From: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2011 23:58:56 +0000 (-0800)
Subject: pci: use security_capable() when checking capablities during config space read
X-Git-Url: https://git.stricted.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=47970b1b2aa64464bc0a9543e86361a622ae7c03;p=GitHub%2FLineageOS%2Fandroid_kernel_motorola_exynos9610.git

pci: use security_capable() when checking capablities during config space read

Eric Paris noted that commit de139a3 ("pci: check caps from sysfs file
open to read device dependent config space") caused the capability check
to bypass security modules and potentially auditing.  Rectify this by
calling security_capable() when checking the open file's capabilities
for config space reads.

Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---

diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 8ecaac983923..f7771f336b7d 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/pci-aspm.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include "pci.h"
@@ -368,7 +369,7 @@ pci_read_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 	u8 *data = (u8*) buf;
 
 	/* Several chips lock up trying to read undefined config space */
-	if (cap_raised(filp->f_cred->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+	if (security_capable(filp->f_cred, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
 		size = dev->cfg_size;
 	} else if (dev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_CARDBUS) {
 		size = 128;