Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 22:07:35 +0000 (23:07 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.107' into update
This is the 3.10.107 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 22:06:23 +0000 (23:06 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.106' into update
This is the 3.10.106 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 22:00:38 +0000 (23:00 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.105' into update
This is the 3.10.105 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:58:25 +0000 (22:58 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.104' into update
This is the 3.10.104 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:58:21 +0000 (22:58 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.103' into update
This is the 3.10.103 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:54:09 +0000 (22:54 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.102' into update
This is the 3.10.102 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:52:41 +0000 (22:52 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.101' into update
This is the 3.10.101 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:52:38 +0000 (22:52 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.100' into update
This is the 3.10.100 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:51:42 +0000 (22:51 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.99' into update
This is the 3.10.99 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:51:37 +0000 (22:51 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.98' into update
This is the 3.10.98 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:51:04 +0000 (22:51 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.97' into update
This is the 3.10.97 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:51:00 +0000 (22:51 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.96' into update
This is the 3.10.96 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:50:56 +0000 (22:50 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.95' into update
This is the 3.10.95 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:49:45 +0000 (22:49 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.94' into update
This is the 3.10.94 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:49:39 +0000 (22:49 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.93' into update
This is the 3.10.93 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:49:35 +0000 (22:49 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.92' into update
This is the 3.10.92 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:48:36 +0000 (22:48 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.91' into update
This is the 3.10.91 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:47:31 +0000 (22:47 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.90' into update
This is the 3.10.90 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:47:28 +0000 (22:47 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.89' into update
This is the 3.10.89 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:47:25 +0000 (22:47 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.88' into update
This is the 3.10.88 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:47:22 +0000 (22:47 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.87' into update
This is the 3.10.87 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:47:17 +0000 (22:47 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.86' into update
This is the 3.10.86 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:46:39 +0000 (22:46 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.85' into update
This is the 3.10.85 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:46:36 +0000 (22:46 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.84' into update
This is the 3.10.84 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:46:32 +0000 (22:46 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.83' into update
This is the 3.10.83 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:45:38 +0000 (22:45 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.82' into update
This is the 3.10.82 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:45:35 +0000 (22:45 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.81' into update
This is the 3.10.81 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:45:22 +0000 (22:45 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.80' into update
This is the 3.10.80 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:44:42 +0000 (22:44 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.79' into update
This is the 3.10.79 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:44:38 +0000 (22:44 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.78' into update
This is the 3.10.78 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:44:34 +0000 (22:44 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.77' into update
This is the 3.10.77 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:42:30 +0000 (22:42 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.76' into update
This is the 3.10.76 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:41:10 +0000 (22:41 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.75' into update
This is the 3.10.75 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:41:07 +0000 (22:41 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.74' into update
This is the 3.10.74 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:41:03 +0000 (22:41 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.73' into update
This is the 3.10.73 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:40:54 +0000 (22:40 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.72' into update
This is the 3.10.72 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:40:50 +0000 (22:40 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.71' into update
This is the 3.10.71 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:40:47 +0000 (22:40 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.70' into update
This is the 3.10.70 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:39:46 +0000 (22:39 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.69' into update
This is the 3.10.69 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:38:24 +0000 (22:38 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.68' into update
This is the 3.10.68 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:36:30 +0000 (22:36 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.67' into update
This is the 3.10.67 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:36:27 +0000 (22:36 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.66' into update
This is the 3.10.66 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:36:23 +0000 (22:36 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.65' into update
This is the 3.10.65 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:33:51 +0000 (22:33 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.64' into update
This is the 3.10.64 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:33:47 +0000 (22:33 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.63' into update
This is the 3.10.63 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:31:45 +0000 (22:31 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.62' into update
This is the 3.10.62 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:31:40 +0000 (22:31 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.61' into update
This is the 3.10.61 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:31:34 +0000 (22:31 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.60' into update
This is the 3.10.60 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:31:29 +0000 (22:31 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.59' into update
This is the 3.10.59 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:31:25 +0000 (22:31 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.58' into update
This is the 3.10.58 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:28:46 +0000 (22:28 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.57' into update
This is the 3.10.57 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:22:19 +0000 (22:22 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.56' into update
This is the 3.10.56 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 21:13:57 +0000 (22:13 +0100)]
Merge tag 'v3.10.55' into update
This is the 3.10.55 stable release
Stricted [Wed, 21 Mar 2018 14:41:24 +0000 (15:41 +0100)]
disable some mediatekl custom warnings
Stricted [Fri, 16 Mar 2018 11:36:42 +0000 (12:36 +0100)]
scripts: kconfig: fix jump initialization
Stricted [Fri, 16 Mar 2018 11:43:09 +0000 (12:43 +0100)]
scripts: sortextable: fix relocs_size initialization
Stricted [Mon, 19 Mar 2018 16:45:11 +0000 (17:45 +0100)]
cleanup Makefile
Stricted [Mon, 19 Mar 2018 16:33:56 +0000 (17:33 +0100)]
remove useless makefiles and build script
Diogo Ferreira [Fri, 15 Apr 2016 17:34:08 +0000 (18:34 +0100)]
Add an option to multiplex AP and STA on wlan0
This adds CONFIG_MTK_COMBO_AOSP_TETHERING_SUPPORT which, when enabled,
allows ap and wlan to co-exist in the same interface, as Android
expects.
