From: Eric Biggers Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 13:48:32 +0000 (+0100) Subject: KEYS: encrypted: use constant-time HMAC comparison X-Git-Url: https://git.stricted.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=0f534e4a13496b02ae284f50fcb0263f6ea37007;p=GitHub%2FLineageOS%2Fandroid_kernel_motorola_exynos9610.git KEYS: encrypted: use constant-time HMAC comparison MACs should, in general, be compared using crypto_memneq() to prevent timing attacks. Cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: James Morris --- diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 702c80662069..5c98c2fe03f0 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -534,8 +535,8 @@ static int datablob_hmac_verify(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key, p, len); if (ret < 0) goto out; - ret = memcmp(digest, epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len, - sizeof digest); + ret = crypto_memneq(digest, epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len, + sizeof(digest)); if (ret) { ret = -EINVAL; dump_hmac("datablob",