extended tables themselves, and also PASID support. With
this option set, extended tables will not be used even
on hardware which claims to support them.
+ tboot_noforce [Default Off]
+ Do not force the Intel IOMMU enabled under tboot.
+ By default, tboot will force Intel IOMMU on, which
+ could harm performance of some high-throughput
+ devices like 40GBit network cards, even if identity
+ mapping is enabled.
+ Note that using this option lowers the security
+ provided by tboot because it makes the system
+ vulnerable to DMA attacks.
intel_idle.max_cstate= [KNL,HW,ACPI,X86]
0 disables intel_idle and fall back on acpi_idle.
* (used when kernel is launched w/ TXT)
*/
static int force_on = 0;
+int intel_iommu_tboot_noforce;
/*
* 0: Present
"Intel-IOMMU: enable pre-production PASID support\n");
intel_iommu_pasid28 = 1;
iommu_identity_mapping |= IDENTMAP_GFX;
+ } else if (!strncmp(str, "tboot_noforce", 13)) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO
+ "Intel-IOMMU: not forcing on after tboot. This could expose security risk for tboot\n");
+ intel_iommu_tboot_noforce = 1;
}
str += strcspn(str, ",");
}
if (no_iommu || dmar_disabled) {
+ /*
+ * We exit the function here to ensure IOMMU's remapping and
+ * mempool aren't setup, which means that the IOMMU's PMRs
+ * won't be disabled via the call to init_dmars(). So disable
+ * it explicitly here. The PMRs were setup by tboot prior to
+ * calling SENTER, but the kernel is expected to reset/tear
+ * down the PMRs.
+ */
+ if (intel_iommu_tboot_noforce) {
+ for_each_iommu(iommu, drhd)
+ iommu_disable_protect_mem_regions(iommu);
+ }
+
/*
* Make sure the IOMMUs are switched off, even when we
* boot into a kexec kernel and the previous kernel left
extern int iommu_calculate_max_sagaw(struct intel_iommu *iommu);
extern int dmar_disabled;
extern int intel_iommu_enabled;
+extern int intel_iommu_tboot_noforce;
#else
static inline int iommu_calculate_agaw(struct intel_iommu *iommu)
{