Most of this functionality is also available (albeit not compilable broken)
under CFG_TC1_FEATURE but that has larger implications around the radio
and usb stack that we do not want to adopt.
Change-Id: Ib1d1be40566f1bb9ccc7be45b49ec8d1f3b3ba58
Ticket: PORRIDGE-30
Stricted [Mon, 19 Mar 2018 13:51:56 +0000 (14:51 +0100)]
ignore all warning
i dont really want fix this mess that mediatek did here to get a clean build log
so lets disable the warning for now instead
Kees Cook [Tue, 10 Jun 2014 22:40:23 +0000 (15:40 -0700)]
ARM: add seccomp syscall
Wires up the new seccomp syscall.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Change-Id: I31a2d38b892e2cd81bf3998a916c7bb539a37767
Stricted [Fri, 16 Mar 2018 11:30:43 +0000 (12:30 +0100)]
replace lcm_mdelay with mdelay
Stricted [Tue, 13 Mar 2018 19:30:12 +0000 (20:30 +0100)]
import PULS_20180308
Stricted [Tue, 13 Mar 2018 19:29:02 +0000 (20:29 +0100)]
import PULS_20160108
Willy Tarreau [Tue, 27 Jun 2017 09:49:32 +0000 (11:49 +0200)]
Linux 3.10.107
Helge Deller [Mon, 19 Jun 2017 15:34:05 +0000 (17:34 +0200)]
Allow stack to grow up to address space limit
commit
bd726c90b6b8ce87602208701b208a208e6d5600 upstream.
Fix expand_upwards() on architectures with an upward-growing stack (parisc,
metag and partly IA-64) to allow the stack to reliably grow exactly up to
the address space limit given by TASK_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Hugh Dickins [Tue, 20 Jun 2017 09:10:44 +0000 (02:10 -0700)]
mm: fix new crash in unmapped_area_topdown()
commit
f4cb767d76cf7ee72f97dd76f6cfa6c76a5edc89 upstream.
Trinity gets kernel BUG at mm/mmap.c:1963! in about 3 minutes of
mmap testing. That's the VM_BUG_ON(gap_end < gap_start) at the
end of unmapped_area_topdown(). Linus points out how MAP_FIXED
(which does not have to respect our stack guard gap intentions)
could result in gap_end below gap_start there. Fix that, and
the similar case in its alternative, unmapped_area().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas")
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Debugged-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Hugh Dickins [Mon, 19 Jun 2017 11:03:24 +0000 (04:03 -0700)]
mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas
commit
1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.
Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.
This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.
Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.
One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).
Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.
Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.
Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
[wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes]
[wt: backport to 3.18: adjust context ; no FOLL_POPULATE ;
s390 uses generic arch_get_unmapped_area()]
[wt: backport to 3.16: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 3.10: adjust context ; code logic in PARISC's
arch_get_unmapped_area() wasn't found ; code inserted into
expand_upwards() and expand_downwards() runs under anon_vma lock;
changes for gup.c:faultin_page go to memory.c:__get_user_pages();
included Hugh Dickins' fixes]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Hector Marco-Gisbert [Thu, 10 Mar 2016 19:51:00 +0000 (20:51 +0100)]
x86/mm/32: Enable full randomization on i386 and X86_32
commit
8b8addf891de8a00e4d39fc32f93f7c5eb8feceb upstream.
