net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

[ Upstream commit 899537b73557aafbdd11050b501cf54b4f5c45af ]

arg is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

net/atm/lec.c:715 lec_mcast_attach() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev_lec' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing arg before using it to index dev_lec.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/net/atm/lec.c b/net/atm/lec.c
index 9f2365694ad4a4e76dec293fdcfed6705338f6bc..85ce89c8a35c993f534769e0e28f3e7aead9d381 100644 (file)
--- a/net/atm/lec.c
+++ b/net/atm/lec.c
@@ -710,7 +710,10 @@ static int lec_vcc_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, void __user *arg)
 
 static int lec_mcast_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, int arg)
 {
-       if (arg < 0 || arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF || !dev_lec[arg])
+       if (arg < 0 || arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
+               return -EINVAL;
+       arg = array_index_nospec(arg, MAX_LEC_ITF);
+       if (!dev_lec[arg])
                return -EINVAL;
        vcc->proto_data = dev_lec[arg];
        return lec_mcast_make(netdev_priv(dev_lec[arg]), vcc);
@@ -728,6 +731,7 @@ static int lecd_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, int arg)
                i = arg;
        if (arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
                return -EINVAL;
+       i = array_index_nospec(arg, MAX_LEC_ITF);
        if (!dev_lec[i]) {
                int size;