use the correct size.
Fixes:
de25deb18016 ("[SCSI] use dynamically allocated sense buffer")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Peter Robinson [Sun, 11 Feb 2018 23:15:37 +0000 (23:15 +0000)]
crypto: sunxi-ss - Add MODULE_ALIAS to sun4i-ss
[ Upstream commit
7c73cf4cc2ac16465f5102437dc0a12d66671bd6 ]
The MODULE_ALIAS is required to enable the sun4i-ss driver to load
automatically when built at a module. Tested on a Cubietruck.
Fixes:
6298e948215f ("crypto: sunxi-ss - Add Allwinner Security System crypto accelerator")
Signed-off-by: Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
NeilBrown [Thu, 22 Feb 2018 22:09:33 +0000 (09:09 +1100)]
staging: lustre: lmv: correctly iput lmo_root
[ Upstream commit
17556cdbe6ed70a6a20e597b228628f7f34387f8 ]
Commit
8f18c8a48b73 ("staging: lustre: lmv: separate master object
with master stripe") changed how lmo_root inodes were managed,
particularly when LMV_HASH_FLAG_MIGRATION is not set.
Previously lsm_md_oinfo[0].lmo_root was always a borrowed
inode reference and didn't need to by iput().
Since the change, that special case only applies when
LMV_HASH_FLAG_MIGRATION is set
In the upstream (lustre-release) version of this patch [Commit
60e07b972114 ("LU-4690 lod: separate master object with master
stripe")] the for loop in the lmv_unpack_md() was changed to count
from 0 and to ignore entry 0 if LMV_HASH_FLAG_MIGRATION is set.
In the patch that got applied to Linux, that change was missing,
so lsm_md_oinfo[0].lmo_root is never iput().
This results in a "VFS: Busy inodes" warning at unmount.
Fixes:
8f18c8a48b73 ("staging: lustre: lmv: separate master object with master stripe")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: James Simmons <jsimmons@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Colin Ian King [Wed, 28 Feb 2018 11:28:49 +0000 (11:28 +0000)]
staging: rtl8192u: return -ENOMEM on failed allocation of priv->oldaddr
[ Upstream commit
e1a7418529e33bc4efc346324557251a16a3e79b ]
Currently the allocation of priv->oldaddr is not null checked which will
lead to subsequent errors when accessing priv->oldaddr. Fix this with
a null pointer check and a return of -ENOMEM on allocation failure.
Detected with Coccinelle:
drivers/staging/rtl8192u/r8192U_core.c:1708:2-15: alloc with no test,
possible model on line 1723
Fixes:
8fc8598e61f6 ("Staging: Added Realtek rtl8192u driver to staging")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
NeilBrown [Thu, 1 Mar 2018 23:31:25 +0000 (10:31 +1100)]
staging: lustre: fix bug in osc_enter_cache_try
[ Upstream commit
2fab9faf9b27298c4536c1c1b14072ab18b8f80b ]
The lustre-release patch commit
bdc5bb52c554 ("LU-4933 osc:
Automatically increase the max_dirty_mb") changed
- if (cli->cl_dirty + PAGE_CACHE_SIZE <= cli->cl_dirty_max &&
+ if (cli->cl_dirty_pages < cli->cl_dirty_max_pages &&
When this patch landed in Linux a couple of years later, it landed as
- if (cli->cl_dirty + PAGE_SIZE <= cli->cl_dirty_max &&
+ if (cli->cl_dirty_pages <= cli->cl_dirty_max_pages &&
which is clearly different ('<=' vs '<'), and allows cl_dirty_pages to
increase beyond cl_dirty_max_pages - which causes a latter assertion
to fails.
Fixes:
3147b268400a ("staging: lustre: osc: Automatically increase the max_dirty_mb")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Larry Finger [Sun, 11 Feb 2018 18:24:32 +0000 (12:24 -0600)]
Bluetooth: btusb: Add device ID for RTL8822BE
[ Upstream commit
fed03fe7e55b7dc16077f672bd9d7bbe92b3a691 ]
The Asus Z370-I contains a Realtek RTL8822BE device with an associated
BT chip using a USB ID of 0b05:185c. This device is added to the driver.
Signed-off-by: Hon Weng Chong <honwchong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Brad Love [Fri, 5 Jan 2018 00:04:13 +0000 (19:04 -0500)]
media: em28xx: USB bulk packet size fix
[ Upstream commit
c7c7e8d7803406daa21e96d00c357de8b77b6764 ]
Hauppauge em28xx bulk devices exhibit continuity errors and corrupted
packets, when run in VMWare virtual machines. Unknown if other
manufacturers bulk models exhibit the same issue. KVM/Qemu is unaffected.
According to documentation the maximum packet multiplier for em28xx in bulk
transfer mode is 256 * 188 bytes. This changes the size of bulk transfers
to maximum supported value and have a bonus beneficial alignment.
Before:
After:
This sets up USB to expect just as many bytes as the em28xx is set to emit.
Successful usage under load afterwards natively and in both VMWare
and KVM/Qemu virtual machines.
Signed-off-by: Brad Love <brad@nextdimension.cc>
Reviewed-by: Michael Ira Krufky <mkrufky@linuxtv.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Chris Dickens [Mon, 1 Jan 2018 02:59:42 +0000 (18:59 -0800)]
usb: gadget: composite: fix incorrect handling of OS desc requests
[ Upstream commit
5d6ae4f0da8a64a185074dabb1b2f8c148efa741 ]
When handling an OS descriptor request, one of the first operations is
to zero out the request buffer using the wLength from the setup packet.
There is no bounds checking, so a wLength > 4096 would clobber memory
adjacent to the request buffer. Fix this by taking the min of wLength
and the request buffer length prior to the memset. While at it, define
the buffer length in a header file so that magic numbers don't appear
throughout the code.
When returning data to the host, the data length should be the min of
the wLength and the valid data we have to return. Currently we are
returning wLength, thus requests for a wLength greater than the amount
of data in the OS descriptor buffer would return invalid (albeit zero'd)
data following the valid descriptor data. Fix this by counting the
number of bytes when constructing the data and using this when
determining the length of the request.
Signed-off-by: Chris Dickens <christopher.a.dickens@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wolfram Sang [Tue, 6 Feb 2018 08:50:40 +0000 (09:50 +0100)]
usb: gadget: udc: change comparison to bitshift when dealing with a mask
[ Upstream commit
ac87e560f7c0f91b62012e9a159c0681a373b922 ]
Due to a typo, the mask was destroyed by a comparison instead of a bit
shift.
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Lars-Peter Clausen [Fri, 12 Jan 2018 10:05:02 +0000 (11:05 +0100)]
usb: gadget: ffs: Execute copy_to_user() with USER_DS set
[ Upstream commit
4058ebf33cb0be88ca516f968eda24ab7b6b93e4 ]
When using a AIO read() operation on the function FS gadget driver a URB is
submitted asynchronously and on URB completion the received data is copied
to the userspace buffer associated with the read operation.
This is done from a kernel worker thread invoking copy_to_user() (through
copy_to_iter()). And while the user space process memory is made available
to the kernel thread using use_mm(), some architecture require in addition
to this that the operation runs with USER_DS set. Otherwise the userspace
memory access will fail.
For example on ARM64 with Privileged Access Never (PAN) and User Access
Override (UAO) enabled the following crash occurs.
Internal error: Accessing user space memory with fs=KERNEL_DS:
9600004f [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 1636 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted
4.9.0-04081-g8ab2dfb-dirty #487
Hardware name: ZynqMP ZCU102 Rev1.0 (DT)
Workqueue: events ffs_user_copy_worker
task:
ffffffc87afc8080 task.stack:
ffffffc87a00c000
PC is at __arch_copy_to_user+0x190/0x220
LR is at copy_to_iter+0x78/0x3c8
[...]
[<
ffffff800847b790>] __arch_copy_to_user+0x190/0x220
[<
ffffff80086f25d8>] ffs_user_copy_worker+0x70/0x130
[<
ffffff80080b8c64>] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x460
[<
ffffff80080b8f38>] worker_thread+0x50/0x4b0
[<
ffffff80080bf5a0>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
[<
ffffff8008083680>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Address this by placing a set_fs(USER_DS) before of the copy operation
and revert it again once the copy operation has finished.
This patch is analogous to commit
d7ffde35e31a ("vhost: use USER_DS in
vhost_worker thread") which addresses the same underlying issue.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Lars-Peter Clausen [Fri, 12 Jan 2018 10:26:16 +0000 (11:26 +0100)]
usb: gadget: ffs: Let setup() return USB_GADGET_DELAYED_STATUS
[ Upstream commit
946ef68ad4e45aa048a5fb41ce8823ed29da866a ]
Some UDC drivers (like the DWC3) expect that the response to a setup()
request is queued from within the setup function itself so that it is
available as soon as setup() has completed.
Upon receiving a setup request the function fs driver creates an event that
is made available to userspace. And only once userspace has acknowledged
that event the response to the setup request is queued.
So it violates the requirement of those UDC drivers and random failures can
be observed. This is basically a race condition and if userspace is able to
read the event and queue the response fast enough all is good. But if it is
not, for example because other processes are currently scheduled to run,
the USB host that sent the setup request will observe an error.
To avoid this the gadget framework provides the USB_GADGET_DELAYED_STATUS
return code. If a setup() callback returns this value the UDC driver is
aware that response is not yet available and can uses the appropriate
methods to handle this case.
Since in the case of function fs the response will never be available when
the setup() function returns make sure that this status code is used.
