CMD( MI_LOAD_SCAN_LINES_EXCL, SMI, !F, 0x3F, R ),
};
+/*
+ * For Gen9 we can still rely on the h/w to enforce cmd security, and only
+ * need to re-enforce the register access checks. We therefore only need to
+ * teach the cmdparser how to find the end of each command, and identify
+ * register accesses. The table doesn't need to reject any commands, and so
+ * the only commands listed here are:
+ * 1) Those that touch registers
+ * 2) Those that do not have the default 8-bit length
+ *
+ * Note that the default MI length mask chosen for this table is 0xFF, not
+ * the 0x3F used on older devices. This is because the vast majority of MI
+ * cmds on Gen9 use a standard 8-bit Length field.
+ * All the Gen9 blitter instructions are standard 0xFF length mask, and
+ * none allow access to non-general registers, so in fact no BLT cmds are
+ * included in the table at all.
+ *
+ */
+static const struct drm_i915_cmd_descriptor gen9_blt_cmds[] = {
+ CMD( MI_NOOP, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_USER_INTERRUPT, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_WAIT_FOR_EVENT, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_FLUSH, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_ARB_CHECK, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_REPORT_HEAD, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_ARB_ON_OFF, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_SUSPEND_FLUSH, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_LOAD_SCAN_LINES_INCL, SMI, !F, 0x3F, S ),
+ CMD( MI_LOAD_SCAN_LINES_EXCL, SMI, !F, 0x3F, S ),
+ CMD( MI_STORE_DWORD_IMM, SMI, !F, 0x3FF, S ),
+ CMD( MI_LOAD_REGISTER_IMM(1), SMI, !F, 0xFF, W,
+ .reg = { .offset = 1, .mask = 0x007FFFFC, .step = 2 } ),
+ CMD( MI_UPDATE_GTT, SMI, !F, 0x3FF, S ),
+ CMD( MI_STORE_REGISTER_MEM_GEN8, SMI, F, 4, W,
+ .reg = { .offset = 1, .mask = 0x007FFFFC } ),
+ CMD( MI_FLUSH_DW, SMI, !F, 0x3F, S ),
+ CMD( MI_LOAD_REGISTER_MEM_GEN8, SMI, F, 4, W,
+ .reg = { .offset = 1, .mask = 0x007FFFFC } ),
+ CMD( MI_LOAD_REGISTER_REG, SMI, !F, 0xFF, W,
+ .reg = { .offset = 1, .mask = 0x007FFFFC, .step = 1 } ),
+};
+
static const struct drm_i915_cmd_descriptor noop_desc =
CMD(MI_NOOP, SMI, F, 1, S);
{ hsw_blt_cmds, ARRAY_SIZE(hsw_blt_cmds) },
};
+static const struct drm_i915_cmd_table gen9_blt_cmd_table[] = {
+ { gen9_blt_cmds, ARRAY_SIZE(gen9_blt_cmds) },
+};
+
+
/*
* Register whitelists, sorted by increasing register offset.
*/
REG64_IDX(RING_TIMESTAMP, BLT_RING_BASE),
};
+static const struct drm_i915_reg_descriptor gen9_blt_regs[] = {
+ REG64_IDX(RING_TIMESTAMP, RENDER_RING_BASE),
+ REG64_IDX(RING_TIMESTAMP, BSD_RING_BASE),
+ REG32(BCS_SWCTRL),
+ REG64_IDX(RING_TIMESTAMP, BLT_RING_BASE),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 0),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 1),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 2),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 3),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 4),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 5),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 6),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 7),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 8),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 9),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 10),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 11),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 12),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 13),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 14),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 15),
+};
+
#undef REG64
#undef REG32
{ gen7_blt_regs, ARRAY_SIZE(gen7_blt_regs) },
};
+static const struct drm_i915_reg_table gen9_blt_reg_tables[] = {
+ { gen9_blt_regs, ARRAY_SIZE(gen9_blt_regs) },
+};
+
static u32 gen7_render_get_cmd_length_mask(u32 cmd_header)
{
u32 client = cmd_header >> INSTR_CLIENT_SHIFT;
return 0;
}
+static u32 gen9_blt_get_cmd_length_mask(u32 cmd_header)
+{
+ u32 client = cmd_header >> INSTR_CLIENT_SHIFT;
+
+ if (client == INSTR_MI_CLIENT || client == INSTR_BC_CLIENT)
+ return 0xFF;
+
+ DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("CMD: Abnormal blt cmd length! 0x%08X\n", cmd_header);
+ return 0;
+}
+
static bool validate_cmds_sorted(const struct intel_engine_cs *engine,
const struct drm_i915_cmd_table *cmd_tables,
int cmd_table_count)
int cmd_table_count;
int ret;
- if (!IS_GEN7(engine->i915))
+ if (!IS_GEN7(engine->i915) && !(IS_GEN9(engine->i915) &&
+ engine->id == BCS))
return;
switch (engine->id) {
engine->reg_tables = ivb_render_reg_tables;
engine->reg_table_count = ARRAY_SIZE(ivb_render_reg_tables);
}
-
engine->get_cmd_length_mask = gen7_render_get_cmd_length_mask;
break;
case VCS:
engine->get_cmd_length_mask = gen7_bsd_get_cmd_length_mask;
break;
case BCS:
- if (IS_HASWELL(engine->i915)) {
+ engine->get_cmd_length_mask = gen7_blt_get_cmd_length_mask;
+ if (IS_GEN9(engine->i915)) {
+ cmd_tables = gen9_blt_cmd_table;
+ cmd_table_count = ARRAY_SIZE(gen9_blt_cmd_table);
+ engine->get_cmd_length_mask =
+ gen9_blt_get_cmd_length_mask;
+
+ /* BCS Engine unsafe without parser */
+ engine->flags |= I915_ENGINE_REQUIRES_CMD_PARSER;
+ } else if (IS_HASWELL(engine->i915)) {
cmd_tables = hsw_blt_ring_cmd_table;
cmd_table_count = ARRAY_SIZE(hsw_blt_ring_cmd_table);
} else {
cmd_table_count = ARRAY_SIZE(gen7_blt_cmd_table);
}
- if (IS_HASWELL(engine->i915)) {
+ if (IS_GEN9(engine->i915)) {
+ engine->reg_tables = gen9_blt_reg_tables;
+ engine->reg_table_count =
+ ARRAY_SIZE(gen9_blt_reg_tables);
+ } else if (IS_HASWELL(engine->i915)) {
engine->reg_tables = hsw_blt_reg_tables;
engine->reg_table_count = ARRAY_SIZE(hsw_blt_reg_tables);
} else {
engine->reg_tables = ivb_blt_reg_tables;
engine->reg_table_count = ARRAY_SIZE(ivb_blt_reg_tables);
}
-
- engine->get_cmd_length_mask = gen7_blt_get_cmd_length_mask;
break;
case VECS:
cmd_tables = hsw_vebox_cmd_table;
}
/*
- * If the batch buffer contains a chained batch, return an
- * error that tells the caller to abort and dispatch the
- * workload as a non-secure batch.
+ * We don't try to handle BATCH_BUFFER_START because it adds
+ * non-trivial complexity. Instead we abort the scan and return
+ * and error to indicate that the batch is unsafe.
*/
if (desc->cmd.value == MI_BATCH_BUFFER_START) {
ret = -EACCES;
* the parser enabled.
* 9. Don't whitelist or handle oacontrol specially, as ownership
* for oacontrol state is moving to i915-perf.
+ * 10. Support for Gen9 BCS Parsing
*/
- return 9;
+ return 10;
}