Smack: handle zero-length security labels without panic

Zero-length security labels are invalid but kernel should handle them.

This patch fixes kernel panic after setting zero-length security labels:
# attr -S -s "SMACK64" -V "" file

And after writing zero-length string into smackfs files syslog and onlycp:
# python -c 'import os; os.write(1, "")' > /smack/syslog

The problem is caused by brain-damaged logic in function smk_parse_smack()
which takes pointer to buffer and its length but if length below or equal zero
it thinks that the buffer is zero-terminated. Unfortunately callers of this
function are widely used and proper fix requires serious refactoring.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index b11ab23b328b17dabccf26ea035dbb4e3e526075..afa5ad0e7f72cbbde05399211229541c660bfe82 100644 (file)
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
                rc = -EPERM;
 
        if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
-               skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+               skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
                if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
                    (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
                        rc = -EINVAL;

diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 3c720ff105917dcedbfda26c7814f8cc8716fa8f..56a1439786a9fbb0fdb2d1b24eaccdf494d4f4dc 100644 (file)
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -1677,7 +1677,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
        if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp)
                return -EPERM;
 
-       data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+       data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
        if (data == NULL)
                return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -2228,7 +2228,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                return -EPERM;
 
-       data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+       data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
        if (data == NULL)
                return -ENOMEM;