This fixed random occasional failures that were previously observed on a
DWC3 based system under high system load.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Minas Harutyunyan [Fri, 19 Jan 2018 10:44:20 +0000 (14:44 +0400)]
usb: dwc2: host: Fix transaction errors in host mode
[ Upstream commit
92a8dd26464e1f21f1d869ec53717bd2c1200d63 ]
Added missing GUSBCFG programming in host mode, which fixes
transaction errors issue on HiKey and Altera Cyclone V boards.
These field even if was programmed in device mode (in function
dwc2_hsotg_core_init_disconnected()) will be resetting to POR values
after core soft reset applied.
So, each time when switching to host mode required to set this field
to correct value.
Acked-by: John Youn <johnyoun@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Minas Harutyunyan <hminas@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Grigor Tovmasyan <tovmasya@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Grigor Tovmasyan [Tue, 6 Feb 2018 15:07:38 +0000 (19:07 +0400)]
usb: dwc2: Fix interval type issue
[ Upstream commit
12814a3f8f9b247531d7863170cc82b3fe4218fd ]
The maximum value that unsigned char can hold is 255, meanwhile
the maximum value of interval is 2^(bIntervalMax-1)=2^15.
Signed-off-by: Grigor Tovmasyan <tovmasya@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Mathias Nyman [Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:33:01 +0000 (16:33 +0200)]
xhci: zero usb device slot_id member when disabling and freeing a xhci slot
[ Upstream commit
a400efe455f7b61ac9a801ac8d0d01f8c8d82dd5 ]
set udev->slot_id to zero when disabling and freeing the xhci slot.
Prevents usb core from calling xhci with a stale slot id.
xHC controller may be reset during resume to recover from some error.
All slots are unusable as they are disabled and freed.
xhci driver starts slot enumeration again from 1 in the order they are
enabled. In the worst case a stale udev->slot_id for one device matches
a newly enabled slot_id for a different device, causing us to
perform a action on the wrong device.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thinh Nguyen [Fri, 16 Mar 2018 22:33:54 +0000 (15:33 -0700)]
usb: dwc3: Update DWC_usb31 GTXFIFOSIZ reg fields
[ Upstream commit
0cab8d26d6e5e053b2bed3356992aaa71dc93628 ]
Update two GTXFIFOSIZ bit fields for the DWC_usb31 controller. TXFDEP
is a 15-bit value instead of 16-bit value, and bit 15 is TXFRAMNUM.
The GTXFIFOSIZ register for DWC_usb31 is as follows:
+-------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| BITS | Name | Description |
+=======+===========+==================================+
| 31:16 | TXFSTADDR | Transmit FIFOn RAM Start Address |
| 15 | TXFRAMNUM | Asynchronous/Periodic TXFIFO |
| 14:0 | TXFDEP | TXFIFO Depth |
+-------+-----------+----------------------------------+
Signed-off-by: Thinh Nguyen <thinhn@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thinh Nguyen [Fri, 16 Mar 2018 22:33:48 +0000 (15:33 -0700)]
usb: dwc3: Add SoftReset PHY synchonization delay
[ Upstream commit
fab3833338779e1e668bd58d1f76d601657304b8 ]
>From DWC_usb31 programming guide section 1.3.2, once DWC3_DCTL_CSFTRST
bit is cleared, we must wait at least 50ms before accessing the PHY
domain (synchronization delay).
Signed-off-by: Thinh Nguyen <thinhn@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Nobutaka Okabe [Fri, 23 Mar 2018 10:18:22 +0000 (19:18 +0900)]
ALSA: usb-audio: Add native DSD support for Luxman DA-06
[ Upstream commit
71426535f49fe6034d0e0db77608b91a0c1a022d ]
Add native DSD support quirk for Luxman DA-06 DAC, by adding the
PID/VID 1852:5065.
Rename "is_marantz_denon_dac()" function to "is_itf_usb_dsd_2alts_dac()"
to cover broader device family sharing the same USB audio
implementation(*).
For the same reason, rename "is_teac_dsd_dac()" function to
"is_itf_usb_dsd_3alts_dac()".
(*)
These devices have the same USB controller "ITF-USB DSD", supplied by
INTERFACE Co., Ltd.
"ITF-USB DSD" USB controller has two patterns,
Pattern 1. (2 altsets version)
- Altset 0: for control
- Altset 1: for stream (S32)
- Altset 2: for stream (S32, DSD_U32)
Pattern 2. (3 altsets version)
- Altset 0: for control
- Altset 1: for stream (S16)
- Altset 2: for stream (S32)
- Altset 3: for stream (S32, DSD_U32)
"is_itf_usb_dsd_2alts_dac()" returns true, if the DAC has "Pattern 1"
USB controller, and "is_itf_usb_dsd_3alts_dac()" returns true, if
"Pattern2".
Signed-off-by: Nobutaka Okabe <nob77413@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Vicente Bergas [Tue, 20 Mar 2018 18:41:10 +0000 (19:41 +0100)]
Bluetooth: btusb: Add USB ID 7392:a611 for Edimax EW-7611ULB
[ Upstream commit
a41e0796396eeceff673af4a38feaee149c6ff86 ]
This WiFi/Bluetooth USB dongle uses a Realtek chipset, so, use btrtl for it.
Product information:
https://wikidevi.com/wiki/Edimax_EW-7611ULB
>From /sys/kernel/debug/usb/devices
T: Bus=02 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 3 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=7392 ProdID=a611 Rev= 2.00
S: Manufacturer=Realtek
S: Product=Edimax Wi-Fi N150 Bluetooth4.0 USB Adapter
S: SerialNumber=
00e04c000001
C:* #Ifs= 3 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA
A: FirstIf#= 0 IfCount= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01
I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=81(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 16 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 0 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 0 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 9 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 9 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 2 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 17 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 17 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 3 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 25 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 25 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 4 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 33 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 33 Ivl=1ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 5 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 49 Ivl=1ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 49 Ivl=1ms
I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 6 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=rtl8723bu
E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=06(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=87(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=500us
E: Ad=08(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=09(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
Tested-by: Vicente Bergas <vicencb@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vicente Bergas <vicencb@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Giuseppe Lippolis [Mon, 26 Mar 2018 14:34:39 +0000 (16:34 +0200)]
net-usb: add qmi_wwan if on lte modem wistron neweb d18q1
[ Upstream commit
d4c4bc11353f3bea6754f7d21e3612c9f32d1d64 ]
This modem is embedded on dlink dwr-921 router.
The oem configuration states:
T: Bus=02 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 2 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=1435 ProdID=0918 Rev= 2.32
S: Manufacturer=Android
S: Product=Android
S: SerialNumber=
0123456789ABCDEF
C:* #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA
I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none)
E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
E: Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms
E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
E: Ad=88(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms
E: Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
E: Ad=8a(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms
E: Ad=89(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=06(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=08(stor.) Sub=06 Prot=50 Driver=(none)
E: Ad=8b(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=07(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=125us
Tested on openwrt distribution
Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Lippolis <giu.lippolis@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Torsten Hilbrich [Mon, 26 Mar 2018 05:19:57 +0000 (07:19 +0200)]
net/usb/qmi_wwan.c: Add USB id for lt4120 modem
[ Upstream commit
f3d801baf118c9d452ee7c278df16880c892e669 ]
This is needed to support the modem found in HP EliteBook 820 G3.
Signed-off-by: Torsten Hilbrich <torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fredrik Noring [Fri, 9 Mar 2018 17:34:34 +0000 (18:34 +0100)]
USB: OHCI: Fix NULL dereference in HCDs using HCD_LOCAL_MEM
[ Upstream commit
d6c931ea32dc08ac2665bb5f009f9c40ad1bbdb3 ]
Scatter-gather needs to be disabled when using dma_declare_coherent_memory
and HCD_LOCAL_MEM. Andrea Righi made the equivalent fix for EHCI drivers
in commit
4307a28eb01284 "USB: EHCI: fix NULL pointer dererence in HCDs
that use HCD_LOCAL_MEM".
The following NULL pointer WARN_ON_ONCE triggered with OHCI drivers:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 49 at drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1379 hcd_alloc_coherent+0x4c/0xc8
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 49 Comm: usb-storage Not tainted 4.15.0+ #1014
Stack :
00000000 00000000 805a78d2 0000003a 81f5c2cc 8053d367 804d77fc 00000031
805a3a08 00000563 81ee9400 805a0000 00000000 10058c00 81f61b10 805c0000
00000000 00000000 805a0000 00d9038e 00000004 803ee818 00000006 312e3420
805c0000 00000000 00000073 81f61958 00000000 00000000 802eb380 804fd538
00000009 00000563 81ee9400 805a0000 00000002 80056148 00000000 805a0000
...
Call Trace:
[<
578af360>] show_stack+0x74/0x104
[<
2f3702c6>] __warn+0x118/0x120
[<
ae93fc9e>] warn_slowpath_null+0x44/0x58
[<
a891a517>] hcd_alloc_coherent+0x4c/0xc8
[<
3578fa36>] usb_hcd_map_urb_for_dma+0x4d8/0x534
[<
110bc94c>] usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x82c/0x834
[<
02eb5baf>] usb_sg_wait+0x14c/0x1a0
[<
ccd09e85>] usb_stor_bulk_transfer_sglist.part.1+0xac/0x124
[<
87a5c34c>] usb_stor_bulk_srb+0x40/0x60
[<
ff1792ac>] usb_stor_Bulk_transport+0x160/0x37c
[<
b9e2709c>] usb_stor_invoke_transport+0x3c/0x500
[<
004754f4>] usb_stor_control_thread+0x258/0x28c
[<
22edf42e>] kthread+0x134/0x13c
[<
a419ffd0>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c
---[ end trace
bcdb825805eefdcc ]---
Signed-off-by: Fredrik Noring <noring@nocrew.org>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Dominik Bozek [Fri, 16 Feb 2018 05:27:48 +0000 (21:27 -0800)]
usb: cdc_acm: prevent race at write to acm while system resumes
[ Upstream commit
b86b8eb6fecb5a4bac1ed0ca925c4082a61ea6e9 ]
ACM driver may accept data to transmit while system is not fully
resumed. In this case ACM driver buffers data and prepare URBs
on usb anchor list.
