non-critical issue, CVE-2010-2803
Userspace controls the amount of memory to be allocate, so it can
get the ioctl to allocate more memory than the kernel uses, and get
access to kernel stack. This can only be done for processes authenticated
to the X server for DRI access, and if the user has DRI access.
Fix is to just memset the data to 0 if the user doesn't copy into
it in the first place.
Reported-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
retcode = -EFAULT;
goto err_i1;
}
- }
+ } else
+ memset(kdata, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
+
if (ioctl->flags & DRM_UNLOCKED)
retcode = func(dev, kdata, file_priv);
else {