From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2009 22:57:01 +0000 (-0700)
Subject: signals: send_sigio: use do_send_sig_info() to avoid check_kill_permission()
X-Git-Url: https://git.stricted.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=06f1631a1671bce2d59d58cb1debdf23e1803ebf;p=GitHub%2FLineageOS%2FG12%2Fandroid_kernel_amlogic_linux-4.9.git

signals: send_sigio: use do_send_sig_info() to avoid check_kill_permission()

group_send_sig_info()->check_kill_permission() assumes that current is the
sender and uses current_cred().

This is not true in send_sigio_to_task() case.  From the security pov the
sender is not current, but the task which did fcntl(F_SETOWN), that is why
we have sigio_perm() which uses the right creds to check.

Fortunately, send_sigio() always sends either SEND_SIG_PRIV or
SI_FROMKERNEL() signal, so check_kill_permission() does nothing.  But
still it would be tidier to avoid this bogus security check and save a
couple of cycles.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stephane eranian <eranian@googlemail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---

diff --git a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c
index ae413086db97..50a988993262 100644
--- a/fs/fcntl.c
+++ b/fs/fcntl.c
@@ -461,11 +461,11 @@ static void send_sigio_to_task(struct task_struct *p,
 			else
 				si.si_band = band_table[reason - POLL_IN];
 			si.si_fd    = fd;
-			if (!group_send_sig_info(signum, &si, p))
+			if (!do_send_sig_info(signum, &si, p, true))
 				break;
 		/* fall-through: fall back on the old plain SIGIO signal */
 		case 0:
-			group_send_sig_info(SIGIO, SEND_SIG_PRIV, p);
+			do_send_sig_info(SIGIO, SEND_SIG_PRIV, p, true);
 	}
 }