There is a little chance that two tasks put a char and initiate
acm_tty_flush_chars(). In such a case, driver will put one URB
twice on usb anchor list.
This patch also reset length of data before resue of a buffer.
This not only prevent sending rubbish, but also lower risc of race.
Without this patch we hit following kernel panic in one of our
stabilty/stress tests.
[ 46.884442] *list_add double add*: new=
ffff9b2ab7289330, prev=
ffff9b2ab7289330, next=
ffff9b2ab81e28e0.
[ 46.884476] Modules linked in: hci_uart btbcm bluetooth rfkill_gpio igb_avb(O) cfg80211 snd_soc_sst_bxt_tdf8532 snd_soc_skl snd_soc_skl_ipc snd_soc_sst_ipc snd_soc_sst_dsp snd_soc_sst_acpi snd_soc_sst_match snd_hda_ext_core snd_hda_core trusty_timer trusty_wall trusty_log trusty_virtio trusty_ipc trusty_mem trusty_irq trusty virtio_ring virtio intel_ipu4_mmu_bxtB0 lib2600_mod_bxtB0 intel_ipu4_isys_mod_bxtB0 lib2600psys_mod_bxtB0 intel_ipu4_psys_mod_bxtB0 intel_ipu4_mod_bxtB0 intel_ipu4_wrapper_bxtB0 intel_ipu4_acpi videobuf2_dma_contig as3638 dw9714 lm3643 crlmodule smiapp smiapp_pll
[ 46.884480] CPU: 1 PID: 33 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Tainted: G U W O
4.9.56-quilt-2e5dc0ac-g618ed69ced6e-dirty #4
[ 46.884489] Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc
[ 46.884494]
ffffb98ac012bb08 ffffffffad3e82e5 ffffb98ac012bb58 0000000000000000
[ 46.884497]
ffffb98ac012bb48 ffffffffad0a23d1 00000024ad6374dd ffff9b2ab7289330
[ 46.884500]
ffff9b2ab81e28e0 ffff9b2ab7289330 0000000000000002 0000000000000000
[ 46.884501] Call Trace:
[ 46.884507] [<
ffffffffad3e82e5>] dump_stack+0x67/0x92
[ 46.884511] [<
ffffffffad0a23d1>] __warn+0xd1/0xf0
[ 46.884513] [<
ffffffffad0a244f>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5f/0x80
[ 46.884516] [<
ffffffffad407443>] __list_add+0xb3/0xc0
[ 46.884521] [<
ffffffffad71133c>] *usb_anchor_urb*+0x4c/0xa0
[ 46.884524] [<
ffffffffad782c6f>] *acm_tty_flush_chars*+0x8f/0xb0
[ 46.884527] [<
ffffffffad782cd1>] *acm_tty_put_char*+0x41/0x100
[ 46.884530] [<
ffffffffad4ced34>] tty_put_char+0x24/0x40
[ 46.884533] [<
ffffffffad4d3bf5>] do_output_char+0xa5/0x200
[ 46.884535] [<
ffffffffad4d3e98>] __process_echoes+0x148/0x290
[ 46.884538] [<
ffffffffad4d654c>] n_tty_receive_buf_common+0x57c/0xb00
[ 46.884541] [<
ffffffffad4d6ae4>] n_tty_receive_buf2+0x14/0x20
[ 46.884543] [<
ffffffffad4d9662>] tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0x22/0x50
[ 46.884545] [<
ffffffffad4d9c05>] flush_to_ldisc+0xc5/0xe0
[ 46.884549] [<
ffffffffad0bcfe8>] process_one_work+0x148/0x440
[ 46.884551] [<
ffffffffad0bdc19>] worker_thread+0x69/0x4a0
[ 46.884554] [<
ffffffffad0bdbb0>] ? max_active_store+0x80/0x80
[ 46.884556] [<
ffffffffad0c2e10>] kthread+0x110/0x130
[ 46.884559] [<
ffffffffad0c2d00>] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60
[ 46.884563] [<
ffffffffadad9917>] ret_from_fork+0x27/0x40
[ 46.884566] ---[ end trace
3bd599058b8a9eb3 ]---
Signed-off-by: Dominik Bozek <dominikx.bozek@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Vardan Mikayelyan [Tue, 16 Jan 2018 12:04:24 +0000 (16:04 +0400)]
usb: dwc2: Fix dwc2_hsotg_core_init_disconnected()
[ Upstream commit
755d739534f998d92e348fba8ffb0478416576e7 ]
We should call dwc2_hsotg_enqueue_setup() after properly
setting lx_state. Because it may cause error-out from
dwc2_hsotg_enqueue_setup() due to wrong value in lx_state.
Issue can be reproduced by loading driver while connected
A-Connector (start in A-HOST mode) then disconnect A-Connector
to switch to B-DEVICE.
Acked-by: John Youn <johnyoun@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Vardan Mikayelyan <mvardan@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Grigor Tovmasyan <tovmasya@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Stefan Agner [Sun, 11 Feb 2018 23:14:42 +0000 (00:14 +0100)]
usb: gadget: fsl_udc_core: fix ep valid checks
[ Upstream commit
20c63f4089cceab803438c383631963e34c4d8e5 ]
Clang reports the following warning:
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fsl_udc_core.c:1312:10: warning: address of array
'ep->name' will always evaluate to 'true' [-Wpointer-bool-conversion]
if (ep->name)
~~ ~~~~^~~~
It seems that the authors intention was to check if the ep has been
configured through struct_ep_setup. Check whether struct usb_ep name
pointer has been set instead.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Manu Gautam [Thu, 21 Dec 2017 04:24:25 +0000 (09:54 +0530)]
usb: gadget: core: Fix use-after-free of usb_request
[ Upstream commit
e74bd4d358e5455233f1dcc3975425905b270b91 ]
Driver is tracing usb_request after freeing it.
Fix it by changing the order.
Signed-off-by: Manu Gautam <mgautam@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Roger Quadros [Mon, 22 Jan 2018 13:01:42 +0000 (15:01 +0200)]
usb: dwc3: omap: don't miss events during suspend/resume
[ Upstream commit
c49f63055e252810e5d6c83a4943b18db16b3cd8 ]
The USB cable state can change during suspend/resume
so be sure to check and update the extcon state.
Signed-off-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Brian Norris [Wed, 17 Jan 2018 21:22:49 +0000 (13:22 -0800)]
usb: dwc3: Undo PHY init if soft reset fails
[ Upstream commit
00b42170c86f90ac9dea83a7dfcd3f0c38098fe2 ]
In this function, we init the USB2 and USB3 PHYs, but if soft reset
times out, we don't unwind this.
Noticed by inspection.
Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
John Keeping [Fri, 12 Jan 2018 18:43:32 +0000 (18:43 +0000)]
usb: gadget: f_uac2: fix bFirstInterface in composite gadget
[ Upstream commit
8813a59ed892305b5ac1b5b901740b1ad4b5fefa ]
If there are multiple functions associated with a configuration, then
the UAC2 interfaces may not start at zero. Set the correct first
interface number in the association descriptor so that the audio
interfaces are enumerated correctly in this case.
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Opasiak <k.opasiak@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: John Keeping <john@metanate.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tetsuo Handa [Wed, 9 May 2018 10:42:20 +0000 (19:42 +0900)]
x86/kexec: Avoid double free_page() upon do_kexec_load() failure
commit
a466ef76b815b86748d9870ef2a430af7b39c710 upstream.
>From
ff82bedd3e12f0d3353282054ae48c3bd8c72012 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Wed, 9 May 2018 12:12:39 +0900
Subject: x86/kexec: Avoid double free_page() upon do_kexec_load() failure
syzbot is reporting crashes after memory allocation failure inside
do_kexec_load() [1]. This is because free_transition_pgtable() is called
by both init_transition_pgtable() and machine_kexec_cleanup() when memory
allocation failed inside init_transition_pgtable().
Regarding 32bit code, machine_kexec_free_page_tables() is called by both
machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables() and machine_kexec_cleanup() when memory
allocation failed inside machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables().
Fix this by leaving the error handling to machine_kexec_cleanup()
(and optionally setting NULL after free_page()).
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=
91e52396168cf2bdd572fe1e1bc0bc645c1c6b40
Fixes:
f5deb79679af6eb4 ("x86: kexec: Use one page table in x86_64 machine_kexec")
Fixes:
92be3d6bdf2cb349 ("kexec/i386: allocate page table pages dynamically")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+d96f60296ef613fe1d69@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Cc: takahiro.akashi@linaro.org
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: dyoung@redhat.com
Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/201805091942.DGG12448.tMFVFSJFQOOLHO@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tetsuo Handa [Fri, 18 May 2018 23:09:16 +0000 (16:09 -0700)]
hfsplus: stop workqueue when fill_super() failed
commit
66072c29328717072fd84aaff3e070e3f008ba77 upstream.
syzbot is reporting ODEBUG messages at hfsplus_fill_super() [1]. This
is because hfsplus_fill_super() forgot to call cancel_delayed_work_sync().
As far as I can see, it is hfsplus_mark_mdb_dirty() from
hfsplus_new_inode() in hfsplus_fill_super() that calls
queue_delayed_work(). Therefore, I assume that hfsplus_new_inode() does
not fail if queue_delayed_work() was called, and the out_put_hidden_dir
label is the appropriate location to call cancel_delayed_work_sync().
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=
a66f45e96fdbeb76b796bf46eb25ea878c42a6c9
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/964a8b27-cd69-357c-fe78-76b066056201@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+4f2e5f086147d543ab03@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Ernesto A. Fernandez <ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com>
Cc: Vyacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Johannes Berg [Tue, 3 Apr 2018 12:33:49 +0000 (14:33 +0200)]
cfg80211: limit wiphy names to 128 bytes
commit
a7cfebcb7594a24609268f91299ab85ba064bf82 upstream.
There's currently no limit on wiphy names, other than netlink
message size and memory limitations, but that causes issues when,
for example, the wiphy name is used in a uevent, e.g. in rfkill
where we use the same name for the rfkill instance, and then the
buffer there is "only" 2k for the environment variables.
This was reported by syzkaller, which used a 4k name.
Limit the name to something reasonable, I randomly picked 128.
Reported-by: syzbot+230d9e642a85d3fec29c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Jens Remus [Thu, 3 May 2018 11:52:47 +0000 (13:52 +0200)]
scsi: zfcp: fix infinite iteration on ERP ready list
commit
fa89adba1941e4f3b213399b81732a5c12fd9131 upstream.
zfcp_erp_adapter_reopen() schedules blocking of all of the adapter's
rports via zfcp_scsi_schedule_rports_block() and enqueues a reopen
adapter ERP action via zfcp_erp_action_enqueue(). Both are separately
processed asynchronously and concurrently.
Blocking of rports is done in a kworker by zfcp_scsi_rport_work(). It
calls zfcp_scsi_rport_block(), which then traces a DBF REC "scpdely" via
zfcp_dbf_rec_trig(). zfcp_dbf_rec_trig() acquires the DBF REC spin lock
and then iterates with list_for_each() over the adapter's ERP ready list
without holding the ERP lock. This opens a race window in which the
current list entry can be moved to another list, causing list_for_each()
to iterate forever on the wrong list, as the erp_ready_head is never
encountered as terminal condition.
Meanwhile the ERP action can be processed in the ERP thread by
zfcp_erp_thread(). It calls zfcp_erp_strategy(), which acquires the ERP
lock and then calls zfcp_erp_action_to_running() to move the ERP action
from the ready to the running list. zfcp_erp_action_to_running() can
move the ERP action using list_move() just during the aforementioned
race window. It then traces a REC RUN "erator1" via zfcp_dbf_rec_run().
zfcp_dbf_rec_run() tries to acquire the DBF REC spin lock. If this is
held by the infinitely looping kworker, it effectively spins forever.
Example Sequence Diagram:
Process ERP Thread rport_work
------------------- ------------------- -------------------
zfcp_erp_adapter_reopen()
zfcp_erp_adapter_block()
zfcp_scsi_schedule_rports_block()
lock ERP zfcp_scsi_rport_work()
zfcp_erp_action_enqueue(ZFCP_ERP_ACTION_REOPEN_ADAPTER)
list_add_tail() on ready !(rport_task==RPORT_ADD)
wake_up() ERP thread zfcp_scsi_rport_block()
zfcp_dbf_rec_trig() zfcp_erp_strategy() zfcp_dbf_rec_trig()
unlock ERP lock DBF REC
zfcp_erp_wait() lock ERP
| zfcp_erp_action_to_running()
| list_for_each() ready
| list_move() current entry
| ready to running
| zfcp_dbf_rec_run() endless loop over running
| zfcp_dbf_rec_run_lvl()
| lock DBF REC spins forever
Any adapter recovery can trigger this, such as setting the device offline
or reboot.
V4.9 commit
4eeaa4f3f1d6 ("zfcp: close window with unblocked rport
during rport gone") introduced additional tracing of (un)blocking of
rports. It missed that the adapter->erp_lock must be held when calling
zfcp_dbf_rec_trig().
This fix uses the approach formerly introduced by commit
aa0fec62391c
("[SCSI] zfcp: Fix sparse warning by providing new entry in dbf") that got
later removed by commit
ae0904f60fab ("[SCSI] zfcp: Redesign of the debug
tracing for recovery actions.").
Introduce zfcp_dbf_rec_trig_lock(), a wrapper for zfcp_dbf_rec_trig() that
acquires and releases the adapter->erp_lock for read.
Reported-by: Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes:
4eeaa4f3f1d6 ("zfcp: close window with unblocked rport during rport gone")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.32+
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Alexander Potapenko [Fri, 18 May 2018 14:23:18 +0000 (16:23 +0200)]
scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in sg_build_indirect()
commit
a45b599ad808c3c982fdcdc12b0b8611c2f92824 upstream.
This shall help avoid copying uninitialized memory to the userspace when
calling ioctl(fd, SG_IO) with an empty command.
Reported-by: syzbot+7d26fc1eea198488deab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Jason Yan [Thu, 8 Mar 2018 02:34:53 +0000 (10:34 +0800)]
scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
commit
318aaf34f1179b39fa9c30fa0f3288b645beee39 upstream.
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<
ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<
ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<
ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<
ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<
ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<
ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<
ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<
ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<
ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<
ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Martin Schwidefsky [Wed, 23 May 2018 16:21:52 +0000 (18:21 +0200)]
s390: use expoline thunks in the BPF JIT
[ Upstream commit
de5cb6eb514ebe241e3edeb290cb41deb380b81d ]
The BPF JIT need safe guarding against spectre v2 in the sk_load_xxx
assembler stubs and the indirect branches generated by the JIT itself
need to be converted to expolines.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Martin Schwidefsky [Wed, 23 May 2018 16:21:51 +0000 (18:21 +0200)]
s390: extend expoline to BC instructions
[ Upstream commit
6deaa3bbca804b2a3627fd685f75de64da7be535 ]
The BPF JIT uses a 'b <disp>(%r<x>)' instruction in the definition
of the sk_load_word and sk_load_half functions.
Add support for branch-on-condition instructions contained in the
thunk code of an expoline.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Martin Schwidefsky [Wed, 23 May 2018 16:21:50 +0000 (18:21 +0200)]
s390: move spectre sysfs attribute code
[ Upstream commit
4253b0e0627ee3461e64c2495c616f1c8f6b127b ]
The nospec-branch.c file is compiled without the gcc options to
generate expoline thunks. The return branch of the sysfs show
functions cpu_show_spectre_v1 and cpu_show_spectre_v2 is an indirect
branch as well. These need to be compiled with expolines.
Move the sysfs functions for spectre reporting to a separate file
and loose an '.' for one of the messages.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16
Fixes:
d424986f1d ("s390: add sysfs attributes for spectre")
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Martin Schwidefsky [Wed, 23 May 2018 16:21:49 +0000 (18:21 +0200)]
s390/kernel: use expoline for indirect branches
[ Upstream commit
c50c84c3ac4d5db683904bdb3257798b6ef980ae ]
The assember code in arch/s390/kernel uses a few more indirect branches
which need to be done with execute trampolines for CONFIG_EXPOLINE=y.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16
Fixes:
f19fbd5ed6 ("s390: introduce execute-trampolines for branches")
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Martin Schwidefsky [Wed, 23 May 2018 16:21:48 +0000 (18:21 +0200)]
s390/ftrace: use expoline for indirect branches
[ Upstream commit
23a4d7fd34856da8218c4cfc23dba7a6ec0a423a ]
The return from the ftrace_stub, _mcount, ftrace_caller and
return_to_handler functions is done with "br %r14" and "br %r1".
These are indirect branches as well and need to use execute
trampolines for CONFIG_EXPOLINE=y.
The ftrace_caller function is a special case as it returns to the
start of a function and may only use %r0 and %r1. For a pre z10
machine the standard execute trampoline uses a LARL + EX to do
this, but this requires *two* registers in the range %r1..%r15.
To get around this the 'br %r1' located in the lowcore is used,
then the EX instruction does not need an address register.
But the lowcore trick may only be used for pre z14 machines,
with noexec=on the mapping for the first page may not contain
instructions. The solution for that is an ALTERNATIVE in the
expoline THUNK generated by 'GEN_BR_THUNK %r1' to switch to
EXRL, this relies on the fact that a machine that supports
noexec=on has EXRL as well.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16
Fixes:
f19fbd5ed6 ("s390: introduce execute-trampolines for branches")
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Martin Schwidefsky [Wed, 23 May 2018 16:21:47 +0000 (18:21 +0200)]
s390/lib: use expoline for indirect branches
[ Upstream commit
97489e0663fa700d6e7febddc43b58df98d7bcda ]
The return from the memmove, memset, memcpy, __memset16, __memset32 and
__memset64 functions are done with "br %r14". These are indirect branches
as well and need to use execute trampolines for CONFIG_EXPOLINE=y.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16
Fixes:
f19fbd5ed6 ("s390: introduce execute-trampolines for branches")
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Martin Schwidefsky [Wed, 23 May 2018 16:21:46 +0000 (18:21 +0200)]
s390/crc32-vx: use expoline for indirect branches
[ Upstream commit
467a3bf219cee12259182c5cb4821f88fd518a51 ]
The return from the crc32_le_vgfm_16/crc32c_le_vgfm_16 and the
crc32_be_vgfm_16 functions are done with "br %r14". These are indirect
branches as well and need to use execute trampolines for CONFIG_EXPOLINE=y.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16
Fixes:
f19fbd5ed6 ("s390: introduce execute-trampolines for branches")
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Martin Schwidefsky [Wed, 23 May 2018 16:21:45 +0000 (18:21 +0200)]
s390: move expoline assembler macros to a header
[ Upstream commit
6dd85fbb87d1d6b87a3b1f02ca28d7b2abd2e7ba ]
To be able to use the expoline branches in different assembler
files move the associated macros from entry.S to a new header
nospec-insn.h.
