From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2016 18:15:17 +0000 (+0100) Subject: crypto: arm64/aes-ccm-ce: fix for big endian X-Git-Url: https://git.stricted.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=56e4e76c68fcb51547b5299e5b66a135935ff414;p=GitHub%2Fmoto-9609%2Fandroid_kernel_motorola_exynos9610.git crypto: arm64/aes-ccm-ce: fix for big endian The AES-CCM implementation that uses ARMv8 Crypto Extensions instructions refers to the AES round keys as pairs of 64-bit quantities, which causes failures when building the code for big endian. In addition, it byte swaps the input counter unconditionally, while this is only required for little endian builds. So fix both issues. Fixes: 12ac3efe74f8 ("arm64/crypto: use crypto instructions to generate AES key schedule") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S index a2a7fbcacc14..3363560c79b7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ */ #include +#include .text .arch armv8-a+crypto @@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ */ ENTRY(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data) ldr w8, [x3] /* leftover from prev round? */ - ld1 {v0.2d}, [x0] /* load mac */ + ld1 {v0.16b}, [x0] /* load mac */ cbz w8, 1f sub w8, w8, #16 eor v1.16b, v1.16b, v1.16b @@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ ENTRY(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data) beq 8f /* out of input? */ cbnz w8, 0b eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b -1: ld1 {v3.2d}, [x4] /* load first round key */ +1: ld1 {v3.16b}, [x4] /* load first round key */ prfm pldl1strm, [x1] cmp w5, #12 /* which key size? */ add x6, x4, #16 @@ -41,17 +42,17 @@ ENTRY(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data) mov v5.16b, v3.16b b 4f 2: mov v4.16b, v3.16b - ld1 {v5.2d}, [x6], #16 /* load 2nd round key */ + ld1 {v5.16b}, [x6], #16 /* load 2nd round key */ 3: aese v0.16b, v4.16b aesmc v0.16b, v0.16b -4: ld1 {v3.2d}, [x6], #16 /* load next round key */ +4: ld1 {v3.16b}, [x6], #16 /* load next round key */ aese v0.16b, v5.16b aesmc v0.16b, v0.16b -5: ld1 {v4.2d}, [x6], #16 /* load next round key */ +5: ld1 {v4.16b}, [x6], #16 /* load next round key */ subs w7, w7, #3 aese v0.16b, v3.16b aesmc v0.16b, v0.16b - ld1 {v5.2d}, [x6], #16 /* load next round key */ + ld1 {v5.16b}, [x6], #16 /* load next round key */ bpl 3b aese v0.16b, v4.16b subs w2, w2, #16 /* last data? */ @@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ ENTRY(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data) ld1 {v1.16b}, [x1], #16 /* load next input block */ eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b /* xor with mac */ bne 1b -6: st1 {v0.2d}, [x0] /* store mac */ +6: st1 {v0.16b}, [x0] /* store mac */ beq 10f adds w2, w2, #16 beq 10f @@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ ENTRY(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data) adds w7, w7, #1 bne 9b eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b - st1 {v0.2d}, [x0] + st1 {v0.16b}, [x0] 10: str w8, [x3] ret ENDPROC(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data) @@ -89,27 +90,27 @@ ENDPROC(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data) * u32 rounds); */ ENTRY(ce_aes_ccm_final) - ld1 {v3.2d}, [x2], #16 /* load first round key */ - ld1 {v0.2d}, [x0] /* load