Currently on i386 and on X86_64 when emulating X86_32 in legacy mode, only
the stack and the executable are randomized but not other mmapped files
(libraries, vDSO, etc.). This patch enables randomization for the
libraries, vDSO and mmap requests on i386 and in X86_32 in legacy mode.
By default on i386 there are 8 bits for the randomization of the libraries,
vDSO and mmaps which only uses 1MB of VA.
This patch preserves the original randomness, using 1MB of VA out of 3GB or
4GB. We think that 1MB out of 3GB is not a big cost for having the ASLR.
The first obvious security benefit is that all objects are randomized (not
only the stack and the executable) in legacy mode which highly increases
the ASLR effectiveness, otherwise the attackers may use these
non-randomized areas. But also sensitive setuid/setgid applications are
more secure because currently, attackers can disable the randomization of
these applications by setting the ulimit stack to "unlimited". This is a
very old and widely known trick to disable the ASLR in i386 which has been
allowed for too long.
Another trick used to disable the ASLR was to set the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE
personality flag, but fortunately this doesn't work on setuid/setgid
applications because there is security checks which clear Security-relevant
flags.
This patch always randomizes the mmap_legacy_base address, removing the
possibility to disable the ASLR by setting the stack to "unlimited".
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Acked-by: Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457639460-5242-1-git-send-email-hecmargi@upv.es
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Kees Cook [Tue, 14 Apr 2015 22:47:45 +0000 (15:47 -0700)]
x86: standardize mmap_rnd() usage
commit
82168140bc4cec7ec9bad39705518541149ff8b7 upstream.
In preparation for splitting out ET_DYN ASLR, this refactors the use of
mmap_rnd() to be used similarly to arm, and extracts the checking of
PF_RANDOMIZE.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Jamie Bainbridge [Wed, 26 Apr 2017 00:43:27 +0000 (10:43 +1000)]
ipv6: check raw payload size correctly in ioctl
commit
105f5528b9bbaa08b526d3405a5bcd2ff0c953c8 upstream.
In situations where an skb is paged, the transport header pointer and
tail pointer can be the same because the skb contents are in frags.
This results in ioctl(SIOCINQ/FIONREAD) incorrectly returning a
length of 0 when the length to receive is actually greater than zero.
skb->len is already correctly set in ip6_input_finish() with
pskb_pull(), so use skb->len as it always returns the correct result
for both linear and paged data.
Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <jbainbri@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Sergey Senozhatsky [Sat, 18 Feb 2017 11:42:54 +0000 (03:42 -0800)]
printk: use rcuidle console tracepoint
commit
fc98c3c8c9dcafd67adcce69e6ce3191d5306c9c upstream.
Use rcuidle console tracepoint because, apparently, it may be issued
from an idle CPU:
hw-breakpoint: Failed to enable monitor mode on CPU 0.
hw-breakpoint: CPU 0 failed to disable vector catch
===============================
[ ERR: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.10.0-rc8-next-
20170215+ #119 Not tainted
-------------------------------
./include/trace/events/printk.h:32 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
RCU used illegally from idle CPU!
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
RCU used illegally from extended quiescent state!
2 locks held by swapper/0/0:
#0: (cpu_pm_notifier_lock){......}, at: [<
c0237e2c>] cpu_pm_exit+0x10/0x54
#1: (console_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<
c01ab350>] vprintk_emit+0x264/0x474
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc8-next-
20170215+ #119
Hardware name: Generic OMAP4 (Flattened Device Tree)
console_unlock
vprintk_emit
vprintk_default
printk
reset_ctrl_regs
dbg_cpu_pm_notify
notifier_call_chain
cpu_pm_exit
omap_enter_idle_coupled
cpuidle_enter_state
cpuidle_enter_state_coupled
do_idle
cpu_startup_entry
start_kernel
This RCU warning, however, is suppressed by lockdep_off() in printk().
lockdep_off() increments the ->lockdep_recursion counter and thus
disables RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() and debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled(), which want
lockdep to be enabled "current->lockdep_recursion == 0".
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170217015932.11898-1-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[wt: changes are in kernel/printk.c in 3.10]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Willem de Bruijn [Fri, 3 Feb 2017 23:20:48 +0000 (18:20 -0500)]
tun: read vnet_hdr_sz once
commit
e1edab87faf6ca30cd137e0795bc73aa9a9a22ec upstream.
When IFF_VNET_HDR is enabled, a virtio_net header must precede data.
Data length is verified to be greater than or equal to expected header
length tun->vnet_hdr_sz before copying.
Read this value once and cache locally, as it can be updated between
the test and use (TOCTOU).
[js] we have TUN_VNET_HDR in 3.12
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
CC: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
[wt: s/READ_ONCE/ACCESS_ONCE]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Jim Mattson [Mon, 12 Dec 2016 19:01:37 +0000 (11:01 -0800)]
kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
commit
ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388 upstream.
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Josh Poimboeuf [Thu, 13 Apr 2017 22:53:55 +0000 (17:53 -0500)]
ftrace/x86: Fix triple fault with graph tracing and suspend-to-ram
commit
34a477e5297cbaa6ecc6e17c042a866e1cbe80d6 upstream.
On x86-32, with CONFIG_FIRMWARE and multiple CPUs, if you enable function
graph tracing and then suspend to RAM, it will triple fault and reboot when
it resumes.
The first fault happens when booting a secondary CPU:
startup_32_smp()
load_ucode_ap()
prepare_ftrace_return()
ftrace_graph_is_dead()
(accesses 'kill_ftrace_graph')
The early head_32.S code calls into load_ucode_ap(), which has an an
ftrace hook, so it calls prepare_ftrace_return(), which calls
ftrace_graph_is_dead(), which tries to access the global
'kill_ftrace_graph' variable with a virtual address, causing a fault
because the CPU is still in real mode.
The fix is to add a check in prepare_ftrace_return() to make sure it's
running in protected mode before continuing. The check makes sure the
stack pointer is a virtual kernel address. It's a bit of a hack, but
it's not very intrusive and it works well enough.
For reference, here are a few other (more difficult) ways this could
have potentially been fixed:
- Move startup_32_smp()'s call to load_ucode_ap() down to *after* paging
is enabled. (No idea what that would break.)
- Track down load_ucode_ap()'s entire callee tree and mark all the
functions 'notrace'. (Probably not realistic.)
- Pause graph tracing in ftrace_suspend_notifier_call() or bringup_cpu()
or __cpu_up(), and ensure that the pause facility can be queried from
real mode.
Reported-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5c1272269a580660703ed2eccf44308e790c7a98.1492123841.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
J. Bruce Fields [Fri, 21 Apr 2017 20:10:18 +0000 (16:10 -0400)]
nfsd: check for oversized NFSv2/v3 arguments
commit
e6838a29ecb484c97e4efef9429643b9851fba6e upstream.
A client can append random data to the end of an NFSv2 or NFSv3 RPC call
without our complaining; we'll just stop parsing at the end of the
expected data and ignore the rest.
Encoded arguments and replies are stored together in an array of pages,
and if a call is too large it could leave inadequate space for the
reply. This is normally OK because NFS RPC's typically have either
short arguments and long replies (like READ) or long arguments and short
replies (like WRITE). But a client that sends an incorrectly long reply
can violate those assumptions. This was observed to cause crashes.
Also, several operations increment rq_next_page in the decode routine
before checking the argument size, which can leave rq_next_page pointing
well past the end of the page array, causing trouble later in
svc_free_pages.
So, following a suggestion from Neil Brown, add a central check to
enforce our expectation that no NFSv2/v3 call has both a large call and
a large reply.
As followup we may also want to rewrite the encoding routines to check
more carefully that they aren't running off the end of the page array.
We may also consider rejecting calls that have any extra garbage
appended. That would be safer, and within our rights by spec, but given
the age of our server and the NFS protocol, and the fact that we've
never enforced this before, we may need to balance that against the
possibility of breaking some oddball client.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <thaan@synopsys.com>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <ari@synopsys.com>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Al Viro [Fri, 14 Apr 2017 21:22:18 +0000 (17:22 -0400)]
p9_client_readdir() fix
commit
71d6ad08379304128e4bdfaf0b4185d54375423e upstream.
Don't assume that server is sane and won't return more data than
asked for.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Stefano Stabellini [Sat, 16 Apr 2016 01:23:00 +0000 (18:23 -0700)]
xen/x86: don't lose event interrupts
commit
c06b6d70feb32d28f04ba37aa3df17973fd37b6b upstream.
On slow platforms with unreliable TSC, such as QEMU emulated machines,
it is possible for the kernel to request the next event in the past. In
that case, in the current implementation of xen_vcpuop_clockevent, we
simply return -ETIME. To be precise the Xen returns -ETIME and we pass
it on. However the result of this is a missed event, which simply causes
the kernel to hang.
