#
# Generated include files
#
+net_names.h
capability_names.h
rlim_names.h
apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
- resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o
+ resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o
apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+# Build a lower case string table of address family names
+# Transform lines from
+# #define AF_LOCAL 1 /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX */
+# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */
+# to
+# [1] = "local",
+# [2] = "inet",
+#
+# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
+# Transforms lines from
+# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */
+# to
+# #define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "local inet"
+quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@
+cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
+ 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+ echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+ printf '%s' '\#define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
+ sed -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
+ 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
+ $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+
+# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
+# Transform lines from
+# SOCK_STREAM = 1,
+# to
+# [1] = "stream",
+quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN $@
+cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
+ sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
+ -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+ echo "};" >> $@
# Build a lower case string table of capability names
# Transforms lines from
tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
+$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
$(src)/Makefile
$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
$(src)/Makefile
$(call cmd,make-rlim)
+$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
+ $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
+ $(src)/Makefile
+ $(call cmd,make-af)
+ $(call cmd,make-sock)
AA_SFS_DIR("policy", aa_sfs_entry_policy),
AA_SFS_DIR("domain", aa_sfs_entry_domain),
AA_SFS_DIR("file", aa_sfs_entry_file),
+ AA_SFS_DIR("network", aa_sfs_entry_network),
AA_SFS_DIR("mount", aa_sfs_entry_mount),
AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces", aa_sfs_entry_ns),
AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
#include "include/context.h"
#include "include/file.h"
#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/label.h"
return error;
}
+static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+ struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
+ u32 request, u32 denied)
+{
+ struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
+ int error;
+
+ AA_BUG(!sock);
+
+ /* revalidation due to label out of date. No revocation at this time */
+ if (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */
+ error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock);
+ if (denied) {
+ /* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */
+ /* check every profile in file label to is cached */
+ last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock));
+ }
+ if (!error)
+ update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
/**
* aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
* @op: operation being checked
error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
denied);
+ else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
+ error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
+ denied);
done:
rcu_read_unlock();
/* these entries require a custom callback fn */
struct {
struct aa_label *peer;
- struct {
- const char *target;
- kuid_t ouid;
- } fs;
+ union {
+ struct {
+ kuid_t ouid;
+ const char *target;
+ } fs;
+ struct {
+ int type, protocol;
+ struct sock *peer_sk;
+ void *addr;
+ int addrlen;
+ } net;
+ int signal;
+ struct {
+ int rlim;
+ unsigned long max;
+ } rlim;
+ };
};
struct {
struct aa_profile *profile;
const char *ns;
long pos;
} iface;
- int signal;
- struct {
- int rlim;
- unsigned long max;
- } rlim;
struct {
const char *src_name;
const char *type;
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_NET_H
+#define __AA_NET_H
+
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+#include "label.h"
+#include "perms.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+
+#define AA_MAY_SEND AA_MAY_WRITE
+#define AA_MAY_RECEIVE AA_MAY_READ
+
+#define AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN AA_MAY_DELETE
+
+#define AA_MAY_CONNECT AA_MAY_OPEN
+#define AA_MAY_ACCEPT 0x00100000
+
+#define AA_MAY_BIND 0x00200000
+#define AA_MAY_LISTEN 0x00400000
+
+#define AA_MAY_SETOPT 0x01000000
+#define AA_MAY_GETOPT 0x02000000
+
+#define NET_PERMS_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \
+ AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_BIND | AA_MAY_LISTEN | \
+ AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SETATTR | \
+ AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETOPT | AA_MAY_GETOPT)
+
+#define NET_FS_PERMS (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \
+ AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_RENAME |\
+ AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_CHMOD | \
+ AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_CHGRP | AA_MAY_LOCK | \
+ AA_MAY_MPROT)
+
+#define NET_PEER_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CONNECT | \
+ AA_MAY_ACCEPT)
+struct aa_sk_ctx {
+ struct aa_label *label;
+ struct aa_label *peer;
+ struct path path;
+};
+
+#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
+ struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
+ .family = (F)}; \
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, \
+ ((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \
+ LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \
+ OP); \
+ NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net); \
+ aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T); \
+ aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P)
+
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK) \
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type, \
+ (SK)->sk_protocol)
+
+/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
+ * @allow: basic network families permissions
+ * @audit: which network permissions to force audit
+ * @quiet: which network permissions to quiet rejects
+ */
+struct aa_net {
+ u16 allow[AF_MAX];
+ u16 audit[AF_MAX];
+ u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
+};
+
+
+extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[];
+
+void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va);
+int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+ u32 request, u16 family, int type);
+int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
+ int type, int protocol);
+static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa,
+ u32 request,
+ struct sock *sk)
+{
+ return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family,
+ sk->sk_type);
+}
+int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk);
+
+int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+ struct socket *sock);
+
+
+static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
+{
+ /* NOP */
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask);
-void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask);
+void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
+ u32 mask);
void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
- u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask);
+ u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask);
void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
struct aa_perms *perms);
void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
#include "file.h"
#include "lib.h"
#include "label.h"
+#include "net.h"
#include "perms.h"
#include "resource.h"
* @policy: general match rules governing policy
* @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
* @caps: capabilities for the profile
+ * @net: network controls for the profile
* @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
*
* @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs
struct aa_policydb policy;
struct aa_file_rules file;
struct aa_caps caps;
+ struct aa_net net;
struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
struct aa_loaddata *rawdata;
return 0;
}
+static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ u16 AF) {
+ unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
+ u16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF);
+
+ if (!state)
+ return 0;
+ return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2);
+}
+
/**
* aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p
* @p: profile (MAYBE NULL)
*str = '\0';
}
-void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask)
+void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
+ u32 mask)
{
const char *fmt = "%s";
unsigned int i, perm = 1;
}
void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
- u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask)
+ u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask)
{
char str[33];
#include "include/context.h"
#include "include/file.h"
#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/label.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
return error;
}
+/**
+ * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
+ */
+static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
+ */
+static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+ SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
+ aa_put_label(ctx->label);
+ aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
+ path_put(&ctx->path);
+ kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
+ */
+static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+
+ new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
+ new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
+ new->path = ctx->path;
+ path_get(&new->path);
+}
+
+static int aa_sock_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
+ int protocol)
+{
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+ return aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type,
+ protocol);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
+ error = aa_sock_create_perm(label, family, type, protocol);
+ end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
+ *
+ * Note:
+ * - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to
+ * move to a special kernel label
+ * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
+ * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
+ * sock_graft.
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+ int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label;
+
+ if (kern) {
+ struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+
+ label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns));
+ aa_put_ns(ns);
+ } else
+ label = aa_get_current_label();
+
+ if (sock->sk) {
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+
+ aa_put_label(ctx->label);
+ ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
+ }
+ aa_put_label(label);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ AA_BUG(!sock);
+ AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+ AA_BUG(!address);
+ AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+ return aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ AA_BUG(!sock);
+ AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+ AA_BUG(!address);
+ AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+ return aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+ AA_BUG(!sock);
+ AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+ AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+ return aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection.
+ *
+ * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
+ * has not been done.