While we are at it make the macros a bit nicer to use.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16
Fixes:
f19fbd5ed6 ("s390: introduce execute-trampolines for branches")
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Martin Schwidefsky [Wed, 23 May 2018 16:21:44 +0000 (18:21 +0200)]
s390: add assembler macros for CPU alternatives
[ Upstream commit
fba9eb7946251d6e420df3bdf7bc45195be7be9a ]
Add a header with macros usable in assembler files to emit alternative
code sequences. It works analog to the alternatives for inline assmeblies
in C files, with the same restrictions and capabilities.
The syntax is
ALTERNATIVE "<default instructions sequence>", \
"<alternative instructions sequence>", \
"<features-bit>"
and
ALTERNATIVE_2 "<default instructions sequence>", \
"<alternative instructions sqeuence #1>", \
"<feature-bit #1>",
"<alternative instructions sqeuence #2>", \
"<feature-bit #2>"
Reviewed-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Al Viro [Thu, 17 May 2018 21:18:30 +0000 (17:18 -0400)]
ext2: fix a block leak
commit
5aa1437d2d9a068c0334bd7c9dafa8ec4f97f13b upstream.
open file, unlink it, then use ioctl(2) to make it immutable or
append only. Now close it and watch the blocks *not* freed...
Immutable/append-only checks belong in ->setattr().
Note: the bug is old and backport to anything prior to
737f2e93b972
("ext2: convert to use the new truncate convention") will need
these checks lifted into ext2_setattr().
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
hpreg@vmware.com [Mon, 14 May 2018 12:14:49 +0000 (08:14 -0400)]
vmxnet3: use DMA memory barriers where required
[ Upstream commit
f3002c1374fb2367c9d8dbb28852791ef90d2bac ]
The gen bits must be read first from (resp. written last to) DMA memory.
The proper way to enforce this on Linux is to call dma_rmb() (resp.
dma_wmb()).
Signed-off-by: Regis Duchesne <hpreg@vmware.com>
Acked-by: Ronak Doshi <doshir@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
hpreg@vmware.com [Mon, 14 May 2018 12:14:34 +0000 (08:14 -0400)]
vmxnet3: set the DMA mask before the first DMA map operation
[ Upstream commit
61aeecea40afb2b89933e27cd4adb10fc2e75cfd ]
The DMA mask must be set before, not after, the first DMA map operation, or
the first DMA map operation could in theory fail on some systems.
Fixes:
b0eb57cb97e78 ("VMXNET3: Add support for virtual IOMMU")
Signed-off-by: Regis Duchesne <hpreg@vmware.com>
Acked-by: Ronak Doshi <doshir@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Eric Dumazet [Tue, 15 May 2018 04:14:26 +0000 (21:14 -0700)]
tcp: purge write queue in tcp_connect_init()
[ Upstream commit
7f582b248d0a86bae5788c548d7bb5bca6f7691a ]
syzkaller found a reliable way to crash the host, hitting a BUG()
in __tcp_retransmit_skb()
Malicous MSG_FASTOPEN is the root cause. We need to purge write queue
in tcp_connect_init() at the point we init snd_una/write_seq.
This patch also replaces the BUG() by a less intrusive WARN_ON_ONCE()
kernel BUG at net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2837!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 5276 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #51
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__tcp_retransmit_skb+0x2992/0x2eb0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2837
RSP: 0000:
ffff8801dae06ff8 EFLAGS:
00010206
RAX:
ffff8801b9fe61c0 RBX:
00000000ffc18a16 RCX:
ffffffff864e1a49
RDX:
0000000000000100 RSI:
ffffffff864e2e12 RDI:
0000000000000005
RBP:
ffff8801dae073a0 R08:
ffff8801b9fe61c0 R09:
ffffed0039c40dd2
R10:
ffffed0039c40dd2 R11:
ffff8801ce206e93 R12:
00000000421eeaad
R13:
ffff8801ce206d4e R14:
ffff8801ce206cc0 R15:
ffff8801cd4f4a80
FS:
0000000000000000(0000) GS:
ffff8801dae00000(0063) knlGS:
00000000096bc900
CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0:
0000000080050033
CR2:
0000000020000000 CR3:
00000001c47b6000 CR4:
00000000001406f0
DR0:
0000000000000000 DR1:
0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
DR3:
0000000000000000 DR6:
00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
tcp_retransmit_skb+0x2e/0x250 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2923
tcp_retransmit_timer+0xc50/0x3060 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:488
tcp_write_timer_handler+0x339/0x960 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:573
tcp_write_timer+0x111/0x1d0 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:593
call_timer_fn+0x230/0x940 kernel/time/timer.c:1326
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline]
__run_timers+0x79e/0xc50 kernel/time/timer.c:1666
run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692
__do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline]
irq_exit+0x1d1/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:525 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x17e/0x710 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:863
Fixes:
cf60af03ca4e ("net-tcp: Fast Open client - sendmsg(MSG_FASTOPEN)")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Eric Dumazet [Fri, 18 May 2018 11:47:55 +0000 (04:47 -0700)]
sock_diag: fix use-after-free read in __sk_free
[ Upstream commit
9709020c86f6bf8439ca3effc58cfca49a5de192 ]
We must not call sock_diag_has_destroy_listeners(sk) on a socket
that has no reference on net structure.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sock_diag_has_destroy_listeners include/linux/sock_diag.h:75 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __sk_free+0x329/0x340 net/core/sock.c:1609
Read of size 8 at addr
ffff88018a02e3a0 by task swapper/1/0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5+ #54
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433
sock_diag_has_destroy_listeners include/linux/sock_diag.h:75 [inline]
__sk_free+0x329/0x340 net/core/sock.c:1609
sk_free+0x42/0x50 net/core/sock.c:1623
sock_put include/net/sock.h:1664 [inline]
reqsk_free include/net/request_sock.h:116 [inline]
reqsk_put include/net/request_sock.h:124 [inline]
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:672 [inline]
reqsk_timer_handler+0xe27/0x10e0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:739
call_timer_fn+0x230/0x940 kernel/time/timer.c:1326
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline]
__run_timers+0x79e/0xc50 kernel/time/timer.c:1666
run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692
__do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline]
irq_exit+0x1d1/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:525 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x17e/0x710 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:863
</IRQ>
RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:54
RSP: 0018:
ffff8801d9ae7c38 EFLAGS:
00000282 ORIG_RAX:
ffffffffffffff13
RAX:
dffffc0000000000 RBX:
1ffff1003b35cf8a RCX:
0000000000000000
RDX:
1ffffffff11a30d0 RSI:
0000000000000001 RDI:
ffffffff88d18680
RBP:
ffff8801d9ae7c38 R08:
ffffed003b5e46c3 R09:
0000000000000000
R10:
0000000000000000 R11:
0000000000000000 R12:
0000000000000001
R13:
ffff8801d9ae7cf0 R14:
ffffffff897bef20 R15:
0000000000000000
arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:94 [inline]
default_idle+0xc2/0x440 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:354
arch_cpu_idle+0x10/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:345
default_idle_call+0x6d/0x90 kernel/sched/idle.c:93
cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:153 [inline]
do_idle+0x395/0x560 kernel/sched/idle.c:262
cpu_startup_entry+0x104/0x120 kernel/sched/idle.c:368
start_secondary+0x426/0x5b0 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:269
secondary_startup_64+0xa5/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:242
Allocated by task 4557:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x760 mm/slab.c:3554
kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:691 [inline]
net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:383 [inline]
copy_net_ns+0x159/0x4c0 net/core/net_namespace.c:423
create_new_namespaces+0x69d/0x8f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc3/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:206
ksys_unshare+0x708/0xf90 kernel/fork.c:2408
__do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2476 [inline]
__se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2474 [inline]
__x64_sys_unshare+0x31/0x40 kernel/fork.c:2474
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 69:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x11a/0x170 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x2d0 mm/slab.c:3756
net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:399 [inline]
net_drop_ns.part.14+0x11a/0x130 net/core/net_namespace.c:406
net_drop_ns net/core/net_namespace.c:405 [inline]
cleanup_net+0x6a1/0xb20 net/core/net_namespace.c:541
process_one_work+0xc1e/0x1b50 kernel/workqueue.c:2145
worker_thread+0x1cc/0x1440 kernel/workqueue.c:2279
kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:240
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412
The buggy address belongs to the object at
ffff88018a02c140
which belongs to the cache net_namespace of size 8832
The buggy address is located 8800 bytes inside of
8832-byte region [
ffff88018a02c140,
ffff88018a02e3c0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:
ffffea0006280b00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:
ffff88018a02c140 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000008100(slab|head)
raw:
02fffc0000008100 ffff88018a02c140 0000000000000000 0000000100000001
raw:
ffffea00062a1320 ffffea0006268020 ffff8801d9bdde40 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Fixes:
b922622ec6ef ("sock_diag: don't broadcast kernel sockets")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Willem de Bruijn [Fri, 11 May 2018 17:24:25 +0000 (13:24 -0400)]
packet: in packet_snd start writing at link layer allocation
[ Upstream commit
b84bbaf7a6c8cca24f8acf25a2c8e46913a947ba ]
Packet sockets allow construction of packets shorter than
dev->hard_header_len to accommodate protocols with variable length
link layer headers. These packets are padded to dev->hard_header_len,
because some device drivers interpret that as a minimum packet size.
packet_snd reserves dev->hard_header_len bytes on allocation.