Instead it is better to always ask the hypervisor for a timer event,
even if the timeout is in the past. That way there are no lost
interrupts and the kernel survives. To do that, remove the
VCPU_SSHOTTMR_future flag.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com [Thu, 14 Apr 2016 17:43:27 +0000 (10:43 -0700)]
RDS: Fix the atomicity for congestion map update
commit
e47db94e10447fc467777a40302f2b393e9af2fa upstream.
Two different threads with different rds sockets may be in
rds_recv_rcvbuf_delta() via receive path. If their ports
both map to the same word in the congestion map, then
using non-atomic ops to update it could cause the map to
be incorrect. Lets use atomics to avoid such an issue.
Full credit to Wengang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> for
finding the issue, analysing it and also pointing out
to offending code with spin lock based fix.
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@leon.nu>
Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Corey Minyard [Mon, 11 Apr 2016 14:10:19 +0000 (09:10 -0500)]
MIPS: Fix crash registers on non-crashing CPUs
commit
c80e1b62ffca52e2d1d865ee58bc79c4c0c55005 upstream.
As part of handling a crash on an SMP system, an IPI is send to
all other CPUs to save their current registers and stop. It was
using task_pt_regs(current) to get the registers, but that will
only be accurate if the CPU was interrupted running in userland.
Instead allow the architecture to pass in the registers (all
pass NULL now, but allow for the future) and then use get_irq_regs()
which should be accurate as we are in an interrupt. Fall back to
task_pt_regs(current) if nothing else is available.
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Cc: David Daney <ddaney@caviumnetworks.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/13050/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Nikolay Aleksandrov [Fri, 21 Apr 2017 17:42:16 +0000 (20:42 +0300)]
ip6mr: fix notification device destruction
commit
723b929ca0f79c0796f160c2eeda4597ee98d2b8 upstream.
Andrey Konovalov reported a BUG caused by the ip6mr code which is caused
because we call unregister_netdevice_many for a device that is already
being destroyed. In IPv4's ipmr that has been resolved by two commits
long time ago by introducing the "notify" parameter to the delete
function and avoiding the unregister when called from a notifier, so
let's do the same for ip6mr.
The trace from Andrey:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6813!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 1165 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc7+ #251
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs
01/01/2011
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
task:
ffff880069208000 task.stack:
ffff8800692d8000
RIP: 0010:rollback_registered_many+0x348/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:6813
RSP: 0018:
ffff8800692de7f0 EFLAGS:
00010297
RAX:
ffff880069208000 RBX:
0000000000000002 RCX:
0000000000000001
RDX:
0000000000000000 RSI:
0000000000000000 RDI:
ffff88006af90569
RBP:
ffff8800692de9f0 R08:
ffff8800692dec60 R09:
0000000000000000
R10:
0000000000000006 R11:
0000000000000000 R12:
ffff88006af90070
R13:
ffff8800692debf0 R14:
dffffc0000000000 R15:
ffff88006af90000
FS:
0000000000000000(0000) GS:
ffff88006cb00000(0000)
knlGS:
0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0:
0000000080050033
CR2:
00007fe7e897d870 CR3:
00000000657e7000 CR4:
00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
unregister_netdevice_many.part.105+0x87/0x440 net/core/dev.c:7881
unregister_netdevice_many+0xc8/0x120 net/core/dev.c:7880
ip6mr_device_event+0x362/0x3f0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1346
notifier_call_chain+0x145/0x2f0 kernel/notifier.c:93
__raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394
raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x51/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1647
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1663
rollback_registered_many+0x919/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:6841
unregister_netdevice_many.part.105+0x87/0x440 net/core/dev.c:7881
unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:7880
default_device_exit_batch+0x4fa/0x640 net/core/dev.c:8333
ops_exit_list.isra.4+0x100/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:144
cleanup_net+0x5a8/0xb40 net/core/net_namespace.c:463
process_one_work+0xc04/0x1c10 kernel/workqueue.c:2097
worker_thread+0x223/0x19c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2231
kthread+0x35e/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:430
Code: 3c 32 00 0f 85 70 0b 00 00 48 b8 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de 49 89
47 78 e9 93 fe ff ff 49 8d 57 70 49 8d 5f 78 eb 9e e8 88 7a 14 fe <0f>
0b 48 8b 9d 28 fe ff ff e8 7a 7a 14 fe 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00
RIP: rollback_registered_many+0x348/0xeb0 RSP:
ffff8800692de7f0
---[ end trace
e0b29c57e9b3292c ]---
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Xin Long [Thu, 6 Apr 2017 05:10:52 +0000 (13:10 +0800)]
sctp: listen on the sock only when it's state is listening or closed
commit
34b2789f1d9bf8dcca9b5cb553d076ca2cd898ee upstream.
