From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2009 01:27:40 +0000 (+0200) Subject: mm_for_maps: take ->cred_guard_mutex to fix the race with exec X-Git-Url: https://git.stricted.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=704b836cbf19e885f8366bccb2e4b0474346c02d;p=GitHub%2Fmoto-9609%2Fandroid_kernel_motorola_exynos9610.git mm_for_maps: take ->cred_guard_mutex to fix the race with exec The problem is minor, but without ->cred_guard_mutex held we can race with exec() and get the new ->mm but check old creds. Now we do not need to re-check task->mm after ptrace_may_access(), it can't be changed to the new mm under us. Strictly speaking, this also fixes another very minor problem. Unless security check fails or the task exits mm_for_maps() should never return NULL, the caller should get either old or new ->mm. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris --- diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index f3c2e4085fed..175db258942f 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -234,19 +234,19 @@ static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task) struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task) { - struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(task); + struct mm_struct *mm; - if (mm && mm != current->mm) { - /* - * task->mm can be changed before security check, - * in that case we must notice the change after. - */ - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) || - mm != task->mm) { - mmput(mm); - mm = NULL; - } + if (mutex_lock_killable(&task->cred_guard_mutex)) + return NULL; + + mm = get_task_mm(task); + if (mm && mm != current->mm && + !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) { + mmput(mm); + mm = NULL; } + mutex_unlock(&task->cred_guard_mutex); + return mm; }