[ Upstream commit
355b98553789b646ed97ad801a619ff898471b92 ]
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes:
0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
*/
spinlock_t rules_mod_lock;
+ u32 hash_mix;
atomic64_t cookie_gen;
struct list_head list; /* list of network namespaces */
#ifndef __NET_NS_HASH_H__
#define __NET_NS_HASH_H__
-#include <asm/cache.h>
-
-struct net;
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
static inline u32 net_hash_mix(const struct net *net)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS
- /*
- * shift this right to eliminate bits, that are
- * always zeroed
- */
-
- return (u32)(((unsigned long)net) >> L1_CACHE_SHIFT);
-#else
- return 0;
-#endif
+ return net->hash_mix;
}
#endif
atomic_set(&net->count, 1);
refcount_set(&net->passive, 1);
+ get_random_bytes(&net->hash_mix, sizeof(u32));
net->dev_base_seq = 1;
net->user_ns = user_ns;
idr_init(&net->netns_ids);