Now sctp doesn't check sock's state before listening on it. It could
even cause changing a sock with any state to become a listening sock
when doing sctp_listen.
This patch is to fix it by checking sock's state in sctp_listen, so
that it will listen on the sock with right state.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Thu, 23 Mar 2017 19:39:21 +0000 (12:39 -0700)]
net: neigh: guard against NULL solicit() method
commit
48481c8fa16410ffa45939b13b6c53c2ca609e5f upstream.
Dmitry posted a nice reproducer of a bug triggering in neigh_probe()
when dereferencing a NULL neigh->ops->solicit method.
This can happen for arp_direct_ops/ndisc_direct_ops and similar,
which can be used for NUD_NOARP neighbours (created when dev->header_ops
is NULL). Admin can then force changing nud_state to some other state
that would fire neigh timer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Arnd Bergmann [Tue, 26 Jan 2016 18:08:10 +0000 (13:08 -0500)]
gfs2: avoid uninitialized variable warning
commit
67893f12e5374bbcaaffbc6e570acbc2714ea884 upstream.
We get a bogus warning about a potential uninitialized variable
use in gfs2, because the compiler does not figure out that we
never use the leaf number if get_leaf_nr() returns an error:
fs/gfs2/dir.c: In function 'get_first_leaf':
fs/gfs2/dir.c:802:9: warning: 'leaf_no' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
fs/gfs2/dir.c: In function 'dir_split_leaf':
fs/gfs2/dir.c:1021:8: warning: 'leaf_no' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
Changing the 'if (!error)' to 'if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(error))' is
sufficient to let gcc understand that this is exactly the same
condition as in IS_ERR() so it can optimize the code path enough
to understand it.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Arnd Bergmann [Thu, 28 Jan 2016 21:58:28 +0000 (22:58 +0100)]
hostap: avoid uninitialized variable use in hfa384x_get_rid
commit
48dc5fb3ba53b20418de8514700f63d88c5de3a3 upstream.
The driver reads a value from hfa384x_from_bap(), which may fail,
and then assigns the value to a local variable. gcc detects that
in in the failure case, the 'rlen' variable now contains
uninitialized data:
In file included from ../drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/hostap_pci.c:220:0:
drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/hostap_hw.c: In function 'hfa384x_get_rid':
drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/hostap_hw.c:842:5: warning: 'rec' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
if (le16_to_cpu(rec.len) == 0) {
This restructures the function as suggested by Russell King, to
make it more readable and get more reliable error handling, by
handling each failure mode using a goto.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Arnd Bergmann [Mon, 25 Jan 2016 21:54:56 +0000 (22:54 +0100)]
tty: nozomi: avoid a harmless gcc warning
commit
a4f642a8a3c2838ad09fe8313d45db46600e1478 upstream.
The nozomi wireless data driver has its own helper function to
transfer data from a FIFO, doing an extra byte swap on big-endian
architectures, presumably to bring the data back into byte-serial
order after readw() or readl() perform their implicit byteswap.
This helper function is used in the receive_data() function to
first read the length into a 32-bit variable, which causes
a compile-time warning:
drivers/tty/nozomi.c: In function 'receive_data':
drivers/tty/nozomi.c:857:9: warning: 'size' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
The problem is that gcc is unsure whether the data was actually
read or not. We know that it is at this point, so we can replace
it with a single readl() to shut up that warning.
I am leaving the byteswap in there, to preserve the existing
behavior, even though this seems fishy: Reading the length of
the data into a cpu-endian variable should normally not use
a second byteswap on big-endian systems, unless the hardware
is aware of the CPU endianess.
There appears to be a lot more confusion about endianess in this
driver, so it probably has not worked on big-endian systems in
a long time, if ever, and I have no way to test it. It's well
possible that this driver has not been used by anyone in a while,
the last patch that looks like it was tested on the hardware is
from 2008.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Andrey Konovalov [Wed, 29 Mar 2017 14:11:22 +0000 (16:11 +0200)]
net/packet: fix overflow in check for tp_reserve
commit
bcc5364bdcfe131e6379363f089e7b4108d35b70 upstream.
