net: af_key: fix sleeping under rcu

There's a kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL in a helper
(pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx) used in pfkey_compile_policy which is
called under rcu_read_lock. Adjust pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx to have
a gfp argument and adjust the users.

CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>

diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c
index 1a04c13293628eb420088717dce841266328b09f..1526023f99ede5e1fe43ea1f43d2e2661fe054bc 100644 (file)
--- a/net/key/af_key.c
+++ b/net/key/af_key.c
@@ -433,12 +433,13 @@ static inline int verify_sec_ctx_len(const void *p)
        return 0;
 }
 
-static inline struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(const struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+static inline struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(const struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
+                                                                    gfp_t gfp)
 {
        struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = NULL;
        int ctx_size = sec_ctx->sadb_x_ctx_len;
 
-       uctx = kmalloc((sizeof(*uctx)+ctx_size), GFP_KERNEL);
+       uctx = kmalloc((sizeof(*uctx)+ctx_size), gfp);
 
        if (!uctx)
                return NULL;
@@ -1124,7 +1125,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state * pfkey_msg2xfrm_state(struct net *net,
 
        sec_ctx = ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_SEC_CTX - 1];
        if (sec_ctx != NULL) {
-               struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(sec_ctx);
+               struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(sec_ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
 
                if (!uctx)
                        goto out;
@@ -2231,7 +2232,7 @@ static int pfkey_spdadd(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_
 
        sec_ctx = ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_SEC_CTX - 1];
        if (sec_ctx != NULL) {
-               struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(sec_ctx);
+               struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(sec_ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
 
                if (!uctx) {
                        err = -ENOBUFS;
@@ -2335,7 +2336,7 @@ static int pfkey_spddelete(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sa
 
        sec_ctx = ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_SEC_CTX - 1];
        if (sec_ctx != NULL) {
-               struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(sec_ctx);
+               struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(sec_ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
 
                if (!uctx)
                        return -ENOMEM;
@@ -3239,7 +3240,7 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *pfkey_compile_policy(struct sock *sk, int opt,
                }
                if ((*dir = verify_sec_ctx_len(p)))
                        goto out;
-               uctx = pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(sec_ctx);
+               uctx = pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(sec_ctx, GFP_ATOMIC);
                *dir = security_xfrm_policy_alloc(&xp->security, uctx);
                kfree(uctx);