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ AA_BUG(!sock);
+ AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+ AA_BUG(!newsock);
+ AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+ return aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk);
+}
+
+static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+ AA_BUG(!sock);
+ AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+ AA_BUG(!msg);
+ AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+ return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+ return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
+{
+ return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
+}
+
+/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */
+static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
+{
+ AA_BUG(!sock);
+ AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+ AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+ return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
+}
+
+/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */
+static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+ int level, int optname)
+{
+ AA_BUG(!sock);
+ AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+ AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+ return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+ int optname)
+{
+ return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
+ level, optname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+ int optname)
+{
+ return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
+ level, optname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+ return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
+ *
+ * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
+ *
+ * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
+ * to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb()
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+ if (ctx->peer)
+ return ctx->peer;
+
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
+ *
+ * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
+{
+ char *name;
+ int slen, error = 0;
+ struct aa_label *label;
+ struct aa_label *peer;
+
+ label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk);
+ if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
+ error = PTR_ERR(peer);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer,
+ FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
+ FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
+ /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
+ if (slen < 0) {
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ } else {
+ if (slen > len) {
+ error = -ERANGE;
+ } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
+ error = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (put_user(slen, optlen))
+ error = -EFAULT;
+out:
+ kfree(name);
+
+ }
+
+done:
+ end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
+ * @sock: the peer socket
+ * @skb: packet data
+ * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+
+{
+ /* TODO: requires secid support */
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
+ * @sk: child sock
+ * @parent: parent socket
+ *
+ * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
+ * just set sk security information off of current creating process label
+ * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
+ * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
+ * socket is shared by different tasks.
+ */
+static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+ if (!ctx->label)
+ ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
+}
+
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+ apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
+
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+#include "net_names.h"
+
+
+struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
+ AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
+ { }
+};
+
+static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
+ "unknown",
+ "send",
+ "receive",
+ "unknown",
+
+ "create",
+ "shutdown",
+ "connect",
+ "unknown",
+
+ "setattr",
+ "getattr",
+ "setcred",
+ "getcred",
+
+ "chmod",
+ "chown",
+ "chgrp",
+ "lock",
+
+ "mmap",
+ "mprot",
+ "unknown",
+ "unknown",
+
+ "accept",
+ "bind",
+ "listen",
+ "unknown",
+
+ "setopt",
+ "getopt",
+ "unknown",
+ "unknown",
+
+ "unknown",
+ "unknown",
+ "unknown",
+ "unknown",
+};
+
+
+/* audit callback for net specific fields */
+void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
+ if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
+ audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
+ if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type])
+ audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]);
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol);
+
+ if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
+ aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0,
+ net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
+
+ if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
+ aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0,
+ net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
+ }
+ }
+ if (aad(sa)->peer) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+ aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
+ FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ }
+}
+
+
+/* Generic af perm */
+int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+ u32 request, u16 family, int type)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+ AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
+ AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
+
+ if (profile_unconfined(profile))
+ return 0;
+
+ perms.allow = (profile->net.allow[family] & (1 << type)) ?
+ ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0;
+ perms.audit = (profile->net.audit[family] & (1 << type)) ?
+ ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0;
+ perms.quiet = (profile->net.quiet[family] & (1 << type)) ?
+ ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0;
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
+}
+
+int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
+ int type, int protocol)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
+
+ return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family,
+ type));
+}
+
+static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+ struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
+
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(!sk);
+
+ if (unconfined(label))
+ return 0;
+
+ return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
+}
+
+int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label;
+ int error;
+
+ AA_BUG(!sk);
+ AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+ /* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
+ label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk);
+ end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+
+int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+ struct socket *sock)
+{
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(!sock);
+ AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+
+ return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
+}
return 0;
}
+static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
+{
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
+ if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
+ return 0;
+ if (data)
+ *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le16 *) e->pos));
+ e->pos += sizeof(u16);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
{
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL;
const char *info = "failed to unpack profile";
- size_t ns_len;
+ size_t size = 0, ns_len;
struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 };
char *key = NULL;
struct aa_data *data;
goto fail;
}
+ size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
+ if (size) {
+
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ /* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
+ * never request
+ */
+ if (i >= AF_MAX) {
+ u16 tmp;
+
+ if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
+ !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
+ !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v7)) {
+ /* pre v7 policy always allowed these */
+ profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
+ profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
+ }
+
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
info = "failed to unpack policydb";
projects / GitHub / MotorolaMobilityLLC / kernel-slsi.git / commitdiff