When calculating po->tp_hdrlen + po->tp_reserve the result can overflow.
Fix by checking that tp_reserve <= INT_MAX on assign.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Andrey Konovalov [Wed, 29 Mar 2017 14:11:21 +0000 (16:11 +0200)]
net/packet: fix overflow in check for tp_frame_nr
commit
8f8d28e4d6d815a391285e121c3a53a0b6cb9e7b upstream.
When calculating rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr the result
can overflow.
Add a check that tp_block_size * tp_block_nr <= UINT_MAX.
Since frames_per_block <= tp_block_size, the expression would
never overflow.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Michael Ellerman [Thu, 23 Apr 2015 07:27:12 +0000 (17:27 +1000)]
powerpc: Reject binutils 2.24 when building little endian
commit
60e065f70bdb0b0e916389024922ad40f3270c96 upstream.
There is a bug in binutils 2.24 which causes miscompilation if we're
building little endian and using weak symbols (which the kernel does).
It is fixed in binutils commit
57fa7b8c7e59 "Correct elf_merge_st_other
arguments for weak symbols", which is in binutils 2.25 and has been
backported to the binutils 2.24 branch and has been picked up by most
distros it seems.
However if we're running stock 2.24 (no extra version) then the bug is
present, so check for that and bail.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Yazen Ghannam [Thu, 30 Mar 2017 11:17:14 +0000 (13:17 +0200)]
x86/mce/AMD: Give a name to MCA bank 3 when accessed with legacy MSRs
commit
29f72ce3e4d18066ec75c79c857bee0618a3504b upstream.
MCA bank 3 is reserved on systems pre-Fam17h, so it didn't have a name.
However, MCA bank 3 is defined on Fam17h systems and can be accessed
using legacy MSRs. Without a name we get a stack trace on Fam17h systems
when trying to register sysfs files for bank 3 on kernels that don't
recognize Scalable MCA.
Call MCA bank 3 "decode_unit" since this is what it represents on
Fam17h. This will allow kernels without SMCA support to see this bank on
Fam17h+ and prevent the stack trace. This will not affect older systems
since this bank is reserved on them, i.e. it'll be ignored.
Tested on AMD Fam15h and Fam17h systems.
WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 1 at lib/kobject.c:210 kobject_add_internal
kobject: (
ffff88085bb256c0): attempted to be registered with empty name!
...
Call Trace:
kobject_add_internal
kobject_add
kobject_create_and_add
threshold_create_device
threshold_init_device
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1490102285-3659-1-git-send-email-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Sebastian Siewior [Wed, 22 Feb 2017 16:15:21 +0000 (17:15 +0100)]
ubi/upd: Always flush after prepared for an update
commit
9cd9a21ce070be8a918ffd3381468315a7a76ba6 upstream.
In commit
6afaf8a484cb ("UBI: flush wl before clearing update marker") I
managed to trigger and fix a similar bug. Now here is another version of
which I assumed it wouldn't matter back then but it turns out UBI has a
check for it and will error out like this:
|ubi0 warning: validate_vid_hdr: inconsistent used_ebs
|ubi0 error: validate_vid_hdr: inconsistent VID header at PEB 592
All you need to trigger this is? "ubiupdatevol /dev/ubi0_0 file" + a
powercut in the middle of the operation.
ubi_start_update() sets the update-marker and puts all EBs on the erase
list. After that userland can proceed to write new data while the old EB
aren't erased completely. A powercut at this point is usually not that
much of a tragedy. UBI won't give read access to the static volume
because it has the update marker. It will most likely set the corrupted
flag because it misses some EBs.
So we are all good. Unless the size of the image that has been written
differs from the old image in the magnitude of at least one EB. In that
case UBI will find two different values for `used_ebs' and refuse to
attach the image with the error message mentioned above.
So in order not to get in the situation, the patch will ensure that we
wait until everything is removed before it tries to write any data.
