From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 20:39:30 +0000 (-0500) Subject: powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option X-Git-Url: https://git.stricted.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=6c2eb44188330f72c9e7efad8a64043e08f0ccef;p=GitHub%2FLineageOS%2Fandroid_kernel_motorola_exynos9610.git powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option commit 782e69efb3dfed6e8360bc612e8c7827a901a8f9 upstream Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass. The default behavior is unchanged. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Jiri Kosina (on x86) Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: Paul Mackerras Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky Cc: Heiko Carstens Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Will Deacon Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Tyler Hicks Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Randy Dunlap Cc: Steven Price Cc: Phil Auld Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/245a606e1a42a558a310220312d9b6adb9159df6.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 480ec3a4e185..204161cee674 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2389,7 +2389,7 @@ http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git mitigations= - [X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU + [X86,PPC] Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific options. @@ -2398,10 +2398,11 @@ Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This improves system performance, but it may also expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities. - Equivalent to: nopti [X86] - nospectre_v2 [X86] + Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC] + nospectre_v1 [PPC] + nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC] spectre_v2_user=off [X86] - spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86] + spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC] l1tf=off [X86] auto (default) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c index 48b50fb8dc4b..e9af5d9badf2 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void) enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) && security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR); - if (!no_nospec) + if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off()) enable_barrier_nospec(enable); } @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p) early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2); void setup_spectre_v2(void) { - if (no_spectrev2) + if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) do_btb_flush_fixups(); else btb_flush_enabled = true; @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void) stf_enabled_flush_types = type; - if (!no_stf_barrier) + if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off()) stf_barrier_enable(enable); } diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c index 0618aa61b26a..41b3b2787f23 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable) enabled_flush_types = types; - if (!no_rfi_flush) + if (!no_rfi_flush && !cpu_mitigations_off()) rfi_flush_enable(enable); }