From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 16:28:16 +0000 (-0400) Subject: ext4: clear i_data in ext4_inode_info when removing inline data X-Git-Url: https://git.stricted.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=deb465ec750b80776cc4ac5b92b72c0a71fd4f0b;p=GitHub%2Fmoto-9609%2Fandroid_kernel_motorola_exynos9610.git ext4: clear i_data in ext4_inode_info when removing inline data commit 6e8ab72a812396996035a37e5ca4b3b99b5d214b upstream. When converting from an inode from storing the data in-line to a data block, ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock() was only clearing the on-disk copy of the i_blocks[] array. It was not clearing copy of the i_blocks[] in ext4_inode_info, in i_data[], which is the copy actually used by ext4_map_blocks(). This didn't matter much if we are using extents, since the extents header would be invalid and thus the extents could would re-initialize the extents tree. But if we are using indirect blocks, the previous contents of the i_blocks array will be treated as block numbers, with potentially catastrophic results to the file system integrity and/or user data. This gets worse if the file system is using a 1k block size and s_first_data is zero, but even without this, the file system can get quite badly corrupted. This addresses CVE-2018-10881. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200015 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- diff --git a/fs/ext4/inline.c b/fs/ext4/inline.c index 8f5dc243effd..afdef31ff728 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inline.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c @@ -443,6 +443,7 @@ static int ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock(handle_t *handle, memset((void *)ext4_raw_inode(&is.iloc)->i_block, 0, EXT4_MIN_INLINE_DATA_SIZE); + memset(ei->i_data, 0, EXT4_MIN_INLINE_DATA_SIZE); if (ext4_has_feature_extents(inode->i_sb)) { if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) ||