ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index d73291f5f0fcbfb0cd2cff2bb1b628a72f754f6e..b6c00ce0e29e3563037c16fe7bbc754b396f606f 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
 
        state = *get_task_state(task);
        vsize = eip = esp = 0;
-       permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT);
+       permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT);
        mm = get_task_mm(task);
        if (mm) {
                vsize = task_vsize(mm);

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 2cf5d7e373757d631de6f9d8a174287d46058219..e665097c1da5aa87549fc50a249555441832f80d 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_cmdline_ops = {
 static int proc_pid_auxv(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
                         struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
 {
-       struct mm_struct *mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+       struct mm_struct *mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
        if (mm && !IS_ERR(mm)) {
                unsigned int nwords = 0;
                do {
@@ -430,7 +430,8 @@ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
 
        wchan = get_wchan(task);
 
-       if (wchan && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) && !lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname))
+       if (wchan && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)
+                       && !lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname))
                seq_printf(m, "%s", symname);
        else
                seq_putc(m, '0');
@@ -444,7 +445,7 @@ static int lock_trace(struct task_struct *task)
        int err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
        if (err)
                return err;
-       if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)) {
+       if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)) {
                mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
                return -EPERM;
        }
@@ -697,7 +698,7 @@ static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode)
         */
        task = get_proc_task(inode);
        if (task) {
-               allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+               allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
                put_task_struct(task);
        }
        return allowed;
@@ -732,7 +733,7 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid,
                return true;
        if (in_group_p(pid->pid_gid))
                return true;
-       return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+       return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
 }
 
 
@@ -809,7 +810,7 @@ struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode)
        struct mm_struct *mm = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
 
        if (task) {
-               mm = mm_access(task, mode);
+               mm = mm_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS);
                put_task_struct(task);
 
                if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) {
@@ -1860,7 +1861,7 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
        if (!task)
                goto out_notask;
 
-       mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+       mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
        if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm))
                goto out;
 
@@ -2013,7 +2014,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir,
                goto out;
 
        result = -EACCES;
-       if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+       if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS))
                goto out_put_task;
 
        result = -ENOENT;
@@ -2066,7 +2067,7 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
                goto out;
 
        ret = -EACCES;
-       if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+       if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS))
                goto out_put_task;
 
        ret = 0;
@@ -2533,7 +2534,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh
        if (result)
                return result;
 
-       if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
+       if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
                result = -EACCES;
                goto out_unlock;
        }

diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
index 1dece8781f91687307155c38a4c85a3ffba5c6b9..276f12431dbfccdeb4add56a226c07d6062af38b 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c
+++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
        if (!task)
                return error;
 
-       if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
+       if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
                error = ns_get_path(&ns_path, task, ns_ops);
                if (!error)
                        nd_jump_link(&ns_path);
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static int proc_ns_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int bufl
        if (!task)
                return res;
 
-       if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
+       if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
                res = ns_get_name(name, sizeof(name), task, ns_ops);
                if (res >= 0)
                        res = readlink_copy(buffer, buflen, name);

diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
index 061265f9287676afce057892572222a477a47505..504c98a278d46606d27f09d109589e0a1e2263d8 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -57,7 +57,29 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead);
 #define PTRACE_MODE_READ       0x01
 #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH     0x02
 #define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT    0x04
-/* Returns true on success, false on denial. */
+#define PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS 0x08
+#define PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS 0x10
+
+/* shorthands for READ/ATTACH and FSCREDS/REALCREDS combinations */
+#define PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
+#define PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)
+#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
+#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)
+
+/**
+ * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access
+ * a target task.
+ * @task: target task
+ * @mode: selects type of access and caller credentials
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false on denial.
+ *
+ * One of the flags PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS and PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS must
+ * be set in @mode to specify whether the access was requested through
+ * a filesystem syscall (should use effective capabilities and fsuid
+ * of the caller) or through an explicit syscall such as
+ * process_vm_writev or ptrace (and should use the real credentials).
+ */
 extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
 
 static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index bf8244190d0faa696336c4d4ae9b609a95d5c50b..c0957416b32edd7f945201839c3058128bd718f5 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -3376,7 +3376,7 @@ find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
 