SOCK_DGRAM sockets call skb_push in dev_hard_header() to ensure that
link layer headers are stored in the reserved range. SOCK_RAW sockets
do the same in tpacket_snd, but not in packet_snd.
Syzbot was able to send a zero byte packet to a device with massive
116B link layer header, causing padding to cross over into skb_shinfo.
Fix this by writing from the start of the llheader reserved range also
in the case of packet_snd/SOCK_RAW.
Update skb_set_network_header to the new offset. This also corrects
it for SOCK_DGRAM, where it incorrectly double counted reserve due to
the skb_push in dev_hard_header.
Fixes:
9ed988cd5915 ("packet: validate variable length ll headers")
Reported-by: syzbot+71d74a5406d02057d559@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Willem de Bruijn [Thu, 17 May 2018 17:13:29 +0000 (13:13 -0400)]
net: test tailroom before appending to linear skb
[ Upstream commit
113f99c3358564a0647d444c2ae34e8b1abfd5b9 ]
Device features may change during transmission. In particular with
corking, a device may toggle scatter-gather in between allocating
and writing to an skb.
Do not unconditionally assume that !NETIF_F_SG at write time implies
that the same held at alloc time and thus the skb has sufficient
tailroom.
This issue predates git history.
Fixes:
1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tarick Bedeir [Sun, 13 May 2018 23:38:45 +0000 (16:38 -0700)]
net/mlx4_core: Fix error handling in mlx4_init_port_info.
[ Upstream commit
57f6f99fdad9984801cde05c1db68fe39b474a10 ]
Avoid exiting the function with a lingering sysfs file (if the first
call to device_create_file() fails while the second succeeds), and avoid
calling devlink_port_unregister() twice.
In other words, either mlx4_init_port_info() succeeds and returns zero, or
it fails, returns non-zero, and requires no cleanup.
Fixes:
096335b3f983 ("mlx4_core: Allow dynamic MTU configuration for IB ports")
Signed-off-by: Tarick Bedeir <tarick@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Greg Kroah-Hartman [Tue, 22 May 2018 14:58:04 +0000 (16:58 +0200)]
Linux 4.9.102
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Thu, 17 May 2018 03:18:09 +0000 (23:18 -0400)]
x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO
commit
240da953fcc6a9008c92fae5b1f727ee5ed167ab upstream
The "336996 Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations" from
May defines this as SSB_NO, hence lets sync-up.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tom Lendacky [Thu, 10 May 2018 20:06:39 +0000 (22:06 +0200)]
KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD
commit
bc226f07dcd3c9ef0b7f6236fe356ea4a9cb4769 upstream
Expose the new virtualized architectural mechanism, VIRT_SSBD, for using
speculative store bypass disable (SSBD) under SVM. This will allow guests
to use SSBD on hardware that uses non-architectural mechanisms for enabling
SSBD.
[ tglx: Folded the migration fixup from Paolo Bonzini ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Thu, 10 May 2018 18:42:48 +0000 (20:42 +0200)]
x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG
commit
47c61b3955cf712cadfc25635bf9bc174af030ea upstream
Add the necessary logic for supporting the emulated VIRT_SPEC_CTRL MSR to
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(). If either X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD or
X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL is set then use the new guest_virt_spec_ctrl
argument to check whether the state must be modified on the host. The
update reuses speculative_store_bypass_update() so the ZEN-specific sibling
coordination can be reused.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sat, 12 May 2018 18:10:00 +0000 (20:10 +0200)]
x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic
commit
be6fcb5478e95bb1c91f489121238deb3abca46a upstream
x86_spec_ctrL_mask is intended to mask out bits from a MSR_SPEC_CTRL value
which are not to be modified. However the implementation is not really used
and the bitmask was inverted to make a check easier, which was removed in
"x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set()"
Aside of that it is missing the STIBP bit if it is supported by the
platform, so if the mask would be used in x86_virt_spec_ctrl() then it
would prevent a guest from setting STIBP.
Add the STIBP bit if supported and use the mask in x86_virt_spec_ctrl() to
sanitize the value which is supplied by the guest.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sat, 12 May 2018 18:53:14 +0000 (20:53 +0200)]
x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set()
commit
4b59bdb569453a60b752b274ca61f009e37f4dae upstream
x86_spec_ctrl_set() is only used in bugs.c and the extra mask checks there
provide no real value as both call sites can just write x86_spec_ctrl_base
to MSR_SPEC_CTRL. x86_spec_ctrl_base is valid and does not need any extra
masking or checking.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sat, 12 May 2018 18:49:16 +0000 (20:49 +0200)]
x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly
commit
fa8ac4988249c38476f6ad678a4848a736373403 upstream
x86_spec_ctrl_base is the system wide default value for the SPEC_CTRL MSR.
x86_spec_ctrl_get_default() returns x86_spec_ctrl_base and was intended to
prevent modification to that variable. Though the variable is read only
after init and globaly visible already.
Remove the function and export the variable instead.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Borislav Petkov [Fri, 11 May 2018 22:14:51 +0000 (00:14 +0200)]
x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host}
commit
cc69b34989210f067b2c51d5539b5f96ebcc3a01 upstream
Function bodies are very similar and are going to grow more almost
identical code. Add a bool arg to determine whether SPEC_CTRL is being set
for the guest or restored to the host.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Thu, 10 May 2018 18:31:44 +0000 (20:31 +0200)]
x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update()
commit
0270be3e34efb05a88bc4c422572ece038ef3608 upstream
The upcoming support for the virtual SPEC_CTRL MSR on AMD needs to reuse
speculative_store_bypass_update() to avoid code duplication. Add an
argument for supplying a thread info (TIF) value and create a wrapper
speculative_store_bypass_update_current() which is used at the existing
call site.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tom Lendacky [Thu, 17 May 2018 15:09:18 +0000 (17:09 +0200)]
x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support
commit
11fb0683493b2da112cd64c9dada221b52463bf7 upstream
Some AMD processors only support a non-architectural means of enabling
speculative store bypass disable (SSBD). To allow a simplified view of
this to a guest, an architectural definition has been created through a new
CPUID bit, 0x80000008_EBX[25], and a new MSR, 0xc001011f. With this, a
hypervisor can virtualize the existence of this definition and provide an
architectural method for using SSBD to a guest.
Add the new CPUID feature, the new MSR and update the existing SSBD
support to use this MSR when present.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Wed, 9 May 2018 21:01:01 +0000 (23:01 +0200)]
x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
commit
ccbcd2674472a978b48c91c1fbfb66c0ff959f24 upstream
AMD is proposing a VIRT_SPEC_CTRL MSR to handle the Speculative Store
Bypass Disable via MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG so that guests do not have to care
about the bit position of the SSBD bit and thus facilitate migration.
Also, the sibling coordination on Family 17H CPUs can only be done on
the host.
Extend x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest() and x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() with an
extra argument for the VIRT_SPEC_CTRL MSR.
Hand in 0 from VMX and in SVM add a new virt_spec_ctrl member to the CPU
data structure which is going to be used in later patches for the actual
implementation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Wed, 9 May 2018 19:53:09 +0000 (21:53 +0200)]
x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD
commit
1f50ddb4f4189243c05926b842dc1a0332195f31 upstream
The AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is a per core MSR on Family 17H CPUs. That means when
hyperthreading is enabled the SSBD bit toggle needs to take both cores into
account. Otherwise the following situation can happen:
CPU0 CPU1
disable SSB
disable SSB
enable SSB <- Enables it for the Core, i.e. for CPU0 as well
So after the SSB enable on CPU1 the task on CPU0 runs with SSB enabled
again.
On Intel the SSBD control is per core as well, but the synchronization
logic is implemented behind the per thread SPEC_CTRL MSR. It works like
this:
CORE_SPEC_CTRL = THREAD0_SPEC_CTRL | THREAD1_SPEC_CTRL
i.e. if one of the threads enables a mitigation then this affects both and
the mitigation is only disabled in the core when both threads disabled it.
Add the necessary synchronization logic for AMD family 17H. Unfortunately
that requires a spinlock to serialize the access to the MSR, but the locks
are only shared between siblings.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Thu, 10 May 2018 14:26:00 +0000 (16:26 +0200)]
x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN
commit
d1035d971829dcf80e8686ccde26f94b0a069472 upstream
Add a ZEN feature bit so family-dependent static_cpu_has() optimizations
can be built for ZEN.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Borislav Petkov [Thu, 7 Sep 2017 17:08:21 +0000 (19:08 +0200)]
x86/cpu/AMD: Fix erratum 1076 (CPB bit)
commit
f7f3dc00f61261cdc9ccd8b886f21bc4dffd6fd9 upstream
CPUID Fn8000_0007_EDX[CPB] is wrongly 0 on models up to B1. But they do
support CPB (AMD's Core Performance Boosting cpufreq CPU feature), so fix that.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sherry Hurwitz <sherry.hurwitz@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170907170821.16021-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Thu, 10 May 2018 18:21:36 +0000 (20:21 +0200)]
x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration
commit
52817587e706686fcdb27f14c1b000c92f266c96 upstream
The SSBD enumeration is similarly to the other bits magically shared
between Intel and AMD though the mechanisms are different.
