security: protect from stack expantion into low vm addresses

Add security checks to make sure we are not attempting to expand the
stack into memory protected by mmap_min_addr

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index facc1a75bd4fdbc9f274dbc26a7e536f0eb8f561..938313c76d02f4f6d9ef62471330836ae6448f73 100644 (file)
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1615,6 +1615,12 @@ static inline int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
         */
        if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
                return -ENOMEM;
+
+       address &= PAGE_MASK;
+       error = security_file_mmap(0, 0, 0, 0, address, 1);
+       if (error)
+               return error;
+
        anon_vma_lock(vma);
 
        /*
@@ -1622,8 +1628,6 @@ static inline int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
         * is required to hold the mmap_sem in read mode.  We need the
         * anon_vma lock to serialize against concurrent expand_stacks.
         */
-       address &= PAGE_MASK;
-       error = 0;
 
        /* Somebody else might have raced and expanded it already */
        if (address < vma->vm_start) {