The alternative would be to detect such a case and remove all EBs at the
attached time after we processed the volume-table and see the
update-marker set. The patch looks bigger and I doubt it is worth it
since usually the write() will wait from time to time for a new EB since
usually there not that many spare EB that can be used.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Vitaly Kuznetsov [Fri, 10 Jun 2016 00:08:56 +0000 (17:08 -0700)]
Drivers: hv: get rid of timeout in vmbus_open()
commit
396e287fa2ff46e83ae016cdcb300c3faa3b02f6 upstream.
vmbus_teardown_gpadl() can result in infinite wait when it is called on 5
second timeout in vmbus_open(). The issue is caused by the fact that gpadl
teardown operation won't ever succeed for an opened channel and the timeout
isn't always enough. As a guest, we can always trust the host to respond to
our request (and there is nothing we can do if it doesn't).
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Vitaly Kuznetsov [Sat, 4 Jun 2016 00:09:24 +0000 (17:09 -0700)]
Drivers: hv: don't leak memory in vmbus_establish_gpadl()
commit
7cc80c98070ccc7940fc28811c92cca0a681015d upstream.
In some cases create_gpadl_header() allocates submessages but we never
free them.
[sumits] Note for stable:
Upstream commit
4d63763296ab7865a98bc29cc7d77145815ef89f:
(Drivers: hv: get rid of redundant messagecount in create_gpadl_header())
changes the list usage to initialize list header in all cases; that patch
isn't added to stable, so the current patch is modified a little bit from
the upstream commit to check if the list is valid or not.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mantas M [Fri, 16 Dec 2016 08:30:59 +0000 (10:30 +0200)]
net: ipv6: check route protocol when deleting routes
commit
c2ed1880fd61a998e3ce40254a99a2ad000f1a7d upstream.
The protocol field is checked when deleting IPv4 routes, but ignored for
IPv6, which causes problems with routing daemons accidentally deleting
externally set routes (observed by multiple bird6 users).
This can be verified using `ip -6 route del <prefix> proto something`.
Signed-off-by: Mantas Mikulėnas <grawity@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Ben Hutchings [Sat, 4 Feb 2017 16:57:04 +0000 (16:57 +0000)]
catc: Use heap buffer for memory size test
commit
2d6a0e9de03ee658a9adc3bfb2f0ca55dff1e478 upstream.
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes:
1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Ben Hutchings [Sat, 4 Feb 2017 16:56:56 +0000 (16:56 +0000)]
catc: Combine failure cleanup code in catc_probe()
commit
d41149145f98fe26dcd0bfd1d6cc095e6e041418 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Omar Sandoval [Wed, 1 Feb 2017 08:02:27 +0000 (00:02 -0800)]
virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
commit
c4baad50297d84bde1a7ad45e50c73adae4a2192 upstream.
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Kees Cook [Wed, 5 Apr 2017 16:39:08 +0000 (09:39 -0700)]
mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
commit
a4866aa812518ed1a37d8ea0c881dc946409de94 upstream.
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from
ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Lee, Chun-Yi [Fri, 28 Apr 2017 08:23:59 +0000 (16:23 +0800)]
platform/x86: acer-wmi: setup accelerometer when ACPI device was found
commit
f9ac89f5ad613b462339e845aeb8494646fd9be2 upstream.
The
98d610c3739a patch was introduced since v4.11-rc1 that it causes
that the accelerometer input device will not be created on workable
machines because the HID string comparing logic is wrong.
And, the patch doesn't prevent that the accelerometer input device
be created on the machines that have no BST0001. That's because
the acpi_get_devices() returns success even it didn't find any
match device.
This patch fixed the HID string comparing logic of BST0001 device.
And, it also makes sure that the acpi_get_devices() returns
acpi_handle for BST0001.
Fixes:
98d610c3739a ("acer-wmi: setup accelerometer when machine has appropriate notify event")
Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=193761
Reported-by: Samuel Sieb <samuel-kbugs@sieb.net>
Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Chun-Yi Lee [Thu, 3 Nov 2016 00:18:52 +0000 (08:18 +0800)]
platform/x86: acer-wmi: setup accelerometer when machine has appropriate notify event
commit
98d610c3739ac354319a6590b915f4624d9151e6 upstream.
The accelerometer event relies on the ACERWMID_EVENT_GUID notify.
So, this patch changes the codes to setup accelerometer input device
when detected ACERWMID_EVENT_GUID. It avoids that the accel input
device created on every Acer machines.
In addition, patch adds a clearly parsing logic of accelerometer hid
to acer_wmi_get_handle_cb callback function. It is positive matching
the "SENR" name with "BST0001" device to avoid non-supported hardware.
Reported-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
[andy: slightly massage commit message]
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>