This is a new audit feature which only grants processes with
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL the ability to unset their loginuid. They cannot
directly set it from a valid uid to another valid uid. The ability to
unset the loginuid is nice because a priviledged task, like that of
container creation, can unset the loginuid and then priv is not needed
inside the container when a login daemon needs to set the loginuid.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
__u32 lock; /* which features to lock */
};
-#define AUDIT_LAST_FEATURE -1
+#define AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID 0
+#define AUDIT_LAST_FEATURE AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID
#define audit_feature_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= AUDIT_LAST_FEATURE)
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_TO_MASK(x) (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for __u32 */
.features = 0,
.lock = 0,};
-static char *audit_feature_names[0] = {
+static char *audit_feature_names[1] = {
+ "only_unset_loginuid",
};
/* it is set, you need permission */
if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
return -EPERM;
+ /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
+ if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid))
+ return -EPERM;
return 0;
}