From: Todd Kjos Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2018 23:55:32 +0000 (-0800) Subject: UPSTREAM: binder: fix race that allows malicious free of live buffer X-Git-Url: https://git.stricted.de/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=03c0215f2e668ac802ffc440e5ac6a8f53080ae4;p=GitHub%2FLineageOS%2Fandroid_kernel_samsung_universal7580.git UPSTREAM: binder: fix race that allows malicious free of live buffer commit 7bada55ab50697861eee6bb7d60b41e68a961a9c upstream Malicious code can attempt to free buffers using the BC_FREE_BUFFER ioctl to binder. There are protections against a user freeing a buffer while in use by the kernel, however there was a window where BC_FREE_BUFFER could be used to free a recently allocated buffer that was not completely initialized. This resulted in a use-after-free detected by KASAN with a malicious test program. This window is closed by setting the buffer's allow_user_free attribute to 0 when the buffer is allocated or when the user has previously freed it instead of waiting for the caller to set it. The problem was that when the struct buffer was recycled, allow_user_free was stale and set to 1 allowing a free to go through. Bug: 116855682 Change-Id: I0b38089f6fdb1adbf7e1102747e4119c9a05b191 Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos Acked-by: Arve Hjønnevåg Cc: stable # 4.14 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index 4af5f51db08..e1284f51d60 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -3143,7 +3143,6 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->buffer = NULL; goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed; } - t->buffer->allow_user_free = 0; t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id; t->buffer->transaction = t; t->buffer->target_node = target_node; @@ -3639,14 +3638,18 @@ int binder_thread_write(struct binder_proc *proc, buffer = binder_alloc_prepare_to_free(&proc->alloc, data_ptr); - if (buffer == NULL) { - binder_user_error("%d:%d BC_FREE_BUFFER u%016llx no match\n", - proc->pid, thread->pid, (u64)data_ptr); - break; - } - if (!buffer->allow_user_free) { - binder_user_error("%d:%d BC_FREE_BUFFER u%016llx matched unreturned buffer\n", - proc->pid, thread->pid, (u64)data_ptr); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(buffer)) { + if (PTR_ERR(buffer) == -EPERM) { + binder_user_error( + "%d:%d BC_FREE_BUFFER u%016llx matched unreturned or currently freeing buffer\n", + proc->pid, thread->pid, + (u64)data_ptr); + } else { + binder_user_error( + "%d:%d BC_FREE_BUFFER u%016llx no match\n", + proc->pid, thread->pid, + (u64)data_ptr); + } break; } binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_FREE_BUFFER, diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c index fe842a38b65..a832bac20df 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c @@ -146,14 +146,12 @@ static struct binder_buffer *binder_alloc_prepare_to_free_locked( else { /* * Guard against user threads attempting to - * free the buffer twice + * free the buffer when in use by kernel or + * after it's already been freed. */ - if (buffer->free_in_progress) { - pr_err("%d:%d FREE_BUFFER u%016llx user freed buffer twice\n", - alloc->pid, current->pid, (u64)user_ptr); - return NULL; - } - buffer->free_in_progress = 1; + if (!buffer->allow_user_free) + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + buffer->allow_user_free = 0; return buffer; } } @@ -418,7 +416,7 @@ struct binder_buffer *binder_alloc_new_buf_locked(struct binder_alloc *alloc, rb_erase(best_fit, &alloc->free_buffers); buffer->free = 0; - buffer->free_in_progress = 0; + buffer->allow_user_free = 0; binder_insert_allocated_buffer_locked(alloc, buffer); binder_alloc_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_BUFFER_ALLOC, "%d: binder_alloc_buf size %zd got %pK\n", diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h index dd5649bf646..395d9b56bbf 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h +++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h @@ -48,8 +48,7 @@ struct binder_buffer { unsigned free:1; unsigned allow_user_free:1; unsigned async_transaction:1; - unsigned free_in_progress:1; - unsigned debug_id:28; + unsigned debug_id:29; struct binder_transaction *transaction;