Make X86_FEATURE_SSBD synthetic and set it depending on the vendor specific
features or family dependent setup.
Change the Intel bit to X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD to denote that SSBD is
controlled via MSR_SPEC_CTRL and fix up the usage sites.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Thu, 10 May 2018 17:13:18 +0000 (19:13 +0200)]
x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS
commit
7eb8956a7fec3c1f0abc2a5517dada99ccc8a961 upstream
The availability of the SPEC_CTRL MSR is enumerated by a CPUID bit on
Intel and implied by IBRS or STIBP support on AMD. That's just confusing
and in case an AMD CPU has IBRS not supported because the underlying
problem has been fixed but has another bit valid in the SPEC_CTRL MSR,
the thing falls apart.
Add a synthetic feature bit X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL to denote the
availability on both Intel and AMD.
While at it replace the boot_cpu_has() checks with static_cpu_has() where
possible. This prevents late microcode loading from exposing SPEC_CTRL, but
late loading is already very limited as it does not reevaluate the
mitigation options and other bits and pieces. Having static_cpu_has() is
the simplest and least fragile solution.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Borislav Petkov [Wed, 2 May 2018 16:15:14 +0000 (18:15 +0200)]
x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP
commit
e7c587da125291db39ddf1f49b18e5970adbac17 upstream
Intel and AMD have different CPUID bits hence for those use synthetic bits
which get set on the respective vendor's in init_speculation_control(). So
that debacles like what the commit message of
c65732e4f721 ("x86/cpu: Restore CPUID_8000_0008_EBX reload")
talks about don't happen anymore.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Jörg Otte <jrg.otte@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504161815.GG9257@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 11 May 2018 13:21:01 +0000 (15:21 +0200)]
KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS
commit
15e6c22fd8e5a42c5ed6d487b7c9fe44c2517765 upstream
svm_vcpu_run() invokes x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() after VMEXIT, but
before the host GS is restored. x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() uses 'current'
to determine the host SSBD state of the thread. 'current' is GS based, but
host GS is not yet restored and the access causes a triple fault.
Move the call after the host GS restore.
Fixes:
885f82bfbc6f x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Jim Mattson [Sun, 13 May 2018 21:33:57 +0000 (17:33 -0400)]
x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code
commit
5f2b745f5e1304f438f9b2cd03ebc8120b6e0d3b upstream
Cast val and (val >> 32) to (u32), so that they fit in a
general-purpose register in both 32-bit and 64-bit code.
[ tglx: Made it u32 instead of uintptr_t ]
Fixes:
c65732e4f721 ("x86/cpu: Restore CPUID_8000_0008_EBX reload")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Fri, 11 May 2018 20:50:35 +0000 (16:50 -0400)]
x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void
commit
ffed645e3be0e32f8e9ab068d257aee8d0fe8eec upstream
Fixes:
7bb4d366c ("x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static")
Fixes:
24f7fc83b ("x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Jiri Kosina [Thu, 10 May 2018 20:47:32 +0000 (22:47 +0200)]
x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static
commit
7bb4d366cba992904bffa4820d24e70a3de93e76 upstream
cpu_show_common() is not used outside of arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c, so
make it static.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Jiri Kosina [Thu, 10 May 2018 20:47:18 +0000 (22:47 +0200)]
x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type
commit
d66d8ff3d21667b41eddbe86b35ab411e40d8c5f upstream
__ssb_select_mitigation() returns one of the members of enum ssb_mitigation,
not ssb_mitigation_cmd; fix the prototype to reflect that.
Fixes:
24f7fc83b9204 ("x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Borislav Petkov [Tue, 8 May 2018 13:43:45 +0000 (15:43 +0200)]
Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups
commit
dd0792699c4058e63c0715d9a7c2d40226fcdddc upstream
Fix some typos, improve formulations, end sentences with a fullstop.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Wed, 9 May 2018 19:41:38 +0000 (21:41 +0200)]
proc: Use underscores for SSBD in 'status'
commit
e96f46ee8587607a828f783daa6eb5b44d25004d upstream
The style for the 'status' file is CamelCase or this. _.
Fixes:
fae1fa0fc ("proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations")
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Wed, 9 May 2018 19:41:38 +0000 (21:41 +0200)]
x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD
commit
9f65fb29374ee37856dbad847b4e121aab72b510 upstream
Intel collateral will reference the SSB mitigation bit in IA32_SPEC_CTL[2]
as SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable).
Hence changing it.
It is unclear yet what the MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (0x10a) Bit(4) name
is going to be. Following the rename it would be SSBD_NO but that rolls out
to Speculative Store Bypass Disable No.
Also fixed the missing space in X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD.
[ tglx: Fixup x86_amd_rds_enable() and rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg() as well ]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Kees Cook [Thu, 3 May 2018 21:37:54 +0000 (14:37 -0700)]
x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass
commit
f21b53b20c754021935ea43364dbf53778eeba32 upstream
Unless explicitly opted out of, anything running under seccomp will have
SSB mitigations enabled. Choosing the "prctl" mode will disable this.
[ tglx: Adjusted it to the new arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate() mechanism ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 4 May 2018 13:12:06 +0000 (15:12 +0200)]
seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code
commit
8bf37d8c067bb7eb8e7c381bdadf9bd89182b6bc upstream
The migitation control is simpler to implement in architecture code as it
avoids the extra function call to check the mode. Aside of that having an
explicit seccomp enabled mode in the architecture mitigations would require
even more workarounds.
Move it into architecture code and provide a weak function in the seccomp
code. Remove the 'which' argument as this allows the architecture to decide
which mitigations are relevant for seccomp.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Kees Cook [Thu, 3 May 2018 21:56:12 +0000 (14:56 -0700)]
seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation
commit
00a02d0c502a06d15e07b857f8ff921e3e402675 upstream
If a seccomp user is not interested in Speculative Store Bypass mitigation
by default, it can set the new SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW flag when
adding filters.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 4 May 2018 07:40:03 +0000 (09:40 +0200)]
seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE
commit
b849a812f7eb92e96d1c8239b06581b2cfd8b275 upstream
Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE in seccomp() because seccomp does not allow to
widen restrictions.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Thu, 3 May 2018 20:09:15 +0000 (22:09 +0200)]
prctl: Add force disable speculation
commit
356e4bfff2c5489e016fdb925adbf12a1e3950ee upstream
For certain use cases it is desired to enforce mitigations so they cannot
be undone afterwards. That's important for loader stubs which want to
prevent a child from disabling the mitigation again. Will also be used for
seccomp(). The extra state preserving of the prctl state for SSB is a
preparatory step for EBPF dymanic speculation control.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Kees Cook [Thu, 3 May 2018 22:03:30 +0000 (15:03 -0700)]
x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_init
commit
f9544b2b076ca90d887c5ae5d74fab4c21bb7c13 upstream
There's no reason for these to be changed after boot.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Kees Cook [Tue, 1 May 2018 22:07:31 +0000 (15:07 -0700)]
seccomp: Enable speculation flaw mitigations
commit
5c3070890d06ff82eecb808d02d2ca39169533ef upstream
When speculation flaw mitigations are opt-in (via prctl), using seccomp
will automatically opt-in to these protections, since using seccomp
indicates at least some level of sandboxing is desired.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Kees Cook [Tue, 1 May 2018 22:31:45 +0000 (15:31 -0700)]
proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations
commit
fae1fa0fc6cca8beee3ab8ed71d54f9a78fa3f64 upstream
As done with seccomp and no_new_privs, also show speculation flaw
mitigation state in /proc/$pid/status.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Kees Cook [Tue, 1 May 2018 22:19:04 +0000 (15:19 -0700)]
nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task
commit
7bbf1373e228840bb0295a2ca26d548ef37f448e upstream
Adjust arch_prctl_get/set_spec_ctrl() to operate on tasks other than
current.
This is needed both for /proc/$pid/status queries and for seccomp (since
thread-syncing can trigger seccomp in non-current threads).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 29 Apr 2018 13:26:40 +0000 (15:26 +0200)]
x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation
commit
a73ec77ee17ec556fe7f165d00314cb7c047b1ac upstream
Add prctl based control for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation and make it
the default mitigation for Intel and AMD.
Andi Kleen provided the following rationale (slightly redacted):
There are multiple levels of impact of Speculative Store Bypass:
1) JITed sandbox.
It cannot invoke system calls, but can do PRIME+PROBE and may have call
interfaces to other code
2) Native code process.
No protection inside the process at this level.
3) Kernel.
4) Between processes.
The prctl tries to protect against case (1) doing attacks.
If the untrusted code can do random system calls then control is already
lost in a much worse way. So there needs to be system call protection in
some way (using a JIT not allowing them or seccomp). Or rather if the
process can subvert its environment somehow to do the prctl it can already
execute arbitrary code, which is much worse than SSB.
To put it differently, the point of the prctl is to not allow JITed code
to read data it shouldn't read from its JITed sandbox. If it already has
escaped its sandbox then it can already read everything it wants in its
address space, and do much worse.
The ability to control Speculative Store Bypass allows to enable the
protection selectively without affecting overall system performance.
Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen. Completely rewritten.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 29 Apr 2018 13:21:42 +0000 (15:21 +0200)]
x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass
commit
885f82bfbc6fefb6664ea27965c3ab9ac4194b8c upstream
The Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability can be mitigated with the
Reduced Data Speculation (RDS) feature. To allow finer grained control of
this eventually expensive mitigation a per task mitigation control is
required.
Add a new TIF_RDS flag and put it into the group of TIF flags which are
evaluated for mismatch in switch_to(). If these bits differ in the previous
and the next task, then the slow path function __switch_to_xtra() is
invoked. Implement the TIF_RDS dependent mitigation control in the slow
path.
If the prctl for controlling Speculative Store Bypass is disabled or no
task uses the prctl then there is no overhead in the switch_to() fast
path.
Update the KVM related speculation control functions to take TID_RDS into
account as well.
Based on a patch from Tim Chen. Completely rewritten.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 14 Feb 2017 08:11:04 +0000 (00:11 -0800)]
x86/process: Optimize TIF_NOTSC switch
commit
5a920155e388ec22a22e0532fb695b9215c9b34d upstream
Provide and use a toggle helper instead of doing it with a branch.
x86_64: arch/x86/kernel/process.o
text data bss dec hex
3008 8577 16 11601 2d51 Before
2976 8577 16 11569 2d31 After
i386: arch/x86/kernel/process.o
text data bss dec hex
2925 8673 8 11606 2d56 Before
2893 8673 8 11574 2d36 After
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170214081104.9244-4-khuey@kylehuey.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Kyle Huey [Tue, 14 Feb 2017 08:11:03 +0000 (00:11 -0800)]
x86/process: Correct and optimize TIF_BLOCKSTEP switch
commit
b9894a2f5bd18b1691cb6872c9afe32b148d0132 upstream
The debug control MSR is "highly magical" as the blockstep bit can be
cleared by hardware under not well documented circumstances.
So a task switch relying on the bit set by the previous task (according to
the previous tasks thread flags) can trip over this and not update the flag
for the next task.
To fix this its required to handle DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF when either the previous
or the next or both tasks have the TIF_BLOCKSTEP flag set.
While at it avoid branching within the TIF_BLOCKSTEP case and evaluating
boot_cpu_data twice in kernels without CONFIG_X86_DEBUGCTLMSR.
x86_64: arch/x86/kernel/process.o
text data bss dec hex
3024 8577 16 11617 2d61 Before
3008 8577 16 11601 2d51 After
i386: No change
[ tglx: Made the shift value explicit, use a local variable to make the
code readable and massaged changelog]
Originally-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170214081104.9244-3-khuey@kylehuey.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Kyle Huey [Tue, 14 Feb 2017 08:11:02 +0000 (00:11 -0800)]
x86/process: Optimize TIF checks in __switch_to_xtra()
commit
af8b3cd3934ec60f4c2a420d19a9d416554f140b upstream
Help the compiler to avoid reevaluating the thread flags for each checked
bit by reordering the bit checks and providing an explicit xor for
evaluation.
With default defconfigs for each arch,
x86_64: arch/x86/kernel/process.o
text data bss dec hex
3056 8577 16 11649 2d81 Before
3024 8577 16 11617 2d61 After
i386: arch/x86/kernel/process.o
text data bss dec hex
2957 8673 8 11638 2d76 Before
2925 8673 8 11606 2d56 After
Originally-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170214081104.9244-2-khuey@kylehuey.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[dwmw2: backported to make TIF_RDS handling simpler.
No deferred TR reload.]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 29 Apr 2018 13:20:11 +0000 (15:20 +0200)]
prctl: Add speculation control prctls
commit
b617cfc858161140d69cc0b5cc211996b557a1c7 upstream
Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites
and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance
impacting mitigations.
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with
the following meaning:
Bit Define Description
0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
disabled
2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
enabled
If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is
available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
misfeature will fail.
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the
control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.
The common return values are:
EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl()
arguments are not 0
ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values:
ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE
ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled
The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is
PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between
architectures.
Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 29 Apr 2018 13:01:37 +0000 (15:01 +0200)]
x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell
commit
28a2775217b17208811fa43a9e96bd1fdf417b86 upstream
Having everything in nospec-branch.h creates a hell of dependencies when
adding the prctl based switching mechanism. Move everything which is not
required in nospec-branch.h to spec-ctrl.h and fix up the includes in the
relevant files.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Thu, 26 Apr 2018 02:04:25 +0000 (22:04 -0400)]
x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest
commit
da39556f66f5cfe8f9c989206974f1cb16ca5d7c upstream
Expose the CPUID.7.EDX[31] bit to the guest, and also guard against various
combinations of SPEC_CTRL MSR values.
The handling of the MSR (to take into account the host value of SPEC_CTRL
Bit(2)) is taken care of in patch:
KVM/SVM/VMX/x86/spectre_v2: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[dwmw2: Handle 4.9 guest CPUID differences, rename
guest_cpu_has_ibrs() → guest_cpu_has_spec_ctrl()]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
David Woodhouse [Sun, 20 May 2018 19:52:05 +0000 (20:52 +0100)]
x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested
commit
764f3c21588a059cd783c6ba0734d4db2d72822d upstream
AMD does not need the Speculative Store Bypass mitigation to be enabled.
The parameters for this are already available and can be done via MSR
C001_1020. Each family uses a different bit in that MSR for this.
[ tglx: Expose the bit mask via a variable and move the actual MSR fiddling
into the bugs code as that's the right thing to do and also required
to prepare for dynamic enable/disable ]
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Thu, 26 Apr 2018 02:04:23 +0000 (22:04 -0400)]
x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values
commit
1115a859f33276fe8afb31c60cf9d8e657872558 upstream
Intel and AMD SPEC_CTRL (0x48) MSR semantics may differ in the
future (or in fact use different MSRs for the same functionality).
As such a run-time mechanism is required to whitelist the appropriate MSR
values.
[ tglx: Made the variable __ro_after_init ]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Thu, 26 Apr 2018 02:04:22 +0000 (22:04 -0400)]
x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS
commit
772439717dbf703b39990be58d8d4e3e4ad0598a upstream
Intel CPUs expose methods to:
- Detect whether RDS capability is available via CPUID.7.0.EDX[31],
- The SPEC_CTRL MSR(0x48), bit 2 set to enable RDS.
- MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, Bit(4) no need to enable RRS.
With that in mind if spec_store_bypass_disable=[auto,on] is selected set at
boot-time the SPEC_CTRL MSR to enable RDS if the platform requires it.
Note that this does not fix the KVM case where the SPEC_CTRL is exposed to
guests which can muck with it, see patch titled :
KVM/SVM/VMX/x86/spectre_v2: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS.
And for the firmware (IBRS to be set), see patch titled:
x86/spectre_v2: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits
[ tglx: Distangled it from the intel implementation and kept the call order ]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Thu, 26 Apr 2018 02:04:21 +0000 (22:04 -0400)]
x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation
commit
24f7fc83b9204d20f878c57cb77d261ae825e033 upstream
Contemporary high performance processors use a common industry-wide
optimization known as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which loads from
addresses to which a recent store has occurred may (speculatively) see an
older value. Intel refers to this feature as "Memory Disambiguation" which
is part of their "Smart Memory Access" capability.
Memory Disambiguation can expose a cache side-channel attack against such
speculatively read values. An attacker can create exploit code that allows
them to read memory outside of a sandbox environment (for example,
malicious JavaScript in a web page), or to perform more complex attacks
against code running within the same privilege level, e.g. via the stack.
As a first step to mitigate against such attacks, provide two boot command
line control knobs:
nospec_store_bypass_disable
spec_store_bypass_disable=[off,auto,on]
By default affected x86 processors will power on with Speculative
Store Bypass enabled. Hence the provided kernel parameters are written
from the point of view of whether to enable a mitigation or not.
The parameters are as follows:
- auto - Kernel detects whether your CPU model contains an implementation
of Speculative Store Bypass and picks the most appropriate
mitigation.
- on - disable Speculative Store Bypass
- off - enable Speculative Store Bypass
[ tglx: Reordered the checks so that the whole evaluation is not done
when the CPU does not support RDS ]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Sat, 28 Apr 2018 20:34:17 +0000 (22:34 +0200)]
x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS
commit
0cc5fa00b0a88dad140b4e5c2cead9951ad36822 upstream
Add the CPU feature bit CPUID.7.0.EDX[31] which indicates whether the CPU
supports Reduced Data Speculation.
[ tglx: Split it out from a later patch ]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Thu, 26 Apr 2018 02:04:20 +0000 (22:04 -0400)]
x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass
commit
c456442cd3a59eeb1d60293c26cbe2ff2c4e42cf upstream
Add the sysfs file for the new vulerability. It does not do much except
show the words 'Vulnerable' for recent x86 cores.
Intel cores prior to family 6 are known not to be vulnerable, and so are
some Atoms and some Xeon Phi.
It assumes that older Cyrix, Centaur, etc. cores are immune.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Thu, 26 Apr 2018 02:04:19 +0000 (22:04 -0400)]
x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS
commit
5cf687548705412da47c9cec342fd952d71ed3d5 upstream
A guest may modify the SPEC_CTRL MSR from the value used by the
kernel. Since the kernel doesn't use IBRS, this means a value of zero is
what is needed in the host.
But the 336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf refers to
the other bits as reserved so the kernel should respect the boot time
SPEC_CTRL value and use that.
This allows to deal with future extensions to the SPEC_CTRL interface if
any at all.
Note: This uses wrmsrl() instead of native_wrmsl(). I does not make any
difference as paravirt will over-write the callq *0xfff.. with the wrmsrl
assembler code.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>