random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle
authorJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Wed, 23 Mar 2022 03:43:12 +0000 (21:43 -0600)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sat, 25 Jun 2022 09:46:37 +0000 (11:46 +0200)
commit d97c68d178fbf8aaaf21b69b446f2dfb13909316 upstream.

If CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU is set, the RNG initializes using RDRAND.
But, the user can disable (or enable) this behavior by setting
`random.trust_cpu=0/1` on the kernel command line. This allows system
builders to do reasonable things while avoiding howls from tinfoil
hatters. (Or vice versa.)

CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is basically the same thing, but regards
the seed passed via EFI or device tree, which might come from RDRAND or
a TPM or somewhere else. In order to allow distros to more easily enable
this while avoiding those same howls (or vice versa), this commit adds
the corresponding `random.trust_bootloader=0/1` toggle.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Graham Christensen <graham@grahamc.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Link: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/165355
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
drivers/char/Kconfig
drivers/char/random.c

index 5840c7e810f55c4972bc456366b7d50b19c25275..681d429c64269442ce6eda3d477a64141bfcc960 100644 (file)
                        fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
                        by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU.
 
+       random.trust_bootloader={on,off}
+                       [KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a
+                       seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to
+                       fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
+                       by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
+
        ras=option[,option,...] [KNL] RAS-specific options
 
                cec_disable     [X86]
index 9f51fd6bf5b47db8d984e45de327d4a4be8c1de6..3efb8a74dc01632b684359c906dfda58104cbdc0 100644 (file)
@@ -612,4 +612,5 @@ config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER
        device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy provided by the
        booloader is trustworthy so it will be added to the kernel's entropy
        pool. Otherwise, say N here so it will be regarded as device input that
-       only mixes the entropy pool.
\ No newline at end of file
+       only mixes the entropy pool. This can also be configured at boot with
+       "random.trust_bootloader=on/off".
index 3fa256f02d65509c06d27c3ffed44d9da9f2ad4b..48b87675ffdb884c9b661f4b317f53cf4789cbed 100644 (file)
@@ -940,11 +940,17 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
  **********************************************************************/
 
 static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
+static bool trust_bootloader __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER);
 static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
 {
        return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
 }
+static int __init parse_trust_bootloader(char *arg)
+{
+       return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_bootloader);
+}
 early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
+early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader);
 
 /*
  * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
@@ -1152,7 +1158,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
  */
 void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
 {
-       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER))
+       if (trust_bootloader)
                add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);
        else
                add_device_randomness(buf, size);