Subsequent patches will add RO hardening to LSM hooks, however, SELinux
still needs to be able to perform runtime disablement after init to handle
architectures where init-time disablement via boot parameters is not feasible.
Introduce a new kernel configuration parameter CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS,
and a helper macro __lsm_ro_after_init, to handle this case.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE */
+/* Currently required to handle SELinux runtime hook disable. */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
+#define __lsm_ro_after_init
+#else
+#define __lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */
+
extern int __init security_module_enable(const char *module);
extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
+ depends on SECURITY
+ bool
+ default n
+
config SECURITYFS
bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
help
config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
bool "NSA SELinux runtime disable"
depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+ select SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
default n
help
This option enables writing to a selinuxfs node 'disable', which
portability across platforms where boot parameters are difficult
to employ.
+ NOTE: selecting this option will disable the '__ro_after_init'
+ kernel hardening feature for security hooks. Please consider
+ using the selinux=0 boot parameter instead of enabling this
+ option.
+
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP