Before calling capable(CAP_NET_RAW) check if this operations is on behalf
of the kernel or on behalf of userspace. Do not do the security check if
it is on behalf of the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM && sock->type != SOCK_RAW)
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
- if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
+ if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !kern && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
return -EPERM;
sock->ops = &l2cap_sock_ops;
}
err = -EPERM;
- if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
+ if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !kern && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
err = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
err = -EPERM;
- if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
+ if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !kern && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
sock->ops = answer->ops;