From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2017 00:24:03 +0000 (+0200) Subject: bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj X-Git-Url: https://git.stricted.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=79adffcd6489ef43bda2dfded3d637d7fb4fac80;p=GitHub%2Fmoto-9609%2Fandroid_kernel_motorola_exynos9610.git bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 86deddecff25..a834068a400e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -765,38 +765,56 @@ static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) } } -static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, int size) +static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, + int off, int size) { - if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) { - if (off % size != 0) { - verbose("misaligned access off %d size %d\n", - off, size); - return -EACCES; - } else { - return 0; - } - } - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) - /* misaligned access to packet is ok on x86,arm,arm64 */ - return 0; - if (reg->id && size != 1) { - verbose("Unknown packet alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed\n"); + verbose("Unknown alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed in packet access.\n"); return -EACCES; } /* skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGN-ed */ - if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && - (NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off + off) % size != 0) { + if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off + off) % size != 0) { verbose("misaligned packet access off %d+%d+%d size %d\n", NET_IP_ALIGN, reg->off, off, size); return -EACCES; } + return 0; } +static int check_val_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, + int size) +{ + if (size != 1) { + verbose("Unknown alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed in value access.\n"); + return -EACCES; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int check_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, + int off, int size) +{ + switch (reg->type) { + case PTR_TO_PACKET: + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) ? 0 : + check_pkt_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size); + case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ: + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) ? 0 : + check_val_ptr_alignment(reg, size); + default: + if (off % size != 0) { + verbose("misaligned access off %d size %d\n", + off, size); + return -EACCES; + } + + return 0; + } +} + /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory @@ -818,7 +836,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, if (size < 0) return size; - err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size); + err = check_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size); if (err) return err;