From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 00:45:05 +0000 (-0800)
Subject: proc: report no_new_privs state
X-Git-Url: https://git.stricted.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=af884cd4a5ae62fcf5e321fecf0ec1014730353d;p=GitHub%2Fmoto-9609%2Fandroid_kernel_motorola_exynos9610.git

proc: report no_new_privs state

Similar to being able to examine if a process has been correctly
confined with seccomp, the state of no_new_privs is equally interesting,
so this adds it to /proc/$pid/status.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161103214041.GA58566@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Freire <rfreire@redhat.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Robert Ho <robert.hu@intel.com>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Richard W.M. Jones" <rjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
index 74329fd0add2..c03f2f91c6ab 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ read the file /proc/PID/status:
   CapPrm: 0000000000000000
   CapEff: 0000000000000000
   CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
+  NoNewPrivs:     0
   Seccomp:        0
   voluntary_ctxt_switches:        0
   nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches:     1
@@ -262,6 +263,7 @@ Table 1-2: Contents of the status files (as of 4.1)
  CapPrm                      bitmap of permitted capabilities
  CapEff                      bitmap of effective capabilities
  CapBnd                      bitmap of capabilities bounding set
+ NoNewPrivs                  no_new_privs, like prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIV, ...)
  Seccomp                     seccomp mode, like prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, ...)
  Cpus_allowed                mask of CPUs on which this process may run
  Cpus_allowed_list           Same as previous, but in "list format"
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index 81818adb8e9e..082676ab4878 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -342,10 +342,11 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
 
 static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
 {
+	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "NoNewPrivs:\t", task_no_new_privs(p));
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
-	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "Seccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode);
-	seq_putc(m, '\n');
+	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "\nSeccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode);
 #endif
+	seq_putc(m, '\n');
 }
 
 static inline void task_context_switch_counts(struct seq_file *m,