ext4: ext4_fill_super shouldn't return 0 on corruption

At the start of ext4_fill_super, ret is set to -EINVAL, and any failure path
out of that function returns ret.  However, the generic_check_addressable
clause sets ret = 0 (if it passes), which means that a subsequent failure (e.g.
a group checksum error) returns 0 even though the mount should fail.  This
causes vfs_kern_mount in turn to think that the mount succeeded, leading to an
oops.

A simple fix is to avoid using ret for the generic_check_addressable check,
which was last changed in commit 30ca22c70e3ef0a96ff84de69cd7e8561b416cb2.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>

diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
index ef09d1443d1aa649591bce83821d5dbea34091f3..14ada8c50c43f59296ffc1d56f2d48b4a20faa8b 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -3265,13 +3265,14 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
         * Test whether we have more sectors than will fit in sector_t,
         * and whether the max offset is addressable by the page cache.
         */
-       ret = generic_check_addressable(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
+       err = generic_check_addressable(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
                                        ext4_blocks_count(es));
-       if (ret) {
+       if (err) {
                ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "filesystem"
                         " too large to mount safely on this system");
                if (sizeof(sector_t) < 8)
                        ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "CONFIG_LBDAF not enabled");
+               ret = err;
                goto failed_mount;
        }