From: Jouni Malinen Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2016 21:42:05 +0000 (+0300) Subject: mac80211: FILS AEAD protection for station mode association frames X-Git-Url: https://git.stricted.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=39404feee691a2dc524a629ed6eb5cfe5d8898d1;p=GitHub%2Fmoto-9609%2Fandroid_kernel_motorola_exynos9610.git mac80211: FILS AEAD protection for station mode association frames This adds support for encrypting (Re)Association Request frame and decryption (Re)Association Response frame when using FILS in station mode. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- diff --git a/net/mac80211/Makefile b/net/mac80211/Makefile index f9137a8341f4..0b202b343fd4 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/Makefile +++ b/net/mac80211/Makefile @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ mac80211-y := \ aes_gcm.o \ aes_cmac.o \ aes_gmac.o \ + fils_aead.o \ cfg.o \ ethtool.o \ rx.o \ diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c b/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c index bdf0790d89cc..d0bd5fff5f0a 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c +++ b/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ #define AAD_LEN 20 -static void gf_mulx(u8 *pad) +void gf_mulx(u8 *pad) { int i, carry; @@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ static void gf_mulx(u8 *pad) pad[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] ^= 0x87; } -static void aes_cmac_vector(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, size_t num_elem, - const u8 *addr[], const size_t *len, u8 *mac, - size_t mac_len) +void aes_cmac_vector(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, size_t num_elem, + const u8 *addr[], const size_t *len, u8 *mac, + size_t mac_len) { u8 cbc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], pad[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; const u8 *pos, *end; diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.h b/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.h index 3702041f44fd..c827e1d5de8b 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.h +++ b/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.h @@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ #include +void gf_mulx(u8 *pad); +void aes_cmac_vector(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, size_t num_elem, + const u8 *addr[], const size_t *len, u8 *mac, + size_t mac_len); struct crypto_cipher *ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_setup(const u8 key[], size_t key_len); void ieee80211_aes_cmac(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 *aad, diff --git a/net/mac80211/fils_aead.c b/net/mac80211/fils_aead.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b81b4f2472cf --- /dev/null +++ b/net/mac80211/fils_aead.c @@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ +/* + * FILS AEAD for (Re)Association Request/Response frames + * Copyright 2016, Qualcomm Atheros, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ieee80211_i.h" +#include "aes_cmac.h" +#include "fils_aead.h" + +static int aes_s2v(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, + size_t num_elem, const u8 *addr[], size_t len[], u8 *v) +{ + u8 d[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], tmp[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t i; + const u8 *data[2]; + size_t data_len[2], data_elems; + + /* D = AES-CMAC(K, ) */ + memset(tmp, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + data[0] = tmp; + data_len[0] = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + aes_cmac_vector(tfm, 1, data, data_len, d, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + for (i = 0; i < num_elem - 1; i++) { + /* D = dbl(D) xor AES_CMAC(K, Si) */ + gf_mulx(d); /* dbl */ + aes_cmac_vector(tfm, 1, &addr[i], &len[i], tmp, + AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + crypto_xor(d, tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + + if (len[i] >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + /* len(Sn) >= 128 */ + size_t j; + const u8 *pos; + + /* T = Sn xorend D */ + + /* Use a temporary buffer to perform xorend on Sn (addr[i]) to + * avoid modifying the const input argument. + */ + data[0] = addr[i]; + data_len[0] = len[i] - AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + pos = addr[i] + data_len[0]; + for (j = 0; j < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; j++) + tmp[j] = pos[j] ^ d[j]; + data[1] = tmp; + data_len[1] = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + data_elems = 2; + } else { + /* len(Sn) < 128 */ + /* T = dbl(D) xor pad(Sn) */ + gf_mulx(d); /* dbl */ + memset(tmp, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + memcpy(tmp, addr[i], len[i]); + tmp[len[i]] = 0x80; + crypto_xor(d, tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + data[0] = d; + data_len[0] = sizeof(d); + data_elems = 1; + } + /* V = AES-CMAC(K, T) */ + aes_cmac_vector(tfm, data_elems, data, data_len, v, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + return 0; +} + +/* Note: addr[] and len[] needs to have one extra slot at the end. */ +static int aes_siv_encrypt(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, + const u8 *plain, size_t plain_len, + size_t num_elem, const u8 *addr[], + size_t len[], u8 *out) +{ + u8 v[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + struct crypto_cipher *tfm; + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm2; + struct skcipher_request *req; + int res; + struct scatterlist src[1], dst[1]; + u8 *tmp; + + key_len /= 2; /* S2V key || CTR key */ + + addr[num_elem] = plain; + len[num_elem] = plain_len; + num_elem++; + + /* S2V */ + + tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + /* K1 for S2V */ + res = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, key_len); + if (!res) + res = aes_s2v(tfm, num_elem, addr, len, v); + crypto_free_cipher(tfm); + if (res) + return res; + + /* Use a temporary buffer of the plaintext to handle need for + * overwriting this during AES-CTR. + */ + tmp = kmemdup(plain, plain_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tmp) { + res = -ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + + /* IV for CTR before encrypted data */ + memcpy(out, v, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + /* Synthetic IV to be used as the initial counter in CTR: + * Q = V bitand (1^64 || 0^1 || 1^31 || 0^1 || 1^31) + */ + v[8] &= 0x7f; + v[12] &= 0x7f; + + /* CTR */ + + tfm2 = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ctr(aes)", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm2)) { + kfree(tmp); + return PTR_ERR(tfm2); + } + /* K2 for CTR */ + res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm2, key + key_len, key_len); + if (res) + goto fail; + + req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm2, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) { + res = -ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + + sg_init_one(src, tmp, plain_len); + sg_init_one(dst, out + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, plain_len); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, plain_len, v); + res = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); + skcipher_request_free(req); +fail: + kfree(tmp); + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm2); + return res; +} + +/* Note: addr[] and len[] needs to have one extra slot at the end. */ +static int aes_siv_decrypt(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, + const u8 *iv_crypt, size_t iv_c_len, + size_t num_elem, const u8 *addr[], size_t len[], + u8 *out) +{ + struct crypto_cipher *tfm; + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm2; + struct skcipher_request *req; + struct scatterlist src[1], dst[1]; + size_t crypt_len; + int res; + u8 frame_iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 check[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + crypt_len = iv_c_len - AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + key_len /= 2; /* S2V key || CTR key */ + addr[num_elem] = out; + len[num_elem] = crypt_len; + num_elem++; + + memcpy(iv, iv_crypt, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + memcpy(frame_iv, iv_crypt, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + /* Synthetic IV to be used as the initial counter in CTR: + * Q = V bitand (1^64 || 0^1 || 1^31 || 0^1 || 1^31) + */ + iv[8] &= 0x7f; + iv[12] &= 0x7f; + + /* CTR */ + + tfm2 = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ctr(aes)", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm2)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm2); + /* K2 for CTR */ + res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm2, key + key_len, key_len); + if (res) { + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm2); + return res; + } + + req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm2, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) { + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm2); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + sg_init_one(src, iv_crypt + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, crypt_len); + sg_init_one(dst, out, crypt_len); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, crypt_len, iv); + res = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); + skcipher_request_free(req); + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm2); + if (res) + return res; + + /* S2V */ + + tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + /* K1 for S2V */ + res = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, key_len); + if (!res) + res = aes_s2v(tfm, num_elem, addr, len, check); + crypto_free_cipher(tfm); + if (res) + return res; + if (memcmp(check, frame_iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != 0) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; +} + +int fils_encrypt_assoc_req(struct sk_buff *skb, + struct ieee80211_mgd_assoc_data *assoc_data) +{ + struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt = (void *)skb->data; + u8 *capab, *ies, *encr; + const u8 *addr[5 + 1], *session; + size_t len[5 + 1]; + size_t crypt_len; + + if (ieee80211_is_reassoc_req(mgmt->frame_control)) { + capab = (u8 *)&mgmt->u.reassoc_req.capab_info; + ies = mgmt->u.reassoc_req.variable; + } else { + capab = (u8 *)&mgmt->u.assoc_req.capab_info; + ies = mgmt->u.assoc_req.variable; + } + + session = cfg80211_find_ext_ie(WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION, + ies, skb->data + skb->len - ies); + if (!session || session[1] != 1 + 8) + return -EINVAL; + /* encrypt after FILS Session element */ + encr = (u8 *)session + 2 + 1 + 8; + + /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */ + + /* The STA's MAC address */ + addr[0] = mgmt->sa; + len[0] = ETH_ALEN; + /* The AP's BSSID */ + addr[1] = mgmt->da; + len[1] = ETH_ALEN; + /* The STA's nonce */ + addr[2] = assoc_data->fils_nonces; + len[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN; + /* The AP's nonce */ + addr[3] = &assoc_data->fils_nonces[FILS_NONCE_LEN]; + len[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN; + /* The (Re)Association Request frame from the Capability Information + * field to the FILS Session element (both inclusive). + */ + addr[4] = capab; + len[4] = encr - capab; + + crypt_len = skb->data + skb->len - encr; + skb_put(skb, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + return aes_siv_encrypt(assoc_data->fils_kek, assoc_data->fils_kek_len, + encr, crypt_len, 1, addr, len, encr); +} + +int fils_decrypt_assoc_resp(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, + u8 *frame, size_t *frame_len, + struct ieee80211_mgd_assoc_data *assoc_data) +{ + struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt = (void *)frame; + u8 *capab, *ies, *encr; + const u8 *addr[5 + 1], *session; + size_t len[5 + 1]; + int res; + size_t crypt_len; + + if (*frame_len < 24 + 6) + return -EINVAL; + + capab = (u8 *)&mgmt->u.assoc_resp.capab_info; + ies = mgmt->u.assoc_resp.variable; + session = cfg80211_find_ext_ie(WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION, + ies, frame + *frame_len - ies); + if (!session || session[1] != 1 + 8) { + mlme_dbg(sdata, + "No (valid) FILS Session element in (Re)Association Response frame from %pM", + mgmt->sa); + return -EINVAL; + } + /* decrypt after FILS Session element */ + encr = (u8 *)session + 2 + 1 + 8; + + /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */ + + /* The AP's BSSID */ + addr[0] = mgmt->sa; + len[0] = ETH_ALEN; + /* The STA's MAC address */ + addr[1] = mgmt->da; + len[1] = ETH_ALEN; + /* The AP's nonce */ + addr[2] = &assoc_data->fils_nonces[FILS_NONCE_LEN]; + len[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN; + /* The STA's nonce */ + addr[3] = assoc_data->fils_nonces; + len[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN; + /* The (Re)Association Response frame from the Capability Information + * field to the FILS Session element (both inclusive). + */ + addr[4] = capab; + len[4] = encr - capab; + + crypt_len = frame + *frame_len - encr; + if (crypt_len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + mlme_dbg(sdata, + "Not enough room for AES-SIV data after FILS Session element in (Re)Association Response frame from %pM", + mgmt->sa); + return -EINVAL; + } + res = aes_siv_decrypt(assoc_data->fils_kek, assoc_data->fils_kek_len, + encr, crypt_len, 5, addr, len, encr); + if (res != 0) { + mlme_dbg(sdata, + "AES-SIV decryption of (Re)Association Response frame from %pM failed", + mgmt->sa); + return res; + } + *frame_len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + return 0; +} diff --git a/net/mac80211/fils_aead.h b/net/mac80211/fils_aead.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fbc65232f0b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/mac80211/fils_aead.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* + * FILS AEAD for (Re)Association Request/Response frames + * Copyright 2016, Qualcomm Atheros, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + */ + +#ifndef FILS_AEAD_H +#define FILS_AEAD_H + +int fils_encrypt_assoc_req(struct sk_buff *skb, + struct ieee80211_mgd_assoc_data *assoc_data); +int fils_decrypt_assoc_resp(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, + u8 *frame, size_t *frame_len, + struct ieee80211_mgd_assoc_data *assoc_data); + +#endif /* FILS_AEAD_H */ diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index b4e2b6cf4099..d37a577f63a1 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -401,6 +401,10 @@ struct ieee80211_mgd_assoc_data { struct ieee80211_vht_cap ap_vht_cap; + u8 fils_nonces[2 * FILS_NONCE_LEN]; + u8 fils_kek[FILS_MAX_KEK_LEN]; + size_t fils_kek_len; + size_t ie_len; u8 ie[]; }; diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c index bf553797bdff..d157b250ff77 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include "driver-ops.h" #include "rate.h" #include "led.h" +#include "fils_aead.h" #define IEEE80211_AUTH_TIMEOUT (HZ / 5) #define IEEE80211_AUTH_TIMEOUT_LONG (HZ / 2) @@ -652,6 +653,7 @@ static void ieee80211_send_assoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) 2 + sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap) + /* HT */ 2 + sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_cap) + /* VHT */ assoc_data->ie_len + /* extra IEs */ + (assoc_data->fils_kek_len ? 16 /* AES-SIV */ : 0) + 9, /* WMM */ GFP_KERNEL); if (!skb) @@ -875,6 +877,12 @@ static void ieee80211_send_assoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) memcpy(pos, assoc_data->ie + offset, noffset - offset); } + if (assoc_data->fils_kek_len && + fils_encrypt_assoc_req(skb, assoc_data) < 0) { + dev_kfree_skb(skb); + return; + } + drv_mgd_prepare_tx(local, sdata); IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb)->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_DONT_ENCRYPT; @@ -3146,6 +3154,10 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_assoc_resp(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, reassoc ? "Rea" : "A", mgmt->sa, capab_info, status_code, (u16)(aid & ~(BIT(15) | BIT(14)))); + if (assoc_data->fils_kek_len && + fils_decrypt_assoc_resp(sdata, (u8 *)mgmt, &len, assoc_data) < 0) + return; + pos = mgmt->u.assoc_resp.variable; ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, len - (pos - (u8 *) mgmt), false, &elems); @@ -4707,6 +4719,21 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_assoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, assoc_data->ie_len = req->ie_len; } + if (req->fils_kek) { + /* should already be checked in cfg80211 - so warn */ + if (WARN_ON(req->fils_kek_len > FILS_MAX_KEK_LEN)) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_free; + } + memcpy(assoc_data->fils_kek, req->fils_kek, + req->fils_kek_len); + assoc_data->fils_kek_len = req->fils_kek_len; + } + + if (req->fils_nonces) + memcpy(assoc_data->fils_nonces, req->fils_nonces, + 2 * FILS_NONCE_LEN); + assoc_data->bss = req->bss; if (ifmgd->req_smps == IEEE80211_SMPS_AUTOMATIC) {