        /* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */
        err = -EACCES;
-       if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+       if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
                goto errout;
 
        return task;

diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index c6f514573b28a425f648569473bab692d0ee1940..0773f2b23b107dcc3be9e5caabdbaa0a25de01d0 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -2884,7 +2884,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
        }
 
        ret = -EPERM;
-       if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+       if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
                goto err_unlock;
 
        head = p->robust_list;

diff --git a/kernel/futex_compat.c b/kernel/futex_compat.c
index 55c8c9349cfe6db49b9443c7b4aefb378c6f0249..4ae3232e7a28a507d5ba316d9603c4275012a7ad 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/futex_compat.c
+++ b/kernel/futex_compat.c
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
        }
 
        ret = -EPERM;
-       if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+       if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
                goto err_unlock;
 
        head = p->compat_robust_list;

diff --git a/kernel/kcmp.c b/kernel/kcmp.c
index 0aa69ea1d8fdcfa68046aa75b03c4373783a02fa..3a47fa998fe07277c592f62de36f59dad0d09f8b 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/kcmp.c
+++ b/kernel/kcmp.c
@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type,
                        &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
        if (ret)
                goto err;
-       if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ) ||
-           !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
+       if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS) ||
+           !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) {
                ret = -EPERM;
                goto err_unlock;
        }

diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index aa94aee9d4c942ae99e6ac57a34cdf5566552070..2341efe7fe026f496095c4a9c1526a69cad3849a 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -219,6 +219,14 @@ static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
 static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 {
        const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
+       int dumpable = 0;
+       kuid_t caller_uid;
+       kgid_t caller_gid;
+
+       if (!(mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) == !(mode & PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)) {
+               WARN(1, "denying ptrace access check without PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS\n");
+               return -EPERM;
+       }
 
        /* May we inspect the given task?
         * This check is used both for attaching with ptrace
@@ -228,18 +236,33 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
         * because setting up the necessary parent/child relationship
         * or halting the specified task is impossible.
         */
-       int dumpable = 0;
+
        /* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
        if (same_thread_group(task, current))
                return 0;
        rcu_read_lock();
+       if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) {
+               caller_uid = cred->fsuid;
+               caller_gid = cred->fsgid;
+       } else {
+               /*
+                * Using the euid would make more sense here, but something
+                * in userland might rely on the old behavior, and this
+                * shouldn't be a security problem since
+                * PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS implies that the caller explicitly
+                * used a syscall that requests access to another process
+                * (and not a filesystem syscall to procfs).
+                */
+               caller_uid = cred->uid;
+               caller_gid = cred->gid;
+       }
        tcred = __task_cred(task);
-       if (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) &&
-           uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) &&
-           uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid)  &&
-           gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) &&
-           gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
-           gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid))
+       if (uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->euid) &&
+           uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->suid) &&
+           uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->uid)  &&
+           gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->egid) &&
+           gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) &&
+           gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid))
                goto ok;
        if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
                goto ok;
@@ -306,7 +329,7 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
                goto out;
 
        task_lock(task);
-       retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+       retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
        task_unlock(task);
        if (retval)
                goto unlock_creds;

diff --git a/mm/process_vm_access.c b/mm/process_vm_access.c
index e88d071648c2dece38b25d3fc8e57091d1fcd1d1..5d453e58ddbf7504e78869b4de406aa360fc2a01 100644 (file)
--- a/mm/process_vm_access.c
+++ b/mm/process_vm_access.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static ssize_t process_vm_rw_core(pid_t pid, struct iov_iter *iter,
                goto free_proc_pages;
        }
 
-       mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+       mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
        if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm)) {
                rc = IS_ERR(mm) ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH;
                /*

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 1832cf701c3d6d44d90adeb278bd04bca489d274..48071ed7c445d025fa4ae57c12f032bfa916521f 100644 (file)
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -137,12 +137,17 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
        int ret = 0;
        const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
+       const kernel_cap_t *caller_caps;
 
        rcu_read_lock();
        cred = current_cred();
        child_cred = __task_cred(child);
+       if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
+               caller_caps = &cred->cap_effective;
+       else
+               caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted;
        if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
-           cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
+           cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
                goto out;
        if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
                goto out;