bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask

commit 7fedb63a8307dda0ec3b8969a3b233a1dd7ea8e0 upstream.

This work tightens the offset mask we use for unprivileged pointer arithmetic
in order to mitigate a corner case reported by Piotr and Benedict where in
the speculative domain it is possible to advance, for example, the map value
pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-bounds in order to leak kernel memory
via side-channel to user space.

Before this change, the computed ptr_limit for retrieve_ptr_limit() helper
represents largest valid distance when moving pointer to the right or left
which is then fed as aux->alu_limit to generate masking instructions against
the offset register. After the change, the derived aux->alu_limit represents
the largest potential value of the offset register which we mask against which
is just a narrower subset of the former limit.

For minimal complexity, we call sanitize_ptr_alu() from 2 observation points
in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), that is, before and after the simulated alu
operation. In the first step, we retieve the alu_state and alu_limit before
the operation as well as we branch-off a verifier path and push it to the
verification stack as we did before which checks the dst_reg under truncation,
in other words, when the speculative domain would attempt to move the pointer
out-of-bounds.

In the second step, we retrieve the new alu_limit and calculate the absolute
distance between both. Moreover, we commit the alu_state and final alu_limit
via update_alu_sanitation_state() to the env's instruction aux data, and bail
out from there if there is a mismatch due to coming from different verification
paths with different states.

Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index f76177a37b189fab520a98f9bafaa8901d4ce733..1a39a89e1584765777494a2d0516dfcfe151e99c 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2039,7 +2039,7 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
        bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
        bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD &&  off_is_neg) ||
                            (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
-       u32 off, max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
+       u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
 
        if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
            (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
@@ -2048,23 +2048,18 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
        switch (ptr_reg->type) {
        case PTR_TO_STACK:
                /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the
-                * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP.
+                * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar
+                * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is
+                * currently prohibited for unprivileged.
                 */
                max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left;
-               off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
-               if (mask_to_left)
-                       ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
-               else
-                       ptr_limit = -off - 1;
+               ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off);
                break;
        case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
                max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size;
-               if (mask_to_left) {
-                       ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
-               } else {
-                       off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
-                       ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off - 1;
-               }
+               ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ?
+                            ptr_reg->smin_value :
+                            ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off;
                break;
        default:
                return REASON_TYPE;
@@ -2119,10 +2114,12 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
                            struct bpf_insn *insn,
                            const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
                            const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
-                           struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
+                           struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
+                           struct bpf_insn_aux_data *tmp_aux,
+                           const bool commit_window)
 {
+       struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : tmp_aux;
        struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
-       struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
        bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
        bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
        u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
@@ -2141,18 +2138,33 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
        if (vstate->speculative)
                goto do_sim;
 
-       alu_state  = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
-       alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
-                    BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
-
        err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, off_reg, &alu_limit, opcode);
        if (err < 0)
                return err;
 
+       if (commit_window) {
+               /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on
+                * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation.
+                */
+               alu_state = tmp_aux->alu_state;
+               alu_limit = abs(tmp_aux->alu_limit - alu_limit);
+       } else {
+               alu_state  = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
+               alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
+                            BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
+       }
+
        err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit);
        if (err < 0)
                return err;
 do_sim:
+       /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already
+        * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification
+        * stack.
+        */
+       if (commit_window)
+               return 0;
+
        /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
         * speculative execution from truncation as a result of
         * masking when off was not within expected range. If off
@@ -2262,6 +2274,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
            smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
        u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
            umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
+       struct bpf_insn_aux_data tmp_aux = {};
        u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
        u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
        int ret;
@@ -2314,12 +2327,15 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
            !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type))
                return -EINVAL;
 
-       switch (opcode) {
-       case BPF_ADD:
-               ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg);
+       if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
+               ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
+                                      &tmp_aux, false);
                if (ret < 0)
                        return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
+       }
 
+       switch (opcode) {
+       case BPF_ADD:
                /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
                 * the s32 'off' field
                 */
@@ -2370,10 +2386,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
                }
                break;
        case BPF_SUB:
-               ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg);
-               if (ret < 0)
-                       return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
-
                if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
                        /* scalar -= pointer.  Creates an unknown scalar */
                        if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
@@ -2463,6 +2475,12 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 
        if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0)
                return -EACCES;
+       if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
+               ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
+                                      &tmp_aux, true);
+               if (ret < 0)
+                       return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
+       }
 
        return 0;
 }