mac */ + ld1 {v3.16b}, [x2], #16 /* load first round key */ + ld1 {v0.16b}, [x0] /* load mac */ cmp w3, #12 /* which key size? */ sub w3, w3, #2 /* modified # of rounds */ - ld1 {v1.2d}, [x1] /* load 1st ctriv */ + ld1 {v1.16b}, [x1] /* load 1st ctriv */ bmi 0f bne 3f mov v5.16b, v3.16b b 2f 0: mov v4.16b, v3.16b -1: ld1 {v5.2d}, [x2], #16 /* load next round key */ +1: ld1 {v5.16b}, [x2], #16 /* load next round key */ aese v0.16b, v4.16b aesmc v0.16b, v0.16b aese v1.16b, v4.16b aesmc v1.16b, v1.16b -2: ld1 {v3.2d}, [x2], #16 /* load next round key */ +2: ld1 {v3.16b}, [x2], #16 /* load next round key */ aese v0.16b, v5.16b aesmc v0.16b, v0.16b aese v1.16b, v5.16b aesmc v1.16b, v1.16b -3: ld1 {v4.2d}, [x2], #16 /* load next round key */ +3: ld1 {v4.16b}, [x2], #16 /* load next round key */ subs w3, w3, #3 aese v0.16b, v3.16b aesmc v0.16b, v0.16b @@ -120,47 +121,47 @@ ENTRY(ce_aes_ccm_final) aese v1.16b, v4.16b /* final round key cancels out */ eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b /* en-/decrypt the mac */ - st1 {v0.2d}, [x0] /* store result */ + st1 {v0.16b}, [x0] /* store result */ ret ENDPROC(ce_aes_ccm_final) .macro aes_ccm_do_crypt,enc ldr x8, [x6, #8] /* load lower ctr */ - ld1 {v0.2d}, [x5] /* load mac */ - rev x8, x8 /* keep swabbed ctr in reg */ + ld1 {v0.16b}, [x5] /* load mac */ +CPU_LE( rev x8, x8 ) /* keep swabbed ctr in reg */ 0: /* outer loop */ - ld1 {v1.1d}, [x6] /* load upper ctr */ + ld1 {v1.8b}, [x6] /* load upper ctr */ prfm pldl1strm, [x1] add x8, x8, #1 rev x9, x8 cmp w4, #12 /* which key size? */ sub w7, w4, #2 /* get modified # of rounds */ ins v1.d[1], x9 /* no carry in lower ctr */ - ld1 {v3.2d}, [x3] /* load first round key */ + ld1 {v3.16b}, [x3] /* load first round key */ add x10, x3, #16 bmi 1f bne 4f mov v5.16b, v3.16b b 3f 1: mov v4.16b, v3.16b - ld1 {v5.2d}, [x10], #16 /* load 2nd round key */ + ld1 {v5.16b}, [x10], #16 /* load 2nd round key */ 2: /* inner loop: 3 rounds, 2x interleaved */ aese v0.16b, v4.16b aesmc v0.16b, v0.16b aese v1.16b, v4.16b aesmc v1.16b, v1.16b -3: ld1 {v3.2d}, [x10], #16 /* load next round key */ +3: ld1 {v3.16b}, [x10], #16 /* load next round key */ aese v0.16b, v5.16b aesmc v0.16b, v0.16b aese v1.16b, v5.16b aesmc v1.16b, v1.16b -4: ld1 {v4.2d}, [x10], #16 /* load next round key */ +4: ld1 {v4.16b}, [x10], #16 /* load next round key */ subs w7, w7, #3 aese v0.16b, v3.16b aesmc v0.16b, v0.16b aese v1.16b, v3.16b aesmc v1.16b, v1.16b - ld1 {v5.2d}, [x10], #16 /* load next round key */ + ld1 {v5.16b}, [x10], #16 /* load next round key */ bpl 2b aese v0.16b, v4.16b aese v1.16b, v4.16b @@ -177,14 +178,14 @@ ENDPROC(ce_aes_ccm_final) eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v2.16b /* xor mac with pt ^ rk[last] */ st1 {v1.16b}, [x0], #16 /* write output block */ bne 0b - rev x8, x8 - st1 {v0.2d}, [x5] /* store mac */ +CPU_LE( rev x8, x8 ) + st1 {v0.16b}, [x5] /* store mac */ str x8, [x6, #8] /* store lsb end of ctr (BE) */ 5: ret 6: eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v5.16b /* final round mac */ eor v1.16b, v1.16b, v5.16b /* final round enc */ - st1 {v0.2d}, [x5] /* store mac */ + st1 {v0.16b}, [x5] /* store mac */ add w2, w2, #16 /* process partial tail block */ 7: ldrb w9, [x1], #1 /* get 1 byte of input */ umov w6, v1.b[0] /* get top crypted ctr byte */