From: Eric Paris Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2009 16:54:05 +0000 (-0400) Subject: SELinux: call cap_file_mmap in selinux_file_mmap X-Git-Url: https://git.stricted.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=8cf948e744e0218af604c32edecde10006dc8e9e;p=GitHub%2Fexynos8895%2Fandroid_kernel_samsung_universal8895.git SELinux: call cap_file_mmap in selinux_file_mmap Currently SELinux does not check CAP_SYS_RAWIO in the file_mmap hook. This means there is no DAC check on the ability to mmap low addresses in the memory space. This function adds the DAC check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO while maintaining the selinux check on mmap_zero. This means that processes which need to mmap low memory will need CAP_SYS_RAWIO and mmap_zero but will NOT need the SELinux sys_rawio capability. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris --- diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 1e8cfc4c2ed6..e6d1432b0800 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3030,9 +3030,21 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, int rc = 0; u32 sid = current_sid(); - if (addr < mmap_min_addr) + /* + * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before + * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt + * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even + * if DAC would have also denied the operation. + */ + if (addr < mmap_min_addr) { rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + /* do DAC check on address space usage */ + rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); if (rc || addr_only) return rc;