X.509: Fix self-signed determination
authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Wed, 6 Apr 2016 15:13:34 +0000 (16:13 +0100)
committerDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Wed, 6 Apr 2016 15:13:34 +0000 (16:13 +0100)
There's a bug in the code determining whether a certificate is self-signed
or not: if they have neither AKID nor SKID then we just assume that the
cert is self-signed, which may not be true.

Fix this by checking that the raw subject name matches the raw issuer name
and that the public key algorithm for the key and signature are both the
same in addition to requiring that the AKID bits match.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c

index 752d8d5b48fa441df96eb9c5abc44e275a077dfe..fc77a2bd70ba1bc66038ccac6caef001b0f9081b 100644 (file)
@@ -230,6 +230,11 @@ int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 
        pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
 
+       if (cert->raw_subject_size != cert->raw_issuer_size ||
+           memcmp(cert->raw_subject, cert->raw_issuer,
+                  cert->raw_issuer_size) != 0)
+               goto not_self_signed;
+
        if (cert->sig->auth_ids[0] || cert->sig->auth_ids[1]) {
                /* If the AKID is present it may have one or two parts.  If
                 * both are supplied, both must match.
@@ -246,6 +251,10 @@ int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert)
                        goto out;
        }
 
+       ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+       if (cert->pub->pkey_algo != cert->sig->pkey_algo)
+               goto out;
+
        ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig);
        if (ret < 0) {
                if (ret == -ENOPKG) {