From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Fri, 27 May 2016 19:57:02 +0000 (-0700) Subject: seccomp: Add a seccomp_data parameter secure_computing() X-Git-Url: https://git.stricted.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=2f275de5d1ed7269913ef9b4c64a13952c0a38e8;p=GitHub%2Fmoto-9609%2Fandroid_kernel_motorola_exynos9610.git seccomp: Add a seccomp_data parameter secure_computing() Currently, if arch code wants to supply seccomp_data directly to seccomp (which is generally much faster than having seccomp do it using the syscall_get_xyz() API), it has to use the two-phase seccomp hooks. Add it to the easy hooks, too. Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c index 4d9375814b53..1027d3b54541 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno) /* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */ #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER - if (secure_computing() == -1) + if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) return -1; #else /* XXX: remove this once OABI gets fixed */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c index 3f6cd5c5234f..6e2cf046615d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -1247,7 +1247,7 @@ static void tracehook_report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { /* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */ - if (secure_computing() == -1) + if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) return -1; if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c index 0dcf69194473..c50af846ecf9 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ asmlinkage long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, long syscall) current_thread_info()->syscall = syscall; - if (secure_computing() == -1) + if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) return -1; if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) && diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c index b5458b37fc5b..8edc47c0b98e 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request, long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { /* Do the secure computing check first. */ - if (secure_computing() == -1) + if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) return -1; if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) && diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c index 30a03c03fe73..ed799e994773 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -1783,7 +1783,7 @@ static int do_seccomp(struct pt_regs *regs) * have already loaded -ENOSYS into r3, or seccomp has put * something else in r3 (via SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE). */ - if (__secure_computing()) + if (__secure_computing(NULL)) return -1; /* diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c index 49b1c13bf6c9..c238e9958c2a 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) long ret = 0; /* Do the secure computing check first. */ - if (secure_computing()) { + if (secure_computing(NULL)) { /* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */ ret = -1; goto out; diff --git a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c index 54e7b723db99..8c6d2f2fefa3 100644 --- a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ int do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { u32 work = ACCESS_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags); - if (secure_computing() == -1) + if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) return -1; if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) { diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c b/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c index 48b0dcbd87be..9c5570f0f397 100644 --- a/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c +++ b/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ void handle_syscall(struct uml_pt_regs *r) PT_REGS_SET_SYSCALL_RETURN(regs, -ENOSYS); /* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */ - if (secure_computing() == -1) + if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) return; if (syscall_trace_enter(regs)) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c index 174c2549939d..85acde5fa442 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) */ regs->orig_ax = syscall_nr; regs->ax = -ENOSYS; - tmp = secure_computing(); + tmp = secure_computing(NULL); if ((!tmp && regs->orig_ax != syscall_nr) || regs->ip != address) { warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_DEBUG, regs, "seccomp tried to change syscall nr or ip"); diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h index 2296e6b2f690..9eaa7b34d6da 100644 --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h @@ -28,11 +28,11 @@ struct seccomp { }; #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER -extern int __secure_computing(void); -static inline int secure_computing(void) +extern int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd); +static inline int secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd) { if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP))) - return __secure_computing(); + return __secure_computing(sd); return 0; } @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ struct seccomp { }; struct seccomp_filter { }; #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER -static inline int secure_computing(void) { return 0; } +static inline int secure_computing(struct seccomp_data *sd) { return 0; } #else static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) { return; } #endif diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 7002796f14a4..06816290a212 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -554,9 +554,9 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) BUG(); } #else -int __secure_computing(void) +int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd) { - u32 phase1_result = seccomp_phase1(NULL); + u32 phase1_result = seccomp_phase1(sd); if (likely(phase1_result == SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK)) return 0;